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DUELING CANONS 
ANITA S. KRISHNAKUMAR† 
ABSTRACT 
  This Article offers the first targeted study of the Supreme Court’s 
use of canons and other tools of statutory interpretation in a 
“dueling” manner—that is, in both the majority and dissenting 
opinions in the same case, to support opposing outcomes. Taking its 
inspiration from Karl Llewellyn’s celebrated list of canons and 
countercanons, this Article examines how often and in what ways the 
members of the Roberts Court counter each other’s references to 
particular interpretive tools when disagreeing about the proper 
reading of a statute. Many of the Article’s findings are unexpected and 
undermine the assumptions made by some of the most prominent 
theories of statutory interpretation. Most notably, the data reveal that 
several of textualism’s most-favored interpretive tools are at least as 
susceptible to dueling use as the purposivist tools that textualists have 
long denigrated as indeterminate and readily subject to judicial 
manipulation. For example, the study shows that the Justices dueled 
extensively over the meaning of statutory text. By contrast, they dueled 
at far lower rates over legislative history, purpose, and intent. 
Moreover, the Justices dueled over dictionary references, the whole 
act rule, and language canons at rates that were virtually identical to 
the rates at which they dueled over the purposivist-preferred tools. 
The study also reveals that the canons do not seem capable of 
constraining the Justices to vote against ideology and that noncanon 
tools of analysis, including precedent and practical-consequences-
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based reasoning, lead to higher rates of dueling than do most 
traditional canons or tools of statutory interpretation. After reporting 
the data, the Article examines doctrinal patterns in how the Justices 
duel over individual canons and explores the theoretical implications 
of the Justices’ dueling canon use. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Judge A is an appellate-court judge tasked with interpreting a 
criminal sentencing-enhancement statute. She believes that there is 
a strong argument based on the expressio unius canon1 that the 
enhancement provision does not apply to the defendant in the case. 
Judge B, who is sitting on the panel with Judge A, believes that the 
purpose of the sentencing statute covers conduct like the 
defendant’s and that the enhancement therefore should apply. 
Will Judge B write an opinion that relies on statutory purpose alone, 
or will he search for an opposing language canon to counter Judge 
A’s expressio unius argument? Will Judge A’s opinion confine itself 
to discussing the expressio unius canon, or will it also seek to 
demonstrate that her interpretation is consistent with the statute’s 
purpose—perhaps framing that purpose in different terms than 
Judge B’s opinion? How easy will it be for Judge A and Judge B to 
find countervailing purpose or language canon arguments, if they 
seek to counteract each other in this manner? 
If we extrapolate from the above hypothetical, two larger 
questions emerge: To what extent do judges tailor the interpretive 
tools they discuss in statutory opinions to counter the tools referenced 
by opposing opinions in those same cases? Or, put somewhat 
differently, to what extent do various canons or tools of statutory 
interpretation lend themselves to “dueling” use, such that they can be 
employed to support competing statutory constructions? These are 
two important, yet rarely asked, questions in statutory interpretation. 
Both questions implicate some of the key theoretical debates in the 
field—such as whether certain interpretive tools constrain judges 
more than others—and both are deeply tied to underlying views 
about the proper role of judges. 
In 1950, Columbia Law Professor Karl Llewellyn offered a 
memorable answer to the second question, in what has been called 
“one of the most celebrated law review articles of all time.”2 The 
article famously challenged the view that the canons of statutory 
 
 1. The expressio unius canon is based on a Latin maxim, “expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius,” which dictates that the express inclusion of one item implies the exclusion of other 
items not listed. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP FRICKEY & ELIZABETH 
GARRETT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF 
PUBLIC POLICY 852–54 (4th ed. 2007).  
 2. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement 
Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 593 (1992). 
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construction provide neutral, predictable legal rules that lead courts 
to one “correct” reading of a statute.3 Its most feted feature is a list of 
twenty-eight pairs of canons and countercanons, which Llewellyn 
labeled “thrusts” and “parries.” The article’s demonstration that the 
canons readily can be used to cancel each other out has been taken to 
demonstrate the canons’ illegitimacy and has served as a catalyst for 
discussions about the ability of interpretive tools to constrain judges.4 
But to show that the canons (or other tools of construction) are 
capable of being used by judges in a discretionary, canceling-out 
manner is not to say that they will be used in such a manner. 
Theoretical possibility is not the same as actual judicial practice. 
This Article takes Llewellyn’s famous juxtaposition of canons 
and countercanons as its inspiration and examines the extent to which 
the modern Supreme Court actually duels over the most common 
statutory interpretation canons and tools in opposing opinions in the 
same case. That is, the Article identifies the extent to which a 
majority (or occasionally, concurring) opinion’s reference to a 
particular canon or tool is countered by a dissenting opinion’s 
offsetting reference to the same canon or tool, in the same case. 
Notably, the Article measures a different kind of judicial dueling over 
interpretive canons and tools than that suggested by Llewellyn’s 
“thrusts” and “parries”: the Article counts as dueling those instances 
in which a majority and dissenting opinion in a case invoke the same 
interpretive tool to reach different readings of the statute. It does not 
measure instances in which a majority opinion invokes one tool (e.g., 
purpose) and the dissenting opinion counters by relying on another 
tool (e.g., text or a language canon). The reasons for this 
methodological choice are elaborated in Part II.A. 
 
 3. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or 
Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401–06 (1950). 
 4. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Norms, Empiricism, And Canons In Statutory 
Interpretation, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 671, 679–80 (1999); Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of 
Practical Reason: Statutes, Formalism, and the Rule of Law, 45 VAND. L. REV. 533, 547–48 
(1992); John F. Manning, Continuity and Legislative Design, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1863, 
1863–64 (2004); John F. Manning, Legal Realism and the Canons’ Revival, 5 GREEN BAG 2d 
283, 283 (2001) (“Llewellyn largely persuaded two generations of academics that the canons of 
construction were not to be taken seriously.”); Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—In 
the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 805–14 (1983); David L. Shapiro, 
Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921, 923 (1992) (noting 
that the canons have been “interred” by Llewellyn’s essay); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting 
Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 452 (1989). But see Geoffrey P. Miller, 
Pragmatics and the Maxims of Interpretation, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1179, 1190 (“Llewellyn’s 
critique of the maxims appears overstated.”).  
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Despite the Llewellyn article’s tremendous influence on 
statutory interpretation scholars, only two empirical studies to date 
have considered, even in passing, the extent to which majority and 
dissenting opinions rely on the same interpretive canons to counter 
each other’s constructions of the same statute.5 One of the studies was 
limited to employment law and only briefly discussed dueling 
references to language and substantive canons.6 The other focused 
exclusively on the Supreme Court’s use of legislative history and paid 
only passing attention to judicial dueling over this tool.7 No study has 
examined whether, or to what extent, the Court uses the canons in a 
dueling manner when construing statutes dealing with subjects other 
than employment law. And, importantly, no study to date has 
compared the extent to which the Court uses other traditional 
statutory interpretation tools such as purpose, dictionaries, the 
common law, and the like in a dueling fashion, period. This Article 
offers the first empirical evidence of this kind, going beyond the 
linguistic and referential canons contained in Llewellyn’s list,8 and 
also exploring the extent to which majority and dissenting opinions 
duel over the full array of other statutory interpretation tools.9 
Thus far, statutory interpretation theory has operated with a 
blind spot regarding the extent to which particular interpretive tools 
and canons are used to support competing statutory constructions in 
the same case. Scholars and jurists have made assumptions about how 
manipulable they think certain interpretive tools are, but no one has 
tested those assumptions systematically or examined how judges use 
 
 5. See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest 
for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 4 (2005) [hereinafter Brudney & Ditslear, Canons 
of Construction]; David S. Law & David Zaring, Law Versus Ideology: The Supreme Court and 
the Use of Legislative History, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1653, 1654 (2010). Both of these studies 
measured judicial dueling by counting instances in which a majority opinion’s reference to a 
particular interpretive resource (e.g., a language canon or legislative history) was countered by a 
dissenting opinion’s reference to the same interpretive resource. That is, both of these studies 
defined “dueling” the same way that this Article does—rather than counting how often the 
majority opinion in a case invoked one interpretive tool (a “thrust”) while the dissenting 
opinion countered with a different canon or tool (the “parry”), as suggested by Llewellyn’s 
famous list. 
 6. Brudney & Ditslear, Canons of Construction, supra note 5, at 65 tbl.XII, 68 & n.222, 
96–102. 
 7. Law & Zaring, supra note 5, at 1736–38, 1739 tbl.9. 
 8. See, e.g., Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 2, at 595 & nn.2–3 (characterizing “Thrust But 
Parry” numbers 2–6, 8–10, and 13–14 as referential canons and numbers 11–12 and 15–28 as 
linguistic canons). 
 9. For a detailed explanation of this Article’s methodology, see infra Part II.A. 
KRISHNAKUMAR IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/2/2016  8:54 PM 
914 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:909 
interpretive tools to counter each other in practice. This Article 
begins to address that lacuna. 
The Article’s findings are surprising, and intriguing, for statutory 
interpretation theory. Five points stand out: (1) the overall rate of 
dueling canon or interpretive tool use in the Roberts Court’s first five 
terms was low—at or below 25.0 percent for most tools;10 (2) the rates 
of dueling for text/plain meaning and precedent were much higher 
than for other tools, at 42.7 percent and 63.3 percent, respectively;11 
(3) the rate of judicial dueling over most textualist-preferred 
interpretive tools was roughly the same (about 25.0 percent) as the 
rate of judicial dueling over purposivist-preferred interpretive tools;12 
(4) statutes dealing with certain subject areas—criminal law, 
environmental law, and antidiscrimination law—showed particularly 
high rates of dueling;13 and (5) none of the canons or tools seemed 
capable of constraining the Justices’ tendency to vote consistently 
with their ideological preferences, at least in divided-vote cases.14 
These empirical findings have important implications for some of 
the key debates in statutory interpretation. They are particularly 
relevant to theoretical approaches that emphasize predictability or 
seek to constrain judicial discretion. For example, the findings call 
into question some of textualism’s (and in particular Justice Scalia’s) 
claims about the unique manipulability of interpretive tools like 
purpose, intent, and legislative history as compared to text, language 
canons, dictionary references, and “other statutes.”15 The findings also 
cast some doubt on purposivism’s claims that reliance on legislative 
history, relative to other interpretive resources, helps courts act as 
faithful agents of the legislature.16 The findings even have implications 
 
 10. See infra Table 1; discussion infra Part II.B.1. 
 11. Id.  
 12. Id.  
 13. See infra Table 3a; discussion infra Part II.B.2. Of the eighty-eight cases in the dataset 
that contained judicial dueling over one or more statutory interpretation-specific tools, 26.1 
percent involved a criminal statute, 13.6 percent involved an antidiscrimination statute, and 6.8 
percent involved an environmental statute. 
 14. See infra Part II.B.3; Tables 6a–6g, 8. In the subset of cases decided unanimously, by 
contrast, some of the interpretive tools consistently correlated with votes against individual 
Justices’ ideology. See infra notes 127–36; Table 7. 
 15. “Other statutes” is an interpretive tool that directs interpreters to compare how courts 
in previous cases have interpreted identical or similar language in other statutes addressing 
issues similar to the statute at issue. See, e.g., Deborah A. Widiss, Undermining Congressional 
Overrides: The Hydra Problem in Statutory Interpretation, 90 TEX. L. REV. 859, 871 (2012). 
 16. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, the Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1509, 
1548–49 (1998); John Paul Stevens, Judicial Predilections, 6 NEV. L.J. 1, 1–2 (2005). 
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for pragmatism—a theoretical approach that does not claim to 
promote predictability or constrain judges—because the data confirm 
that practical consequences play a significant role in the judicial 
interpretation of statutes, and because they show that judges duel 
along predictable lines with respect to this interpretive tool. 
Specifically, the data reveal that most of the Court’s dueling over 
practical consequences involves one opinion that emphasizes 
administrability-type practical concerns and an opposing opinion that 
emphasizes policy-constancy concerns.17 
The Article also engages in doctrinal analysis of how precisely 
majority and dissenting opinions invoke the same interpretive 
resource to reach different readings of a statute. This analysis reveals 
some noteworthy patterns in the Court’s dueling over particular 
canons. For example, in applying the plain meaning rule, the Justices 
often divide over the prototypical, core meaning versus the legalist 
meaning of key statutory text.18 Similarly, when dueling over a 
statute’s purpose, the Justices who favor one reading of the statute 
sometimes focus on a generalized purpose, while those who favor an 
opposing reading focus on a narrower, more specific purpose. These 
patterns provide valuable insights and add texture to our 
understanding of how the Court applies the tools of statutory 
construction. The patterns also suggest that it may be possible to 
eliminate some of the dueling that occurs over certain interpretive 
tools—through clearer meta-rules about how those tools should be 
applied.19 
 
 17. See infra Part III.A.4. This administrability versus policy-constancy divide is one that I 
describe in earlier empirical work regarding the Roberts Court. See Anita S. Krishnakumar, 
Statutory Interpretation in the Roberts Court’s First Era: An Empirical and Doctrinal Analysis, 62 
HASTINGS L.J. 221, 244–45 (2010). Briefly, administrability concerns focus on an interpretation’s 
effect on judicial resources, the difficulty of implementing the interpretation, or the clarity and 
predictability of the rule the interpretation creates. Policy-constancy concerns focus on whether 
an interpretation ensures consistent application of the statute over time, any arbitrariness 
created by the interpretation, or the justness of the interpretation. 
 18. See Victoria F. Nourse, Two Kinds of Plain Meaning, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 997, 997, 1002 
(2011); Lawrence M. Solan, The New Textualists’ New Text, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 2027, 2027–28, 
2060–61 (2005). The prototypical meaning of a statute focuses on the “core example” that the 
statute was designed to reach, whereas the legalist meaning looks broadly to the conceptual 
extension of the word at issue, often incorporating the specialized connotations and conventions 
the legal world has attached to the word. See Nourse, supra, at 1000–03. The differences 
between prototypical and legalist meaning are discussed in greater detail infra Part III.A.1.  
 19. Cf. Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: 
Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1822–23 
(2010) (describing state courts’ adoption of a binding statutory interpretation methodology and 
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The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I examines the 
theoretical and empirical background for this study. Part II reports 
the study’s findings on the Roberts Court’s dueling use of interpretive 
canons and other tools from the middle of the 2005 term, when 
Justice Alito joined the Court, to the end of the Court’s 2010 term. It 
also provides doctrinal analysis of the Court’s dueling over several 
individual interpretive tools. Part III explores the theoretical 
implications of the data and doctrinal observations. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A. Llewellyn’s “Thrusts” and “Parries” 
Ironically, Llewellyn’s “fiendishly deconstructive”20 attack on the 
canons—the famous list of “Thrust But Parries”—was not the focus 
of his article. Indeed, Llewellyn included the list only at the end of the 
article, as an illustrative exercise.21 His focus, instead, was on the 
broader legal-realist claim that judges do not decide cases based on 
neutral legal rules, and that neutral legal rules capable of producing a 
single correct answer do not in fact exist. Llewellyn had made this 
point earlier in the common-law context, arguing that case law 
precedents are highly malleable and subject to multiple, conflicting 
applications.22 His article was designed to show that the same is true 
in the statutory interpretation context, despite the existence of 
numerous seemingly definitive “canons of construction.”23 
One reason why Llewellyn’s list of “thrusts” and “parries” has 
endured, and proved so influential among academics, is because the 
list seems to demonstrate concretely that the canons are easily 
manipulated and, therefore, incapable of constraining judges. 
Llewellyn did not actually argue that courts would use his canon–
countercanon pairs to reach opposing statutory constructions in the 
same case, but the strong implication was that judges looking to 
 
suggesting that federal courts might benefit from adopting some form of methodological stare 
decisis as well). 
 20. Robert Weisberg, The Calabresian Judicial Artist: Statutes and the New Legal Process, 
35 STAN. L. REV. 213, 213 (1983). 
 21. See Llewellyn, supra note 3, at 401. 
 22. See, e.g., KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 74 (1930); Karl Llewellyn, A Realist 
Jurisprudence—The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 443–44 (1930); Karl Llewellyn, Some 
Realism About Realism—Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1241–42 (1931).  
 23. See Llewellyn, supra note 3, at 399 (“What we need to see now is that all of this is 
paralleled, in regard to statutes.”). 
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counter a statutory reading based on one canon could readily find an 
opposing canon to support their preferred outcome. Indeed, 
Llewellyn called it a “foolish pretense” for courts to justify their 
statutory constructions based on “a set of mutually contradictory . . . 
rules on How to Construe a Statute.”24 
If Llewellyn was correct that judges can readily find 
countercanons for every canon and that judges use the canons as 
after-the-fact justifications for their decisions, then we might expect, 
in practice, to see judicial opinions pitting canon against canon to 
neutralize the tools that supposedly support an opposing reading—at 
least in cases where judges disagree about the best reading of the 
statute. For example, we might expect to see dictionary definitions in 
a majority opinion countered by opposing dictionary definitions in 
the dissenting opinion, references to statutory purpose in a majority 
opinion (e.g., “the Civil Rights Act was enacted in order to remedy 
the nation’s long history of discrimination against racial minorities”) 
countered by an opposing statutory purpose in the dissenting opinion 
(e.g., “the Civil Rights Act’s primary goal was to create a color-blind 
society”), and a majority opinion’s reliance on the whole act rule met 
by reliance on a contradictory subset of the whole act rule in the 
dissenting opinion.25 Although this Article does not measure the 
Court’s use of Llewellyn’s precise form of canon-for-countercanon 
pairings, it takes his canons-can-point-in-different-directions heuristic 
as inspiration for examining how often majority and dissenting 
opinions in the same case use the same canon to support different 
statutory constructions. 
In a less-celebrated passage of his article, Llewellyn also 
embraced a purposivist approach to statutory interpretation. He 
argued that “if a statute is to make sense, it must be read in the light 
of some assumed purpose.”26 Llewellyn did not claim that judicial 
reliance on statutory purpose would be more determinate than 
reliance on the canons, but his simultaneous rejection of the canons 
and endorsement of statutory purpose raises the comparison. This is 
particularly so given that the New Textualism popularized by Justice 
Scalia takes precisely the opposite view—hailing the canons as 
 
 24. Id. 
 25. See id. at 404 (describing “Thrust But Parry” number 17, which says “The same 
language used repeatedly in the same connection is presumed to bear the same meaning 
throughout the statute” versus “This presumption will be disregarded where it is necessary to 
assign different meanings to make the statute consistent”). 
 26. Id. at 400. 
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neutral rules that enhance predictability, while arguing that statutory 
purpose is malleable and easily shaped to justify an individual judge’s 
policy preferences.27 Indeed, both Llewellyn’s list and New 
Textualism’s claims about the relative merits of different interpretive 
tools invite empirical analysis of the extent to which statutory 
purpose—as well as other noncanon tools, like legislative history—
are susceptible to Llewellyn’s “thrust and parry” criticism. 
Part II of this Article answers these questions with data from the 
Roberts Court’s first five terms. Before turning to the data, however, 
the next Section reviews the two empirical studies that have 
addressed judicial dueling over the canons of construction and 
legislative history, respectively. 
B. Prior Empirical Work 
As noted above, only two studies to date have attempted to 
measure the extent to which judges use the canons of construction 
against each other to support opposing readings of the same statute in 
the same case. The first study, conducted by James Brudney and 
Corey Ditslear, reviewed the Supreme Court’s use of interpretive 
canons in every workplace-law case decided between 1969 and 2003.28 
The study focused on the extent to which the canons of construction 
operate as neutral legal rules, constraining the Justices’ ability to 
interpret statutes according to their ideological preferences. Brudney 
and Ditslear treated “dueling canons” in passing, as a way to test 
claims that the canons enhance consistency and predictability and 
perform an important “gap-filling” function.29 They made two 
findings that seem to support Llewellyn’s skeptical view of the 
canons: (1) dissenting Justices were significantly more likely to rely 
on language and substantive canons when language canons were part 
 
 27. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE LAW 25–27 (1997); sources cited infra note 186. 
 28. See Brudney & Ditslear, Canons of Construction, supra note 5, at 15–69. The Brudney–
Ditslear study coded for judicial reliance on two categories of interpretive tools: language 
canons, which the study defined to include grammar rules, Latin maxims, the whole act rule, and 
the in pari materia rule, and substantive canons, defined as judicial presumptions based on 
constitutional and common-law norms about how statutes should be interpreted. Id. at 12–13. 
 29. See CASS SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE 
REGULATORY STATE 147, 151–53 (1990); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, 
Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 66–67 (1994) (“One goal . . . of the 
canons, is to lower the costs of drafting statutes. . . . The Court can perform a valuable 
coordinating function by generating ‘off-the-rack,’ gap-filling rules that are accessible ex ante to 
the drafters.”); Shapiro, supra note 4, at 943. 
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of the majority’s reasoning than when they were not; and (2) the 
canons failed to constrain the Justices’ ideological preferences, as 
conservative Justices tended to use the canons to reach conservative 
results, while liberal Justices tended to use the canons to reach liberal 
outcomes.30 Based on these findings, the authors concluded that, “in 
divided decisions, the Justices themselves are more prone to view the 
canons as reasonably amenable to supporting either side.”31 
In a subsequent article expanding on their original study, 
Brudney and Ditslear found some evidence that judicial reliance on 
legislative history does have a constraining effect on judicial ideology. 
Specifically, they reported that liberal Justices were more likely to 
vote in favor of employer interests when they invoked legislative 
history,32 and that, during the Burger Court, conservative Justices 
were more likely to vote in favor of worker interests when they relied 
on legislative history.33 However, Brudney and Ditslear found that 
after 1986, conservative Justices ruled increasingly in favor of 
employers (consistent with their ideological preferences), relying on 
canons and even legislative history to do so.34 Brudney and Ditslear 
also reported what they called a “Scalia Effect,” finding that liberal 
Justices opted not to rely on legislative history in a series of 
proemployer majority opinions that Justice Scalia joined, and that 
when liberal Justices did rely on legislative history, Justice Scalia was 
significantly less likely to join their majority opinions, even when he 
voted for the same result.35 Conversely, the authors found that Justice 
Scalia’s resistance to legislative history did not extend to majority 
opinions authored by his conservative colleagues; that is, he was just 
as likely to join his conservative colleagues’ majority opinions when 
they relied on legislative history as when they did not.36 
These findings are significant, particularly given the large sample 
size of workplace-law cases examined by Brudney and Ditslear. But 
the findings also are limited in their generalizability because, as 
Brudney and Ditslear acknowledged, their study examined cases in 
 
 30. Brudney & Ditslear, Canons of Construction, supra note 5, at 57–60. 
 31. Id. at 98. 
 32. See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Liberal Justices’ Reliance on Legislative 
History: Principle, Strategy, and the Scalia Effect, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 117, 143–44 & 
tbl.6 (2008) [hereinafter Brudney & Ditslear, Legislative History]. 
 33. Id. at 144 tbl.6. 
 34. Id. at 142–44; Brudney & Ditslear, Canons of Construction, supra note 5, at 6. 
 35. Brudney & Ditslear, Legislative History, supra note 32, at 160–69. 
 36. Id. at 169–70. 
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only one subject area—workplace law.37 It is thus unclear whether the 
significant level of dueling that Brudney and Ditslear found over 
language and substantive canons is representative of how the Justices 
use the canons in all statutory interpretation cases. Moreover, 
Brudney and Ditslear, like Llewellyn, focused exclusively on language 
and substantive canons. But there are many other interpretive tools 
that courts regularly use to construe statutes—including the plain 
meaning rule, purpose, legislative history, dictionary definitions, and 
congressional intent. And there are non-statute-specific tools of legal 
analysis, such as precedent and practical consequences, which recent 
empirical work has shown to play a significant role in the judicial 
interpretation of statutes.38 The Brudney–Ditslear study thus provides 
an incomplete picture of how the Court duels over statutory 
interpretation tools other than language and substantive canons, 
leaving open the questions of how susceptible other tools are to 
competing inferences and whether such tools provide any 
constraining effect on judges’ ability to vote according to their 
ideological preferences. 
The second empirical study to date on judicial dueling is David 
Law and David Zaring’s comprehensive study of the Supreme Court’s 
use of legislative history.39 Law and Zaring studied every Supreme 
Court statutory interpretation case decided from 1953 to 2006. Their 
focus was on identifying legal factors that might influence the Court 
to rely on legislative history, such as the age or length of a statute.40 
Like Brudney and Ditslear, they examined judicial dueling over 
legislative history only in passing, as a small part of their larger 
project about legislative history use.41 And, like Brudney and Ditslear, 
Law and Zaring found that dissenting Justices were significantly more 
 
 37. Brudney & Ditslear, Canons of Construction, supra note 5, at 26–27. 
 38. See Jane S. Schacter, The Confounding Common Law Originalism in Recent Supreme 
Court Statutory Interpretation: Implications for the Legislative History Debate and Beyond, 51 
STAN. L. REV. 1, 5, 12, 18, 21 (1998); Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority in Statutory 
Interpretation: An Empirical Analysis, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1073, 1107–08 (1992); see also 
Krishnakumar, supra note 17, at 236–37 & tbl.1 (reporting that practical consequences were the 
third most frequently cited interpretive resource cited by the Roberts Court during its first 
three-and-a-half terms, showing up in 51.8 percent of all statutory cases decided during that time 
period). 
 39. Law & Zaring, supra note 5. 
 40. Additional variables for which Law and Zaring coded were the complexity and 
obscurity of the statute, as well as the number of times the statute was amended. See id. at 1689–
98. 
 41. See id. at 1738. 
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likely to cite legislative history when a majority or concurring opinion 
also cited legislative history than when no other opinion cited this 
interpretive resource.42 Law and Zaring hypothesized that these data 
“suggest that Justices are sensitive to the types of arguments made by 
their colleagues and feel an obligation or desire to respond in kind, 
especially when they disagree with one another on the merits.”43 
Law and Zaring’s findings, like Brudney and Ditslear’s, are 
important, especially given the depth and breadth of their sample 
size—all cases before the Court that involved statutes over a fifty-
year period. Their study was not limited by subject area, so their 
findings are less likely to be distorted by partisanship, judicial 
impressions of congressional expertise, age of a statute, obscurity, or 
other concerns that might be particular to one area of the law. But 
Law and Zaring examined judicial dueling over only one interpretive 
tool—legislative history—shedding no light on competing judicial 
invocations of the numerous other canons and tools of statutory 
construction. Thus their study, too, only scratches the surface in 
exploring how Justices authoring an opinion respond to interpretive 
canons and tools used by an opposing opinion.  
The next Part seeks to provide a more complete picture of the 
Justices’ dueling over multiple interpretive tools as well as to explore 
doctrinally how the Justices engage each other’s use of particular 
interpretive tools. 
II.  FINDINGS 
A. Methodology 
The findings and conclusions presented below are based on 
empirical and doctrinal analysis of all decisions in the Roberts Court’s 
2005 (post-January 31, 2006)44 through 2010 terms that confronted a 
question of statutory interpretation. Every case decided during that 
period was examined through the Supreme Court’s online database to 
determine whether it dealt with a statutory issue.45 Any case in which 
 
 42. Id.  
 43. Id.  
 44. This is the date that Justice Alito joined the Court. Biographies of Current Justices of 
the Supreme Court, SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/
biographies.aspx [http://perma.cc/8HLT-QVKN].  
 45. See Opinions, SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/
opinions.aspx [http://perma.cc/P5SJ-ENZP]. The Court’s online database currently only goes 
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the Court’s opinion contained a discussion about statutory meaning 
was included in the study. Cases interpreting the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure were not included,46 but a handful of constitutional 
cases in which the Court construed the meaning of a federal statute 
before deciding the constitutional question were included.47 This 
selection methodology yielded 255 statutory cases over five-and-a-
half terms, with 255 majority or plurality opinions, 103 concurring 
opinions, 156 dissenting opinions, 12 part-concurring/part-dissenting 
opinions, and 2 part-majority/part-concurring opinions, for a total of 
528 opinions.48 Of these, 115 cases were decided unanimously, and 140 
were decided by a divided vote. 
In coding and analyzing these cases, my primary goal was to 
determine the frequency with which the Court referenced a range of 
interpretive sources when giving meaning to federal statutes. The 
cases in the study were examined for references to the following 
interpretive tools: (1) statutory text, including appeals to plain 
meaning; (2) dictionary definitions; (3) grammar rules; (4) the whole 
act rule; (5) other federal and state statutes; (6) common-law 
precedent; (7) substantive canons; (8) Supreme Court precedent; (9) 
statutory purpose; (10) practical consequences; (11) legislative intent; 
(12) legislative history; and (13) language canons such as noscitur a 
sociis and expressio unius.49 
These interpretive sources are consistent with those examined in 
other empirical studies of the Court’s statutory interpretation 
 
back to the 2009 Term, id., but when I began coding cases in 2007, it went back to the 2005 
Term. 
 46. I made this judgment call because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) are 
created in a manner that differs significantly from federal statutes—they are drafted by judges 
rather than Congress and do not require the President’s approval. Accordingly, several of the 
interpretive tools available when construing statutes either are not available with respect to the 
FRCP or provide a very different kind of context, from a very different perspective, when used 
to construe the FRCP—e.g., legislative history, intent, the whole act rule, and other statutes.  
 47. In such cases, the opinion was coded as unanimous, close margin, or wide margin based 
on the Justices’ votes regarding the statutory interpretation question only; thus, if the Justices 
agreed unanimously that the statute should be read to mean X, but then split regarding the 
constitutional validity of the statute, the opinion was coded as unanimous. See, e.g., Nw. Austin 
Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 211 (2009).  
 48. For a list of the cases examined in the study, see infra Appendix. 
 49. In order to reduce the risk of inconsistency, I and at least one research assistant 
separately read and analyzed each opinion and separately recorded the use of each interpretive 
resource. In the event of a disagreement, I reviewed and reconsidered the case and made the 
final determination as to how a particular interpretive resource should be coded. For a detailed 
explanation of how the cases were coded, see Krishnakumar, supra note 17, Codebook at 291–
96. 
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practices.50 A few differences in definitions used for the different 
sources were inevitable and will be pointed out where notable. For 
example, unlike the Brudney and Ditslear study, which grouped 
together several interpretive tools under the heading “language 
canons,” I counted separately references to grammar canons, 
language canons, and the whole act rule.51 However, in order to allow 
comparison with Brudney and Ditslear’s data, I also created a 
combined variable that coded for reliance on any one of these 
interpretive resources (so that if an opinion referenced at least one of 
these interpretive sources, it was coded as a “yes”). Further, unlike 
some previous studies,52 I recorded as a reference to “practical 
consequences” any reliance on the absurdity of a result, the 
administrative or other burdens caused by an interpretation, the 
fairness of an interpretation, an interpretation’s coherence or 
incoherence, the workability of an interpretation for lower courts, or 
other effects that an interpretation could be expected to produce. I 
also further disaggregated this interpretive tool, coding for 
administrability-type practical consequences concerns versus policy-
constancy-type practical consequences concerns.53 
In recording the Court’s reliance on the above interpretive tools, 
I counted only references that reflected substantive reliance on the 
tool in reaching an interpretation. Opinions that mentioned a 
particular interpretive tool but rejected the tool as unconvincing were 
 
 50. See, e.g., Schacter, supra note 38, at 11–12; Zeppos, supra note 38, at 1089; see generally 
FRANK B. CROSS, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (2009) 
(surveying the tools of statutory interpretation and presenting empirical findings on the 
Rehnquist Court's use of interpretive tools). 
 51. The term “grammar canons” refers to interpretive maxims that are based on basic 
conventions of grammar and syntax, such as “‘[o]r’ means in the alternative” or “[s]hall’ is 
mandatory, while ‘may’ is precatory.” See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 1, at 856–60. The term 
“language canons” refers to canons that are based on Latin maxims, such as “expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius” (the inclusion of one item implies the exclusion of others not listed) or 
“noscitur a sociis” (terms in a statutory list should be interpreted in light of the other items in 
the list). See id. at 852–54. The whole act rule refers to a series of inferences that courts may 
draw about the meaning of one section of a statute based on how other sections of the statute 
are structured; it includes the rule that differences in similar or parallel statutory provisions 
should be deemed deliberate and intentional (the meaningful variation rule), rules dictating that 
the title and preamble of a statute are relevant but not dispositive in determining statutory 
meaning, and the rule that one section of a statute should not be construed in a manner that 
renders another section superfluous (the rule against superfluity). See id. at 862–65. 
 52. See infra Part III.A.4.  
 53. See id.; see also Krishnakumar, supra note 17, Codebook at 294 (explaining parameters 
for coding for references to administrability-type practical consequences versus policy-
constancy-type practical consequences). 
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not counted. Similarly, I did not count instances in which the Court 
merely acknowledged, but did not accept, a litigant’s argument that a 
particular canon or tool dictated a particular result.54 
Secondary or corroborative references to an interpretive tool 
were counted. That is, when the Court relied primarily on one 
interpretive tool but went on to note that x, y, and z tools further 
supported that interpretation, the references to x, y, and z were coded 
along with the primarily relied-upon source(s).55 
In addition, the vote margin in each case was recorded, and each 
case and opinion was recorded as unanimous, close margin, or wide 
margin (cases with six or more Justices in the majority).56 Each 
Justice’s vote in each case also was recorded, as was the author of 
each opinion. This methodology comports with my previous empirical 
study.57 
 
 54. An example may help illustrate. In Barber v. Thomas, 560 U.S. 474 (2010), the majority 
opinion relied on the plain meaning rule, statutory purpose, and practical consequences to 
conclude that the phrase “term of imprisonment” in a statute allowing good time credit for good 
behavior by prisoners applies to the time actually served by the prisoner, rather than the time 
the prisoner was sentenced to serve. Id. at 479–84. In so ruling, the majority rejected a legislative 
history argument advanced by petitioner, finding that the cited portions of the legislative record 
did not address the precise interpretive question at issue. See id. at 485. It also rejected rule of 
lenity and whole act rule arguments relied on by petitioner and the dissent, stating that the rule 
of lenity was inapplicable because the statute was not ambiguous and that interpreting “term of 
imprisonment” consistently throughout the statute would contradict the statute’s text (a text-
trumps-whole-act-rule argument). Id. at 486–89. The opinion was coded for reliance on 
text/plain meaning, purpose, and practical consequences, but not legislative history, substantive 
canons, or the whole act rule. 
 55. For example, in Schwab v. Reilly, 560 U.S. 770 (2010), the Court held that when a 
bankruptcy debtor underestimates the value of “property claimed as exempt” on her Schedule 
C filing, the bankruptcy trustee is entitled to retain in the estate any actual value above that 
listed, even if he did not initially object to the “property claimed as exempt.” Id. at 774. The 
majority opinion relied primarily on the “clear” meaning of the Bankruptcy Code’s text, 
combined with a whole act argument. Id. at 782. The opinion also noted that this interpretation 
was consistent with the historical treatment of bankruptcy exemptions (common-law 
precedent), disagreed with the majority’s reading of Supreme Court precedent, and cited other 
Supreme Court precedent supporting its interpretation. Id. at 786–91. The opinion was coded 
for references to text/plain meaning, the whole act rule, common law, and Supreme Court 
precedent.  
 56. Cases decided by a vote margin of 5–4, 5–3 (with only eight justices participating), 5–2 
(with only seven justices participating), and 4–1–4 (by a plurality) were coded as “close margin” 
cases. If the vote margin was 6–3, either with six justices in the majority or with only five justices 
in the majority and one concurring and three dissenting, the case was coded as a wide margin 
case. A quick perusal of the full dataset (not just dueling canon cases) reveals only six cases like 
this (6–3 with five in the majority plus one concurring). 
 57. See Krishnakumar, supra note 17, at 231–33. 
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To measure the Court’s use of interpretive canons and tools in a 
dueling fashion, I sorted the cases in the dataset by docket number 
and identified those that showed a majority and dissenting opinion 
(or a concurring and dissenting opinion) referencing the same canon 
or tool. For these purposes, I defined “same canon or tool” to mean 
that both the majority and dissent argued that a specific interpretive 
resource—purpose, dictionary definition, substantive canon—
supported their respective readings of the statute. I did not count as 
“dueling canon” cases those in which the dissenting opinion 
mentioned, or even criticized, the majority’s application of a 
particular canon or tool, unless the dissenting opinion also argued 
that the interpretive tool supported its reading of the statute.58 I made 
this methodological choice because in my view, judicial rejections or 
disagreements over whether an interpretive canon applies in a 
particular case do not constitute disagreements over the meaning 
dictated by the canon. Rather, such disagreements show merely that 
the canon has limitations or exceptions and that the opposing opinion 
author found the argument from the canon powerful enough to 
require criticism. Further, while battles over applicability do provide 
some evidence that a canon does not constrain judges—who retain 
the discretion to refuse to apply the canon in a particular case—they 
do not show that the canon itself is malleable or indeterminate. That 
is, disagreements over applicability do not necessarily reflect an 
underlying looseness as to what construction the canon, if applicable, 
directs the Court to adopt or the canon’s ready susceptibility to 
judicial massaging to support a judge’s chosen construction. Thus, 
counting such disagreements as instances of “dueling canon” use 
would be misleading, measuring something other than how often the 
 
 58. For example, in Dolan v. United States, 560 U.S. 605 (2010), the Court held that a 
district court retained the power to order restitution to crime victims—even though the court 
missed the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act’s 90-day deadline for establishing the amount of 
the victim’s losses—because the court had made clear, prior to the deadline, that it would order 
restitution in some amount. Id. at 608. The majority opinion referenced several interpretive 
tools, including the statute’s purpose of helping victims by imposing restitution on convicts. Id. 
at 613–14. The dissenting opinion argued that the statute’s text did not permit such a reading, 
particularly given other criminal statutes that “only make[] sense against a background rule that 
trial courts cannot change sentences at will.” Id. at 625–28 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). The 
dissent rejected the majority’s purpose argument, reasoning that the statute’s broad purpose did 
not justify a reading that contradicts the statutory text. See id. at 625. The dissenting opinion was 
coded for references to text/plain meaning and other statutes, but not statutory purpose. 
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Justices used particular interpretive tools to support opposing 
statutory readings.59 
I also did not count as “dueling canon” cases those in which a 
majority opinion relied on one interpretive canon, such as the whole 
act rule, while the dissenting opinion relied on another interpretive 
canon or tool, such as statutory purpose or a dictionary definition.60 
On the one hand, a high rate of this kind of interpretive resource 
dueling would provide some evidence that the interpretive canons 
and tools do not constrain judges by showing that judges retain 
significant discretion about which canons to apply, and which ones to 
privilege when different canons point in different directions. But 
measuring this type of dueling would not reveal very much about the 
indeterminacy of individual interpretive tools or show how often the 
Justices counter each other’s references to specific interpretive 
resources. Instead, it would demonstrate only, or at least primarily, 
that there is no settled methodology dictating which interpretive 
canons and tools judges should use to construe statutes, and no 
hierarchy indicating the order in which they should prioritize 
particular tools when different tools point toward different 
constructions. The whole act rule is not necessarily indeterminate 
simply because statutory purpose points toward a different 
interpretation; and the entire practice of consulting canons and tools 
of statutory construction is not meaningless simply because judges 
faced with different tools pointing in different directions disagree 
about which tools to privilege.61 Accordingly, in order to provide a 
better picture of individual canons’ malleability, this study counted as 
dueling only those cases in which a majority opinion’s reliance on 
purpose was countered with a dissenting opinion’s reliance on 
purpose, or a majority opinion’s reference to a dictionary definition 
was countered with a dissenting opinion’s reference to a dictionary 
definition, or a substantive canon reference in a majority opinion was 
countered with a substantive canon reference in a dissenting opinion, 
and so on. 
 
 59. See SCALIA, supra note 27, at 27 (arguing that Llewellyn’s “parries” do not contradict 
the corresponding canon but merely show that it is not absolute).  
 60. In this sense, my definition of “dueling” interpretive tool use departs from Llewellyn’s, 
as Llewellyn’s thrusts and parries certainly include opposing pairs of this kind.  
 61. See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 27, at 27 (“Every canon is simply one indication of 
meaning; and if there are more contrary indications (perhaps supported by other canons), it 
must yield. But that does not render the entire enterprise a fraud . . . .”). 
KRISHNAKUMAR IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/2/2016  8:54 PM 
2016] DUELING CANONS 927 
B. Dueling Statistics 
Before reporting the data, it is important to note some 
limitations of this study. First, the study covers only five-and-a-half 
Supreme Court terms and only 255 statutory interpretation cases, 
decided by some combination of the same eleven Justices. While this 
dataset is large enough to teach us some things about the Court’s use 
of canons and interpretive tools in a dueling manner, the data 
reported may reflect trends specific to the Roberts Court. Second, 
although the number of cases reviewed is large enough to provide 
some valuable insights, the focus should be on the patterns that 
emerge rather than on precise differences in the percentages 
reported. Third, in noting the canons and other interpretive tools 
referenced in majority and dissenting opinions, I make no claims to 
have discovered the Justices’ underlying or “true” motivations for 
deciding statutory cases; the data do not reveal whether a particular 
opinion relied on a tool because the opinion’s author was persuaded 
by that interpretive tool, or merely because the author felt it 
necessary to counter an opposing opinion’s reliance on that tool. The 
study’s empirical and doctrinal claims are confined to describing how 
the Justices publicly justify their statutory constructions, and to 
theorizing about discernable patterns in the kinds of public 
justifications the Justices regularly provide. 
1. Frequency of Dueling.  At the outset of this study, I expected 
to find higher rates of judicial dueling over dictionary definitions, 
legislative history, and statutory purpose and lower, but still high, 
rates of dueling over language canons and substantive canons. 
Specifically, because dictionaries contain multiple definitions for each 
word—and because the Justices have multiple dictionaries to choose 
from—I expected to find the Justices countering each other’s 
dictionary references in the vast majority of cases—i.e., in the vicinity 
of 60 percent to 70 percent of the cases. I expected to find similarly 
high rates of judicial dueling over legislative history because 
resourceful lawyers can be expected to dig through the (often 
copious) legislative history of a statute and find some snippet to 
support their clients’ preferred statutory construction. Further, 
because both proponents and opponents of a proposed law often 
make competing statements on the House and Senate floor about the 
likely effects or scope of the bill, there is a wealth of material for the 
Justices to invoke in support of opposing readings of a statute. With 
respect to statutory purpose, I expected to find high rates of judicial 
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dueling because statutes often have multiple purposes, again 
providing the Justices with ample fodder for fashioning an argument 
that their chosen statutory construction is more consistent with a 
statute’s purpose than is the opposing opinion’s. 
For substantive canons, I expected to find lower, but still 
meaningful rates of judicial dueling (perhaps in the range of 30 
percent to 40 percent). This expectation stemmed from the fact that 
substantive canons are judicially created policy norms, so they should 
prove relatively easy for the Justices to craft anew, or to tweak and 
invoke in order to lend an aura of inevitability and consistency with 
larger legal norms to their chosen interpretation. I similarly expected 
to find noteworthy rates of judicial dueling (perhaps in the 30 percent 
range) over language canons. This expectation was based on the fact 
that it is often possible to characterize the common denominator 
connecting statutory terms in different and competing ways, so as to 
support competing noscitur a sociis or ejusdem generis arguments 
about what a term in a list means. I also expected the rates of dueling 
over text/plain meaning to be lower than the rates of dueling over 
legislative history, purpose, and dictionary definitions. For the other 
canons and interpretive tools, I did not have specific expectations 
about how often the Justices would employ them in a dueling manner. 
Table 1 lists the frequency with which the Justices on the Roberts 
Court employed the various canons and tools of statutory 
construction in a dueling fashion—that is, in both the majority and 
dissenting opinions in the same case—in the 255 cases decided and 
the 528 opinions issued from the time Justice Alito joined the Court 
in 2006 through the end of the Court’s 2010 term.62 For each 
interpretive tool, the Table first reports the number of unanimous 
opinions, majority opinions, and dissenting opinions that referenced 
the tool. It then reports the percentage of cases in which a majority 
and dissenting opinion in the same case both referenced the 
interpretive tool. This figure is calculated using as a denominator the 
total number of divided-vote cases in which the interpretive tool was 
invoked by at least one opinion (second-to-last-column) and, 
separately, using as a denominator the number of all cases—including 
unanimous cases—in which at least one opinion referenced the tool 
(last column).63 
 
 62. See infra Table 1. 
 63. Table 1 uses the number of cases in which at least one opinion relied on an interpretive 
tool, rather than the total number of cases reviewed in the study (255) as a denominator because 
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Table 1: Dueling Canon Use 2005–2010 Terms 
 
Unanimous 
Cases 
(n=115)* 
Majority 
Opinions 
(n=255) 
Dissenting 
Opinions 
(n=155) 
Dueling 
Opinions 
(Majority or 
Concurrence 
+ Dissent)† 
Percent 
Dueling In 
Divided-
Vote 
Cases‡ 
Percent 
Dueling 
In All 
Cases˚ 
Supreme Court 
Precedent 69 157 75 58 
63.7% 
(n=91) 
32.6% 
(n=178) 
Text or Plain 
Meaning 68 145 64 44 
42.7% 
(n=103) 
25.3% 
(n=174) 
Dictionary Rule 28 75 25 16 
28.6% 
(n=56) 
18.2% 
(n=88) 
Other Statutes 80 44 33 20 
34.5% 
(n=58) 
21.1% 
(n=95) 
Language 
Canons + Whole 
Act Rule 54 117 40 21 
24.7% 
(n=85) 
14.1% 
(n=149) 
Whole Act Rule 56 103 35 17 
21.8% 
(n=78) 
12.7% 
(n=134) 
Grammar or 
Linguistic 
Canons 19 38 14 4 
13.3% 
(n=30) 
8.2% 
(n=49) 
Substantive 
Canons 17 37 26 3 
6.8% 
(n=44) 
4.9% 
(n=61) 
Common Law 25 40 12 6 
22.2% 
(n=27) 
11.5% 
(n=52) 
Purpose 30 75 47 20 
24.7% 
(n=77) 
19.6% 
(n=107) 
  
 
I believe the former is a better measure of the rate at which the Court “dueled” over the canons 
and other interpretive tools. If Table 1 used the total number of cases in the dataset as the 
denominator for calculating the rate of dueling, that would count as potential dueling canon 
cases those cases in which no member of the Court referenced a particular canon or tool. But 
cases in which no opinion referenced a particular interpretive tool might be cases in which no 
on-point legislative history existed, or in which no other statutes were analogous to the one at 
issue, and so on. In any event, it would not provide a good measure of how frequently the 
Justices found it necessary to counter each others’ claims that a particular interpretive resource 
supported a particular statutory construction. For the sake of thoroughness, I note that if Table 
1 were to use the total number of cases in the dataset (255) as the denominator for its 
calculations, the rates of dueling would be significantly lower for every interpretive canon and 
tool (e.g., SCP – 22.7%, Plain Meaning – 17.3%, Dictionary – 6.3%, Other Statutes – 7.8%, 
Language/Whole Act – 8.2%, Purpose – 7.8%, Practical Consequences – 11.4%, Intent – 5.1%, 
Legislative History – 7.5%). 
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Unanimous 
Cases 
(n=115)* 
Majority 
Opinions 
(n=255) 
Dissenting 
Opinions 
(n=155) 
Dueling 
Opinions 
(Majority or 
Concurrence 
+ Dissent)† 
Percent 
Dueling In 
Divided-
Vote 
Cases‡ 
Percent 
Dueling 
In All 
Cases˚ 
Practical 
Consequences 45 93 69 29 
30.9% 
(n=94) 
20.9% 
(n=139) 
Intent 22 40 39 13 
26.5% 
(n=49) 
18.3% 
(n=71) 
Legislative 
History 32 74 47 19 
25.3% 
(n=75) 
17.6% 
(n=108) 
* This column reports the number unanimous cases in which the majority opinion invoked an 
interpretive tool to support its chosen construction.  
** This column includes a small number of double-counts for cases in which more than one 
dissenting opinion referenced the interpretive tool.  
† This column counts the number of cases in which both the majority and one or more 
dissenting opinions relied on the interpretive tool to support its construction and a few cases in 
which a concurring opinion and at least one dissenting opinion relied on the interpretive tool. 
As explained in the article’s methodology section, the figures reported in this column do not 
include cases in which one opinion relied on the interpretive tool and an opposing opinion 
rejected the tool as inapplicable or criticized the opposing opinion’s reliance on the tool. 
‡ Percentages in this column were calculated by dividing the number of cases that dueled over 
this interpretive tool (reported in previous column) by the number of divided-vote cases in the 
dataset in which at least one opinion relied on the tool to support its statutory construction 
(reflected in the figure n=90 for Supreme Court precedent, n=104 for Text/Plain meaning, and 
so on).  
˚ Percentages in this column were calculated by dividing the number of cases that dueled over 
this interpretive tool (reported in the fourth column) by the total number of cases in the dataset 
in which at least one opinion relied on the tool to support its statutory construction, including 
unanimous cases (reflected in the figure n=177 for Supreme Court precedent, n=175 for 
Text/Plain meaning, and so on).  
 
The data reveal several surprising results. First, prior Supreme 
Court precedent and text/plain meaning show very high rates of 
dueling during the Roberts Court’s first five-and-a-half terms—the 
Justices dueled over the application of Supreme Court precedent in 
63.7 percent of the divided-vote cases in which at least one opinion 
cited precedent, and they dueled over text/plain meaning in 42.7 
percent of the divided-vote cases in which at least one opinion found 
a clear statutory meaning.64 (The percentages are significantly lower 
when unanimous cases are included in the count, but still higher than 
for other interpretive resources). Practical consequences and other 
statutes exhibited the next-highest rates of dueling, generating 
 
 64. See supra Table 1. 
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competing judicial references in 30.9 percent and 34.5 percent of the 
divided-vote cases that referenced either resource, respectively. By 
contrast, the Justices dueled over purpose, legislative history, and 
intent in roughly 25.0 percent of the cases in which they invoked these 
tools. The rates for these interpretive tools are almost identical to the 
rates at which the Justices dueled over textualist-preferred tools, such 
as dictionary definitions (28.6 percent), the whole act rule (21.8 
percent) and the combined grammar/language canons/whole act rule 
(24.7 percent), and the common law (22.2 percent). Finally, the data 
revealed that the Justices rarely dueled over substantive canons, at a 
rate of just 10.4 percent.65 
In short, the Court engaged in the highest rates of dueling canon 
or interpretive tool use when invoking traditional tools of legal 
analysis—i.e., precedent, text, and to a lesser extent, practical 
consequences—not when invoking statutory-interpretation-specific 
tools such as the language or substantive canons, statutory purpose, 
legislative history, the whole act rule, or dictionary definitions. The 
only statutory-interpretation-specific tool for which the Justices 
exhibited rates of dueling comparable to those exhibited for 
traditional legal tools was other statutes—an interpretive tool which 
requires traditional legal analysis of prior Supreme Court precedents 
interpreting analogous statutory provisions, in addition to the 
statutory-interpretation-specific task of making analogies across 
statutes.66 
The data are intriguing on many levels. First, the relatively low 
rate of dueling over dictionary definitions is noteworthy and 
unexpected. Dictionary definitions are bountiful; there are numerous 
dictionaries in print and each dictionary typically contains several 
definitions for the same word. Moreover, a recent study of the 
Supreme Court’s dictionary usage from 1986–2010 found that the 
Justices’ choices regarding which dictionary to cite to be “largely ad 
hoc, based on the appeal of particular dictionaries in particular 
 
 65. I counted as substantive canon “duels” those cases in which a majority opinion cited 
one substantive canon (e.g., the rule of lenity) and an opposing opinion cited another 
substantive canon (e.g., the constitutional avoidance canon). I did not count as “dueling” cases 
in which a majority opinion invoked the rule of lenity and the dissenting opinion argued that the 
rule was not applicable. See supra Part II.A. 
 66. Specifically, for statutes deemed in pari materia (in the same matter), “courts will apply 
prior judicial interpretations” of a particular term both “to subsequent cases that arise under the 
statute actually interpreted [and] also to identical or similar language in other statutes 
addressing similar issues.” See Widiss, supra note 15, at 871. 
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cases.”67 That study also found that in the vast majority of cases, 
judicial opinions that referenced dictionary definitions used them as 
“ornament[s]”—meaning that the dictionary played a minimal 
substantive role in the opinion’s reasoning, but nevertheless was used 
to “lend[] a patina of objectivity and legitimacy” to the chosen 
construction.68 Given the abundance of dictionary definitions and 
empirical evidence indicating that the Justices use them in an ad hoc 
manner, one would expect that jurists seeking to use this interpretive 
tool readily could find some definition to support almost any 
construction of a statute—and that majority and dissenting opinions 
in the same case frequently would employ competing dictionary 
definitions, however marginally helpful, to cancel out any aura of 
objectivity that an opposing opinion might gain from using such 
definitions. 
Thus, the low rate of dueling dictionary use—28.6 percent—is 
puzzling.69 One explanation could be that the Justices tend to prefer a 
handful of dictionaries, so that despite the abundance of dictionaries 
and definitions in publication, competing definitions may not be 
readily available within their preferred lexical universe.70 But upon 
closer examination, this explanation seems insufficient for at least two 
reasons. First, the Court’s opinions in recent cases like Taniguchi v. 
Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd.71 demonstrate that despite the Justices’ 
individual preferences for certain dictionaries, they are perfectly 
willing to reference other dictionaries (as many as fourteen in 
Taniguchi!).72 Second, empirical research shows that even those 
Justices with the most pronounced dictionary preferences deviate 
from their preferred dictionary in a substantial number of cases.73 
 
 67. James J. Brudney & Lawrence Baum, Oasis or Mirage: The Supreme Court’s Thirst for 
Dictionaries in the Rehnquist and Roberts Eras, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 483, 537 (2013). 
 68. Id. at 548. 
 69. This finding is consistent with the 28.8 percent rate of dueling dictionary use found in 
Brudney and Baum’s study of employment law, business and commercial law, and criminal-law 
cases from 1986 to 2010. See id. at 526. 
 70. My earlier empirical study of the Roberts Court and Brudney & Baum’s recent study of 
the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts found that the Justices cited the following five dictionaries 
most frequently: Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, the Oxford English Dictionary, 
Webster’s Second New International Dictionary, the American Heritage Dictionary, and 
Black’s Law Dictionary. See Brudney & Baum, supra note 67, at 529; Krishnakumar, supra note 
17, at 240 n.85. 
 71. Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 132 S. Ct. 1997 (2012). 
 72. See id. at 2002–03, 2003 n.2. 
 73. See Brudney & Baum, supra note 67, at 530–31; Krishnakumar, supra note 17, at 
240 n.85. 
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Another possible explanation for the relatively low rate of 
judicial dueling over dictionary references is that, despite the 
availability of numerous dictionaries, there may have been no 
competing definition available in the forty cases in the dataset in 
which majority or dissenting opinions declined to counter an 
opposing opinion’s dictionary reference(s). In order to test this 
possibility, I (or a research assistant) examined the briefs in thirty-
eight of the forty cases in which a majority or dissenting opinion 
referenced a dictionary definition, but the opposing opinion(s) did 
not counter that reference.74 In the vast majority of the cases (67.5 
percent), both the petitioner and the respondent (or, in some cases, 
amici) had provided dictionary definitions supporting their respective 
statutory constructions. Moreover, in another handful of cases, the 
party whose interpretation was favored by the opinion that did not 
invoke a dictionary definition did provide a supporting dictionary 
definition in its brief.75 Ultimately, in 75.0 percent (thirty out of forty) 
of the cases in which a majority or dissenting opinion declined to 
counter a dictionary reference in an opposing opinion, at least one 
brief supporting the opposing opinion provided a helpful dictionary 
definition. Thus, the lack of availability of opposing definitions does 
not seem to explain the low level of dueling—nor does a lack of 
framing by litigants and attorneys. 
A third possibility is that the Justices are motivated to counter an 
opposing opinion’s dictionary references only, or primarily, in those 
cases in which the opposing opinion relies significantly on dictionary 
definitions to reach its statutory construction—and tend to leave 
unanswered those dictionary references that are used merely as 
“ornaments.” I explore this possibility further in the doctrinal analysis 
conducted in Section III.B.76 
Second, the Roberts Court’s relatively low rate of dueling over 
legislative history is quite surprising. The legislative history of most 
federal statutes is extensive, and debate on the House and Senate 
floor often produces competing statements about a statute’s 
 
 74. Briefs were not available online for the other two cases. 
 75. See, e.g., Brief for the State of Cal. at 44–46, Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. 
United States, 556 U.S. 599 (2009) (Nos. 07-1601 & 07-1607); Brief for the United States as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 7, 15, Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389 
(2008) (No. 06-1322); Brief for the Petitioners at 16–17, Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81 (2007) (No. 05-1508). 
 76. See infra Part III.B.1. 
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meaning.77 Accordingly, as with dictionary definitions, one would 
expect there to be “something for everyone” in the legislative 
history—and for this to translate into frequent dueling over this 
interpretive resource. Yet the data from this study reveal judicial 
dueling over legislative history in only 25.3 percent of the divided-
vote cases. Part III will explore the theoretical implications of this 
finding in detail, but for now it bears noting two possible explanations 
for the data: On the one hand, the conventional wisdom could simply 
be wrong, and the legislative history of many statutes may not in fact 
contain support for competing characterizations of the statute’s 
meaning. Alternatively, the Justices who make legislative history 
references may not be citing directly on-point “smoking gun” 
statements, and those authoring opposing opinions accordingly may 
not consider it crucial to counter such legislative history citations. 
Third, the low rate of judicial dueling over substantive canons 
also is unexpected. Substantive canons are judicially created 
interpretive presumptions and rules based on background legal 
norms, policies and conventions.78 They reflect judicially preferred 
policy positions, expressed as rules of thumb about how to treat 
statutory text in light of constitutional priorities, common-law 
practices, or specific statute-based policies. Because substantive 
canons are policy-based, there often are two or more that point in 
opposite directions. Indeed, Llewellyn lists in his “thrust” column the 
substantive canon that “[s]tatutes in derogation of the common law 
will not be extended by construction” and, as its “parry,” the 
countercanon that “[s]uch acts will be liberally construed if their 
nature is remedial.”79 Accordingly, it seems surprising that the 
members of the Roberts Court dueled over substantive canons at a 
rate of only 10.9 percent.80 
Last, the high rates of judicial dueling over precedent and 
practical reasoning, as compared to the low rates of dueling over 
purpose, legislative history, the whole act rule, and the like suggest 
 
 77. See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 27, at 36 (“Legislative history provides, moreover, a 
uniquely broad playing field. In any major piece of legislation, the legislative history is 
extensive, and there is something for everybody.”); In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1343 (7th Cir. 
1989) (Easterbrook, J.) (“Often there is so much legislative history that a court can manipulate 
the meaning of a law by choosing which snippets to emphasize . . . .”). 
 78. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 276 
(1994); Brudney & Ditslear, Canons of Construction, supra note 5, at 13. 
 79. Llewellyn, supra note 3, at 401. 
 80. See supra Table 1. 
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that the canons and tools of statutory construction may not be as 
readily manipulable as the traditional tools of legal analysis that 
Llewellyn sought to compare them to in his article. Or, at the least, 
the Justices on the Roberts Court do not seem as inclined to use the 
tools of statutory construction to counter each other as they do to use 
the common-law tools of analysis in a dueling manner. 
Before we rush to conclude that the Court rarely duels over 
statutory-interpretation-specific tools, however, it is worth looking at 
the rate of dueling by case type rather than by individual interpretive 
tool. As Table 2a shows, only 88 of 255 statutory cases decided during 
the period studied (34.5 percent) involved competing references to 
the same interpretive tool in both a majority and a dissenting opinion, 
excluding cases in which the Justices dueled only over Supreme Court 
precedent or practical consequences.81 This is not a trivial number, but 
neither does it constitute a terribly high rate of dueling. If we separate 
out unanimous cases and focus on the 140 cases in which the Justices 
divided over a statute’s construction, the rate climbs significantly, 
indicating that the Roberts Court engaged in dueling canon use in 
62.9 percent of such cases. Put differently, a large majority of the 
cases in which the Justices disagreed over the construction of the 
statute involved majority–dissent dueling over the same interpretive 
canon or tool. 
  
 
 81. One-hundred and thirteen of the cases involved some kind of dueling, but in nineteen 
of these the Court dueled only over the application of its own precedent, and in another six it 
dueled only over the application of practical consequences reasoning (three) or over precedent 
and practical reasoning (three). In my view, cases in which the Court dueled only over 
precedent and/or practical consequences should not count as “dueling canon” cases because 
precedent and practical consequences are general tools of legal analysis, not canons or tools 
specific to statutory construction. If we count these precedent-only or practical-only cases, then 
44.3 percent of the cases involved “dueling.” 
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Table 2a: Dueling Canon Use by Vote Margin* 
 
Percent Dueling Over 
Statutory Interpretation-
Specific Tools (n) 
 
Percent Dueling Over All Legal 
Analysis Tools (Including 
Precedent-Only and Practical-
Only Dueling) (n) 
All Cases (Including 
Unanimous Cases) 
(n=255) 34.5% (88) 44.3% (113) 
Divided-Vote Cases 
(n=140) 62.9% (88) 80.7% (113) 
Close-Margin Cases 
(5–4 / 5–3) 
(n=53) 64.2% (34) 84.9% (45) 
Wide-Margin Cases 
(n=87) 62.1% (54) 78.2% (68) 
* A chi-squared test revealed no statistical difference between rates of dueling for close-margin 
versus wide-margin cases. 
 
In addition, when the Justices used the interpretive tools in a 
dueling fashion, they tended to do so on multiple levels, dueling over 
numerous resources. Indeed, the members of the Roberts Court 
dueled over two or more interpretive tools in 83.0 percent of the 
eighty-eight dueling canon cases. Only fifteen of the eighty-eight 
dueling canon cases (17.0 percent) involved majority and dissenting 
opinions that dueled over only one interpretive tool.82 Further, as 
Table 2b below shows, the data from the Roberts Court’s first five 
terms are consistent with the Brudney–Ditslear and Law–Zaring 
findings that dissenting opinions were significantly more likely to 
invoke a canon or legislative history when the majority opinion relied 
on that interpretive resource than when the majority opinion did not. 
On the one hand, this finding could be taken to demonstrate that the 
Justices are strategic in their interpretive tool use—tailoring their 
references to counter the specific tools relied on by an opposing 
opinion rather than referencing only those tools they independently 
find compelling. This is the conclusion that Brudney–Ditslear and 
Law–Zaring reached based on similar data.83 On the other hand, the 
 
 82. See infra Appendix (listing each “dueling canon” case and all tools over which majority 
and dissenting opinions dueled by case). If we include cases that involve dueling only over 
precedent or practical consequences, then thirty-seven of one-hundred and thirteen or 32.7 
percent of the dueling cases involved dueling over only one interpretive tool. 
 83. See Brudney & Ditslear, Canons of Construction, supra note 5, at 96; Law & Zaring, 
supra note 5, at 1738. 
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cases in which a majority opinion references a particular interpretive 
tool may also be cases in which citation to that tool is more 
appropriate than in the average case. In many cases, for example, the 
legislative history may not contain on-point discussion of the relevant 
statutory issue; in those cases where it does, and the majority 
references that discussion, a competing comment about the statutory 
provision may also be available. Thus we should be cautious before 
ascribing too much meaning to this statistic.84 
Table 2b: Dissenting Opinion Reliance on Canons and Other 
Interpretative Tools 
 
Dissenting Opinion 
Reliance Absent Majority 
Opinion References 
Dissenting Opinion Reliance 
When Majority Opinion 
Invokes the Canon/Tool 
Text / Plain Meaning 32.3% (20 out of 62) 56.4% (44 out of 78) 
Dictionary 10.6% (10 out of 94) 34.8% (16 out of 46) 
Other Statutes 13.5% (13 out of 96) 45.5% (20 out of 44) 
Language Canons / 
Grammar / Whole Act Rule 24.7% (19 out of 77) 33.3% (21 out of 63) 
Substantive Canons 19.5% (23 out of 118) 13.6% (3 out of 22) 
Common Law 5.0% (6 out of 121) 31.6% (6 out of 19) 
Purpose 30.8% (28 out of 91) 38.8% (19 out of 49) 
Intent 22.0% (26 out of 118) 59.1% (13 out of 22) 
Legislative History 28.9% (28 out of 97) 44.2% (19 out of 43) 
Practical Consequences 49.4% (40 out of 81) 49.2% (29 out of 59) 
Supreme Court Precedent 32.7% (17 out of 52) 65.9% (58 out of 88) 
 
Overall, the data regarding the frequency of dueling canons 
provide a mixed picture. The rates of judicial dueling for most 
individual tools of construction are low—certainly lower than I 
expected to find for legislative history, dictionary references, 
 
 84. This is also why I believe that Table 1—which measures not only the extent to which 
dissenting opinions respond to a majority or concurring opinion’s reliance on a particular 
interpretive tool, but also the extent to which majority or concurring opinions respond to a 
dissenting opinion’s reliance on the tool—provides a better gauge of judicial dueling than does 
either the Brudney–Ditslear or the Law–Zaring study. 
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language/whole act, and substantive canons. At the same time, a large 
percentage of the Court’s divided-vote cases involved some level of 
majority–dissent dueling over the same interpretive tool. Indeed, in 
52.1 percent of the cases in which the Justices disagreed (73 of 140), 
majority and dissenting opinions dueled over multiple canons or 
tools. Thus, on the one hand, the worst implications of Llewellyn’s 
“thrusts” and “parries” do not appear to be borne out, in that most 
individual tools of construction are not being pitted against 
themselves in the vast majority of cases. On the other hand, however, 
the tools of statutory construction hardly seem to constrain the 
Justices or point neatly to one correct interpretation, as nearly two-
thirds of the Court’s divided-vote cases (88 of 140) contained 
competing applications of the same interpretive tool. 
2. Statutory Subject Matter.  If we break the cases down by 
statutory subject matter, the data become still more interesting. As 
Table 3a illustrates, subject matter seems to have a notable 
correlation to the rate at which the Roberts Court dueled over one or 
more interpretive canons when interpreting the statute. Table 3a 
reports the percentage of all dueling canon cases that involve statutes 
in a particular subject area.85 Caution should be used in interpreting 
these figures because once the data are disaggregated by statutory 
subject matter, the number of case observations dips significantly. 
Accordingly, this Article focuses on only the most striking data from 
Table 3a: criminal and antidiscrimination statutes each made up a 
substantial proportion of the Roberts Court’s dueling canon cases; 
nearly 40 percent of the cases in which the Court dueled involved a 
statute that fell within one of these two subject areas.86 If we add in 
cases construing environmental statutes, nearly half (46.5 percent) of 
the Court’s dueling canon cases are accounted for.87 
  
 
 85. See infra Table 3a.  
 86. See id. 
 87. Of the 255 statutory cases decided during the period studied, 32.9 percent involved 
criminal (21.1 percent) or antidiscrimination (11.8 percent) statutes. If we add in environmental 
law cases, the percentage of the Court’s docket that involved these types of statutes was 37.3 
percent. So the proportion of dueling cases accounted for by these statutory subject areas (46.5 
percent) was a bit higher than the proportion of overall statutory cases that involved these 
subject areas. 
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Table 3a: Dueling Canon Use by Subject Area 
 
Percentage of All Dueling Cases That 
Involve Statutes in this Subject Area  
(n=88) 
Criminal  
(incl. AEDPA) 26.1% (23) 
Discrimination  
(incl. IDEA) 13.6% (12) 
Environmental 6.8% (6) 
Jurisdictional  
(not incl. criminal) 4.5% (4) 
Preemption 5.7% (5) 
FAA 3.4% (3) 
Securities 3.4% (3) 
Bankruptcy 5.7% (5) 
Immigration 2.3% (2) 
Communications Act 2.3% (2) 
False Claims Act 2.3% (2) 
NLRA / Employment 2.3% (2) 
Other& 21.6% (19) 
& Fourteen statutes/subject areas generated only one dueling canon case: Terrorism Risk 
Insurance Act; Civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act; Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act; Railroads; Fair Debt Collection Act; Religion; Federal Tort 
Claims Act; Freedom of Information Act; Tax; Indian law; Attorneys’ Fees; Federal Power Act; 
National Banking Act; Jones Act. Three others generated two dueling canon cases each: the 
Prison Litigation Reform Act, statutes dealing with Procedure, and Intellectual Property. 
 
This subject-matter sensitivity could be one reason why the 
Brudney–Ditslear study reported greater overall dueling canon use 
than Table 1 suggests. Because Brudney–Ditslear reviewed only 
employment cases, including many antidiscrimination cases based on 
statutes such as Title VII, the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), and 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (AEDA), their study 
may unwittingly have selected a subset of statutory cases that are 
particularly susceptible to judicial dueling. 
The subject-matter data naturally raise the question: Why? What 
is it about criminal, antidiscrimination, and environmental statutes 
that makes the Roberts Court particularly likely to duel over canons 
and interpretive tools? One possibility is that there is something 
about statutes in these subject areas that gives rise to greater 
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indeterminacy or to competing applications of interpretive tools than 
is the case for statutes in other subject areas. For example, Congress 
often borrows language from existing criminal statutes when it writes 
new ones, particularly when a new statute deals with the same type of 
underlying conduct as older statutes.88 Similarly, Congress often uses 
Title VII or the Fair Labor Standards Act as the template for other, 
newer antidiscrimination statutes.89 As a result, there may be multiple 
analogous statutes available for the Justices to choose from when 
applying the other statutes tool to help decipher the meaning of a 
criminal or antidiscrimination statute.90 Alternately, statutes in these 
subject areas may reflect more ideologically charged legislative 
battles than do other statutes, giving rise to cross cutting statements in 
the legislative record, including competing claims about statutory 
purpose. Thus, there might be a large quantity of contradictory 
legislative history or statutory purposes available to the Justices when 
construing statutes in these subject areas. 
As Table 3b shows, the data contain some evidence that is 
consistent with these explanations. But the evidence is modest and 
does not hold for all three subject areas. For example, nearly one-
fourth of the dueling canon criminal cases contained dueling 
references to the other statutes and legislative history tools, as did 
one-fourth of the dueling canon antidiscrimination cases—but none 
of the environmental cases dueled over either of these tools.91 
Conversely, one-third of the dueling canon environmental cases 
contained dueling references to statutory purpose, but the figures 
were much lower for dueling criminal and antidiscrimination cases.92 
  
 
 88. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 234 (1999) (referencing a robbery statute 
that served as a model for the statute at issue). 
 89. See, e.g., Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 578–79 (1978) (noting that the ADEA was 
modeled on both the FLSA and Title VII); H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 2, at 4 (1991), as reprinted 
in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 696–97 (“A number of other laws banning discrimination, including 
[the ADEA] are modeled after, and have been interpreted in a manner consistent with, Title 
VII.”). 
 90. See, e.g., Jones, 526 U.S. at 234–36, 259–61 (discussing which of three model robbery 
statutes was most analogous to statute at issue). Compare Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance 
Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011) (citing numerous state statutes and federal regulations that 
permit complaints to be filed orally), with Brief in Opposition at 6–8, Kasten v. Saint-Gobain 
Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011) (No. 09-834) (citing numerous different 
analogous statutes to argue that complaints must be filed in writing). 
 91. See infra Table 3b. 
 92. See infra Table 3b. 
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Table 3b: Subject Area Dueling 
 Criminal Antidiscrimination Environmental 
Plain Meaning 43.5% (10) 41.7% (5) 33.3% (2) 
Dictionary 13.0% (3) 8.3% (1) 33.3% (2) 
Language/Whole Act Rule 26.1% (6) 16.7% (2) 33.3% (2) 
Other Statutes 21.7% (5) 25.0% (3) 0.0% (0) 
Purpose 4.3% (1) 16.7% (2) 33.3% (2) 
Legislative History 21.7% (5) 25.0% (3) 0.0% (0) 
Substantive Canons 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 
 
Another possibility is that statutes in the criminal, 
antidiscrimination, and environmental law areas reflect clearer 
ideological dividing lines than do statutes dealing with other 
subjects.93 With respect to the environmental law and 
antidiscrimination law cases, the statutes being interpreted typically 
are sweeping progressive or social-justice statutes enacted during the 
1960s by liberal Congresses—in a political climate very different from 
the one that has existed during the Roberts Court’s tenure.94 Thus, the 
clash between majority and dissenting opinions may be political, with 
the liberal Justices seeking to preserve the original, broad goals of a 
statute enacted in a more liberal era and the conservative Justices 
seeking to curtail the modern application of the statute. As a result, 
when construing statutes in these subject areas, the Justices’ 
ideological preferences may predominate and they may be more 
inclined to use the canons to justify their preferred statutory 
constructions than is the case with other, less controversial subject 
areas. That is, the members of the Roberts Court (1) may be more 
inclined in criminal, antidiscrimination, and environmental law cases 
to start with their preferred outcomes and then look for ways to shape 
the canons and interpretive tools to justify those outcomes; or (2) may 
 
 93. That is, government v. criminal defendant, employer v. employee, disability claimant v. 
state, minority voters v. local authorities, or environmental interests v. private-property 
interests. 
 94. Cf. Law & Zaring, supra note 5, at 1740 (concluding that the level of ideological 
alignment between authoring justice and enacting Congress is a statistically significant predictor 
of probability that a statutory interpretation opinion will reference legislative history). 
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regard the stakes as higher for these cases and, accordingly, consider 
it more necessary to neutralize the interpretive tools used by 
opposing opinions. 
There is some anecdotal evidence for this explanation: a number 
of the U.S. Supreme Court’s most memorable statutory interpretation 
cases have involved significant judicial dueling over statutes in the 
antidiscrimination and environmental law areas. Consider, for 
example, the Rehnquist Court case, Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of 
Communities for a Great Oregon.95 Babbitt involved a section of the 
Endangered Species Act (ESA) that makes it unlawful for any person 
to “take” an endangered species within the United States.96 The ESA 
defines the term “take” to mean, in part, “to harm.”97 In 1975, the 
Department of the Interior issued a regulation defining “‘[h]arm’ in 
the definition of ‘take’” to include any activity that results in 
“significant habitat modification . . . [that] significantly impair[s] 
essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding or 
sheltering.”98 Babbitt raised the question whether the Department had 
the authority, under the ESA, to prevent landowners from harming 
endangered species by destroying their essential habitats.99 
The majority and dissenting opinions in Babbitt dueled over a 
dizzying array of canons and interpretive tools, including dictionary 
definitions, the plain meaning rule, noscitur a sociis, the whole act 
rule, and legislative history.100 Despite their impressive repartee over 
the canons, however, both opinions give the distinct impression of 
being about much more than the neutral application of statutory 
interpretation rules. The strong undercurrent of the conservative 
dissenting opinion is that environmental statutes should be construed 
 
 95. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995). 
 96. See id. at 690; 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (2012). 
 97. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19). 
 98. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1994). 
 99. Babbitt, 515 U.S. at 692. 
 100. For example, Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion argued that the plain meaning of 
“take” encompasses only deliberate, intentional action directed toward individual animals, not 
incidental injuries to habitat. Justice Stevens’ majority opinion countered that the ordinary 
meaning of “harm” in the definition of “take” covers incidental injury of the kind caused by 
habitat destruction. Compare Babbitt, 515 U.S. at 687, 697, 709 (stating that the dictionary 
definition of “harm” includes “injure” and habitat modification which kills individual animals of 
an endangered species causes “injury”), with id. at 717–18 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“It is obvious 
that ‘take’ in this sense . . . describes a class of acts (not omissions) done directly and 
intentionally . . . .”). 
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to interfere as little as possible with private-property rights;101 while 
the underlying theme of the liberal majority opinion is that species 
extinction poses grave threats to the environment and that the ESA’s 
broad purpose of species preservation must trump private-property 
interests.102 A recent case, Rapanos v. United States,103 which involved 
a landowner’s right to backfill wetlands under the Clean Water Act, 
reflects similar majority–dissent dueling on the surface, and a similar 
underlying ideological battle over private-property rights versus 
effective environmental preservation. The conservative plurality 
opinion, for example, began by bemoaning the costly “burden of 
federal regulation on those who would deposit fill material in 
locations denominated ‘waters of the United States,’” calling the 
agency responsible for regulating wetlands “an enlightened despot,” 
and complaining that “for backfilling his own wet fields, Mr. Rapanos 
faced 63 months in prison and hundreds of thousands of dollars in 
criminal and civil fines.”104 The liberal dissenting opinion, by contrast, 
emphasized the Clean Water Act’s “Herculean goal of ending water 
pollution” and the importance of wetlands for the preservation of 
water quality.105 
In a similar vein is the Burger Court case United Steelworkers v. 
Weber.106 Weber involved an early application of Title VII, raising the 
question whether that statute should be read to bar private employers 
from adopting voluntary affirmative action plans designed to remedy 
the present effects of past discrimination against black employees.107 
The majority and dissenting opinions in Weber dueled over multiple 
interpretive tools, including legislative history, purpose, and statutory 
language.108 Most notably, the opinions engaged in an exhaustive 
back-and-forth about various statements in the legislative history, 
 
 101. See id. at 714 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s holding that the hunting and killing 
prohibition incidentally preserves habitat on private lands imposes unfairness to the point of 
financial ruin—not just upon the rich, but upon the simplest farmer who finds his land 
conscripted to national zoological use.”). 
 102. See id. at 698 (majority opinion) (“[T]he broad purpose of the ESA supports the 
Secretary’s decision to extend protection against activities that cause the precise harms 
Congress enacted the statute to avoid.”). 
 103. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006). 
 104. Id. at 721. 
 105. Id. at 787, 798–99 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 106. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). 
 107. Id. at 197. 
 108. Id. at 206, 220, 230. 
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often refuting each other’s claims point-for-point.109 Underlying this 
extensive dueling, however, was a fundamental ideological battle over 
affirmative action. The liberal majority opinion found it unimaginable 
to read a statute designed to address centuries of discrimination 
against black Americans in a manner that would prohibit voluntary 
efforts by private employers to abolish the present-day effects of that 
historical discrimination.110 The conservative dissenting opinion, by 
contrast, found it equally odious to read the statute to allow 
discrimination against white employees as the means for improving 
black employees’ opportunities.111 Several of the Roberts Court’s 
antidiscrimination cases reflect similar underlying judicial divides 
over the appropriate reach of statutes designed to protect minorities 
and women from employment or voting discrimination, even as the 
majority and dissenting opinions duel over the application of specific 
interpretive canons.112 
What, then, about the Court’s high rates of dueling canon use in 
cases involving criminal statutes? After all, the statutes at issue in the 
Court’s criminal-law cases generally are not the product of sweeping 
social-justice movements. Despite this difference, criminal statutes 
nevertheless may reflect clear ideological dividing lines, or 
disagreement, over how the State should treat those accused of 
crimes. Again, the Justices’ clear policy preferences may color the 
way they apply the canons and interpretive tools and make them 
more inclined to counter an opposing opinion’s use of such tools—not 
 
 109. See id. at 207, 207 n.7, 229, 230 n.11, 232, 232 n.12 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  
 110. Id. at 202–04 (majority opinion). 
 111. See id. at 254 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“There is perhaps no device more destructive 
to the notion of equality than the numerus clausus—the quota.”). A recent Roberts Court case, 
Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009), involved a similar ideological clash over Title VII. See 
id. at 563 (discussing the legality under Title VII of a municipality’s race-based promotion 
practices). The majority and dissenting opinions in Ricci dueled over the whole act rule, 
statutory purpose, and practical consequences, see id. at 583–84, 579–80, but again, the 
underlying division was over the fairness of abandoning the results of a firefighter promotion 
examination on which white firefighters significantly outperformed black firefighters, compare 
id. at 593 (“Many of the candidates had studied for months, at considerable personal and 
financial expense, and thus the injury caused by the City's reliance on raw racial statistics at the 
end of the process was all the more severe.”), with id. at 608–11 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(noting that though “[t]he white firefighters who scored high on New Haven's promotional 
exams understandably attract this Court’s sympathy . . . they had no vested right to promotion” 
and that “[f]irefighting is a profession in which the legacy of racial discrimination casts an 
especially long shadow”). 
 112. See, e.g., Ricci, 557 U.S. at 583–84, 579–80, 608–11; Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 6, 
14–16, 27–29 (2009); AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen, 556 U.S. 701, 704, 709 n.3, 720–721 (2008); 
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 621, 628, 646–47 (2006). 
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as a result of longstanding ideological divisions over sweeping statutes 
enacted in a previous era, but because the Justices have strong views 
about the moral culpability of certain behavior and about how the 
government should punish those accused of such behavior. 
Many of the Court’s criminal cases, for example, involve 
sentencing statutes, and seem to reflect an underlying disagreement 
about the harshness of applying a mandatory enhancement to 
particular conduct. Consider Dean v. United States,113 in which the 
Justices employed the whole act rule, other statutes, and common-law 
rules in a dueling manner in determining whether a ten-year 
sentencing enhancement applied to a defendant whose gun 
accidentally discharged while he was robbing a bank.114 Although the 
majority and principal dissenting opinions dueled over the structure 
of the statute, the appropriate inferences to be drawn from the felony 
murder statute (parallel v. meaningful variation), and common-law 
rules about mens rea versus unintended consequences of unlawful 
conduct,115 a strong policy disagreement about fairness seems to 
underlie these more technical disagreements. Specifically, the 
opinions seem to be motivated by a fundamental concern about 
whether it is fair (majority) or unfair (dissent) to subject a criminal 
defendant to an extra ten years in prison because his gun accidentally 
discharged while he was committing a violent crime.116 Several of the 
Court’s other criminal cases involve the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act and reflect ideological divisions about the equity 
of cutting off death-penalty appeals. In such cases, the majority and 
dissenting opinions often seem, at bottom, to be clashing over 
different normative visions about access to the courts for death-
penalty appeals.117 
Overall, then, ideological divisions may explain the high 
representation of environmental, antidiscrimination, and criminal 
statutes among the dueling canon cases. Each of these subject areas 
 
 113. Dean v. United States, 556 U.S. 568 (2009). 
 114. See id. at 570. 
 115. Compare id. at 572–73, 578, with id. at 575, 579 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (disagreeing 
over comparisons to common-law crimes). 
 116. Compare id. at 576 (defendant was “guilty of unlawful conduct twice over”), with id. at 
585 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Congress would not have intended to punish so harshly.”).  
 117. Compare, e.g., Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336 (2007) (worrying about providing 
“incentives for state prisoners to file certiorari petitions as a delay tactic”), with id. at 345 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that the majority’s reading “deprive[s] unwitting 
litigants of the opportunity to pursue their constitutional claims”). 
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involves a hot-button issue that tends to divide the major political 
parties and their supporters. As a result, statutes dealing with these 
subject areas may be the product of extensive compromise between 
legislators on opposite sides of the political divide. This in turn may 
give rise to (1) an abundance of legislative history reflecting 
competing visions of the statute’s reach, (2) statutory text that is 
intentionally vague or susceptible to competing readings, or (3) a 
heightened likelihood that the Justices charged with interpreting 
these statutes will have individual policy preferences regarding how 
such statutes should be implemented. Consequently, it may be the 
case that statutes in these subject areas give rise to competing 
applications of the same interpretive tool more frequently than do 
statutes in other subject areas. Moreover, when construing statutes in 
these subject areas, the Justices may be more likely to use the canons 
and tools of statutory construction to justify a reading arrived at 
through other means, rather than as a starting point. In contrast, 
when construing statutes in other, less ideologically charged subject 
areas, the Justices may be less inclined to use the canons to 
counteract each other. 
Another possibility raised by the subject-matter data is that the 
Justices tend to duel at higher rates in cases involving a statute not 
administered by an agency or a statute that is administered by a weak 
agency. This hypothesis does not perfectly explain the data reported 
in Table 3a, as environmental statutes are administered by the EPA, a 
powerful agency.118 But lack of deference to an agency interpretation 
could be part of the reason why so many of the dueling canon cases 
 
 118. Agencies are not all created equal. Congress grants some agencies expansive powers 
and authority, while limiting the authority granted to others. The EPA is widely considered a 
powerful agency because Congress has granted it broad powers under several statutes, including 
the Clean Water Act, the Clean Air Act, and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 
523 U.S. 83, 87 (1998) (“The [EPA] has the most powerful enforcement arsenal: it may seek 
criminal, civil, or administrative penalties.”); Stephen Breyer, The Executive Branch, 
Administrative Action, and Comparative Expertise, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2189, 2191 
(“Government again expanded the scope of regulation significantly in the 1970s with the 
creation of powerful but not necessarily organizationally ‘independent’ regulatory authorities, 
such as the Environmental Protection Agency, the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration, and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.”); Louis Jaffe, The 
Disorder of Politics: Lowi Takes the High Road (Book Review), 24 STAN. L. REV. 587, 590 
(1972) (book review) (“[EPA] by a continuing series of statutes has been given very powerful 
anti-pollution tools allowing it to formulate and enforce air and water quality standards.”). 
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involve criminal and antidiscrimination119 statutes (and why the next 
largest category of dueling canon cases involves preemption and 
bankruptcy statutes).120 Perhaps the Court engages in more extensive 
statutory interpretation in cases that do not involve a respected 
agency interpretation because in such cases it does not begin with a 
presumption of deference to the agency’s construction. And perhaps 
when the Court engages in more extensive statutory interpretation, 
without the benefit of agency guidance (or with guidance from an 
agency to which Congress has given limited power, like the EEOC), 
the Justices are more inclined to duel over individual interpretive 
tools. 
3. Dueling Canons and Ideology.  While evaluating the data, it 
became clear that it would be useful to examine the relationship 
between ideology and judicial dueling, both for purposes of 
comparison to the Brudney–Ditslear study and because the subject-
matter data suggested the possibility that judicial dueling might be 
more prevalent in cases with strong ideological dividing lines. Before 
reporting the ideology data, however, a caveat is in order: It is 
difficult to code case outcomes for ideology because it is not always 
clear whether an outcome favoring a particular litigant is liberal or 
conservative and coders necessarily must make judgment calls. In 
order to minimize errors and to make this study as replicable as 
possible, I coded for ideology by importing the ideological direction 
coding from the Spaeth Supreme Court database for the cases in my 
dataset.121 
Three results stand out. First, the “dueling canon” cases (i.e., 
cases in which the Court invoked the same interpretive tools to 
support competing interpretations) skewed significantly conservative 
compared to all statutory cases, and somewhat more conservative 
than all divided-vote cases.122 Further, the more closely divided cases 
were significantly more likely to inspire judicial dueling than were 
cases decided by a wide margin. Second, when the Justices in majority 
 
 119. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is a notoriously weak agency, to 
which Congress has delegated limited power, and traditionally receives little deference from 
courts. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 76 n.11 (1977); Gen. Elec. 
Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 (1976); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139–40 (1944). 
 120. See supra Table 3a. 
 121. Legacy Datasets: 2014 Release 01, THE SUPREME COURT DATABASE, http://
supremecourtdatabase.org/data.php?s=2 [http://perma.cc/RG9G-HM78].  
 122. See infra Table 4. 
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and dissenting opinions invoked the interpretive canons in a 
competing or dueling fashion, they tended to do so consistently with 
their ideological preferences. Third, and by contrast, in the 
unanimously decided cases the Justices tended to employ the 
interpretive canons to support both liberal and conservative outcomes 
at much more even rates. (That is, the conservative–liberal 
differential for most canons was much closer). 
Table 4: Ideology by Case Type 
 Conservative (n) Liberal (n) Neither (n) 
All Statutory Cases 
(n=255) 49.8% (127) 46.7% (119) 3.5% (9) 
Dueling Cases 
(n=88) 62.5% (55) 37.1% (33) 0.0% (0) 
Unanimous Cases 
(n=115) 40.0% 53.0% 7.0% 
Divided-Vote Cases 
(n=140) 57.9% (81) 41.4% (58) 0.7% (1) 
 
Table 4 reports the ideological direction of the majority opinion 
in all statutory cases, unanimous cases, divided-vote cases, and 
dueling canon cases in the dataset. As the Table shows, the 
conservative–liberal split for all statutory cases decided during the 
time frame of the study was almost even, while the split for 
unanimous cases skewed liberal by several percentage points 
(thirteen percentage points). By contrast, the split for cases decided 
by a divided vote skewed conservative by a decisive margin (over 
sixteen percentage points). The largest conservative–liberal 
differential occurred in the dueling canon cases, which skewed 
conservative by a whopping thirty-two percentage points. 
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Table 5: Dueling by Vote Margin 
 
Percent of Cases 
Within Vote 
Margin 
Involving 
Dueling Canons& 
Percent of Dueling 
Canon Cases 
Decided By This 
Vote Margin 
 
Percent of Cases 
Within Vote Margin 
Involving Any Dueling 
(Including Precedent- 
Only and Practical- 
Only Dueling) 
5 or 4 Justice Majority  
(5–4 / 5–3 / 4–1–4)  
(n=53) 64.2% 38.6% 84.9% 
5, 4, or 6 Justice 
Majority Cases  
(n=95) 68.4%* 72.7% 84.2% 
7 or More Justice 
Majority Cases  
(n=45) 51.1% 27.3% 73.3% 
& For purposes of this Table, “dueling canon use” refers to cases in which majority and 
dissenting opinions (or, in a few cases, a concurrence and at least one dissenting opinion) both 
employed the same statutory-interpretation-specific interpretive tools to reach different 
statutory readings and case outcomes. This column does not include cases in which majority and 
dissenting opinions dueled solely over the application of Supreme Court precedent, practical 
reasoning, or both precedent and practical reasoning. 
* A chi-squared test showed that the difference between rates of dueling for opinions with six or 
fewer Justices in the majority versus opinions with seven or more Justices in the majority 
approached significance, at p=.084.  
 
Table 5 reports the Roberts Court’s rate of dueling canon use in 
divided-vote cases by vote margin. As the Table shows, the 
overwhelming majority of the dueling canon cases were decided with 
six or fewer Justices joining the majority opinion (72.7 percent), and 
more than half of those cases were decided by extremely close vote 
margins, usually 5–4 or 5–3. Cases in which seven or more Justices 
agreed on a statute’s construction represented a much smaller 
percentage of the dueling canon cases (27.3 percent). Moreover, a 
large majority of all cases decided by close vote margins contained 
judicial dueling over the canons and other interpretive tools. In other 
words, the Justices were most likely to engage the interpretive canons 
and tools in a dueling manner when their levels of consensus were 
low. 
It is difficult to draw any definitive conclusions from these 
numbers, as they show only correlation, not causation. But a number 
of possible explanations are worth exploring. On the one hand, close 
vote margins could reflect statutory ambiguity. That is, the Justices 
could be dividing closely because the statutes at issue lend themselves 
to multiple plausible readings. In cases involving such ambiguous 
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statutes, individual interpretive canons and tools may be particularly 
likely to point in multiple directions. Thus, the Justices could be 
dividing closely because individual canons and tools are pointing in 
competing directions, and they could be dueling over the canons’ 
application because the canons point in multiple directions. 
Alternately, the close margin cases may involve issues that are 
particularly ideologically charged. The Justices could be deciding 
these cases based on their ideological preferences—choosing their 
preferred readings first, and then employing the canons in a dueling 
fashion in order to justify their constructions and neutralize opposing 
arguments. 
Statistical observations cannot reveal the Justices’ internal 
motivations for voting a particular way in a particular case—and in 
this context cannot tell us whether the Justices duel at higher rates in 
close-vote-margin cases because of statutory ambiguity, ideological 
preferences, or some other factor. Nevertheless, it is worth trying to 
understand as much as we can about how the Justices duel over 
individual interpretive canons when they choose to do so. In an effort 
to gain a more granular understanding of the Justices’ dueling 
practices, Tables 6a–6g report the ideological direction of each 
individual Justice’s vote in cases in which the justice authored or 
joined an opinion that employed a particular interpretive tool in a 
dueling manner.123 
  
 
 123. Figures are not reported for dueling over substantive canons or the common-law 
precedent interpretive tool because there were only 5–6 cases involving dueling over each of 
these interpretive tools. 
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Table 6a: Judicial Ideology in Dueling Legislative History Cases 
(n=19) 
Justice 
Justice 
Ideology 
Percent 
Conservativeτ 
Percent 
Liberalϑ 
Percent Not 
Participating
/ Neither 
Conservative
–Liberal 
Differential 
Scalia Conservative 68.4% (13) 10.5% (2) 21.1% (4) 58.1% 
Thomas Conservative 63.2% (12) 15.8% (3) 21.1% (4) 47.4% 
Roberts Conservative 52.6% (10) 21.1% (4) 26.3% (5) 31.5% 
Alito Conservative 73.7% (14) 15.8% (3) 10.5% (2) 57.9% 
Kennedy Conservative 42.1% (8) 42.1% (8) 15.8% (3) 0.0% 
Souter Liberal 21.1% (4) 36.8% (7) 42.1% (8) -15.7% 
Ginsburg Liberal 31.6% (6) 57.9% (11) 10.5% (2) -26.3% 
Breyer Liberal 15.8% (3) 68.4% (13) 15.8% (3) -52.6% 
Stevens Liberal 15.8% (3) 63.2% (12) 21.1% (4) -47.4% 
Sotomayor Liberal 10.5% (2) 21.1% (4) 68.4% (13) -- 
Kagan Liberal 5.2% (1) 10.5% (2) 84.2% (16) -- 
τ Percentage of cases involving majority–dissenting dueling over legislative intent in which the 
Justice authored or joined an opinion that referenced intent to reach a conservative outcome. 
ϑ Percentage of cases involving majority–dissenting dueling over text or plain meaning in which 
the Justice authored or joined an opinion that referenced text or plain meaning to reach a 
liberal outcome. 
Table 6b: Judicial Ideology in Dueling Purpose Cases (n=19) 
Justice 
Justice 
Ideology 
Percent 
Conservativeτ 
Percent 
Liberalϑ 
Percent Not 
Participating 
/ Neither 
Conservative 
–Liberal 
Differential 
Scalia Conservative 63.2% (12) 26.3% (5) 10.5% (2) 36.9% 
Thomas Conservative 68.4% (13) 26.3% (5) 5.26% (1) 42.1% 
Roberts Conservative 68.4% (13) 26.3% (5) 5.26% (1) 42.1% 
Alito Conservative 78.9% (15) 15.8% (3) 5.26% (1) 63.1% 
Kennedy Conservative 73.7% (14) 26.3% (5) 0.0% (0) 47.4% 
Souter Liberal 26.3% (5) 31.6% (6) 42.1% (8) -5.3% 
Ginsburg Liberal 21.1% (4) 78.9% (15) 0.0% (0) -57.8% 
Breyer Liberal 36.8% (7) 63.2% (12) 0.0.% (0) -26.5% 
Stevens Liberal 15.8% (3) 68.4% (13) 15.8% (3) -52.6% 
Sotomayor Liberal 10.5% (2) 26.3% (5) 63.2% (12) -- 
Kagan Liberal 5.26% (1) 5.26% (1) 89.4% (17) -- 
τ Percentage of cases involving majority–dissenting dueling over legislative intent in which the 
Justice authored or joined an opinion that referenced intent to reach a conservative outcome. 
ϑ Percentage of cases involving majority–dissenting dueling over text or plain meaning in which 
the Justice authored or joined an opinion that referenced text or plain meaning to reach a 
liberal outcome. 
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Table 6c: Judicial Ideology in Dueling Dictionary Cases (n=16) 
Justice 
Justice 
Ideology 
Percent 
Conservativeτ 
Percent 
Liberalϑ 
Percent Not 
Participating  
/ Neither 
Conservative 
–Liberal 
Differential 
Scalia Conservative 50.0% (8) 50.0% (8) 0.0% (0) 0.0% 
Thomas Conservative 62.5% (10) 37.5% (6) 0.0% (0) 25.0% 
Roberts Conservative 50.0% (8) 43.75% (7) 6.25% (1) 6.25% 
Alito Conservative 75.0% (12) 25.0% (4) 0.0% (0) 50.0% 
Kennedy Conservative 56.25% (9) 43.75% (7) 0.0% (0) 12.5% 
Souter Liberal 18.75% (3) 43.75% (7) 37.5% (6) -25.0% 
Ginsburg Liberal 37.5% (6) 62.5% (10) 0.0% (0) -25.0% 
Breyer Liberal 25.0% (4) 75.0% (12) 0.0% (0) -50.0% 
Stevens Liberal 18.75% (3) 62.5% (10) 18.75% (3) -50.0% 
Sotomayor Liberal 12.5% (2) 37.5% (4) 62.5% (10) -- 
Kagan Liberal 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 100.0% (16) -- 
τ Percentage of cases involving majority–dissenting dueling over legislative intent in which the 
Justice authored or joined an opinion that referenced intent to reach a conservative outcome. 
ϑ Percentage of cases involving majority–dissenting dueling over text or plain meaning in which 
the Justice authored or joined an opinion that referenced text or plain meaning to reach a 
liberal outcome. 
Table 6d: Judicial Ideology in Dueling Language/Grammar/Whole Act 
Cases (n=21) 
Justice 
Justice 
Ideology 
Percent 
Conservativeτ 
Percent 
Liberalϑ 
Percent Not 
Participating 
/ Neither 
Conservative
–Liberal 
Differential 
Scalia Conservative 71.4% (15) 28.6% (6) 0.0% (0) 42.8% 
Thomas Conservative 85.7% (18) 14.3% (3) 0.0% (0) 71.4% 
Roberts Conservative 57.1% (12) 38.1% (8) 4.8% (1) 19.0% 
Alito Conservative 71.4% (15) 28.6% (6) 0.0% (0) 42.8% 
Kennedy Conservative 57.1% (12) 38.1% (8) 4.8% (1) 19.0% 
Souter Liberal 28.6% (6) 57.1% (12) 14.3% (3) -28.5% 
Ginsburg Liberal 28.6% (6) 61.9% (13) 9.5% (2) -33.3% 
Breyer Liberal 9.5% (2) 66.7% (14) 23.8% (5) -57.2% 
Stevens Liberal 0.0% (0) 76.2% (16) 23.8% (5) -76.2% 
Sotomayor Liberal 0.0% (0) 9.5% (2) 90.5% (19) -- 
Kagan Liberal 0.0% (0) 0.0(0) 100.0% (21) -- 
τ Percentage of cases involving majority–dissenting dueling over legislative intent in which the 
Justice authored or joined an opinion that referenced intent to reach a conservative outcome. 
ϑ Percentage of cases involving majority–dissenting dueling over text or plain meaning in which 
the Justice authored or joined an opinion that referenced text or plain meaning to reach a 
liberal outcome. 
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Table 6e: Judicial Ideology in Dueling Other Statutes Cases (n=20) 
Justice 
Justice 
Ideology 
Percent 
Conservativeτ 
Percent 
Liberalϑ 
Percent Not 
Participating 
/ Neither 
Conservative 
–Liberal 
Differential 
Scalia Conservative 65.0% (13) 30.0% (6) 5.0% (1) 35.0% 
Thomas Conservative 65.0% (13) 35.0% (7) 0.0% (0) 30.0% 
Roberts Conservative 55.0% (11) 40.0% (8) 5.0% (1) 15.0% 
Alito Conservative 55.0% (11) 40.0% (8) 5.0% (1) 15.0% 
Kennedy Conservative 55.0% (11) 40.0% (8) 5.0% (1) 15.0% 
Souter Liberal 30.0% (6) 45.0% (9) 25.0% (5) -5.0% 
Ginsburg Liberal 30.0% (6) 65.0% (13) 5.0% (1) -35.0% 
Breyer Liberal 15.0% (3) 85.0% (17) 0.0% (0) -70.0% 
Stevens Liberal 15.0% (3) 75.0% (15) 10.0% (2) -60.0% 
Sotomayor Liberal 0.0% (0) 20.0% (4) 80.0% (16) -- 
Kagan Liberal 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 100.0% (20) -- 
τ Percentage of cases involving majority–dissenting dueling over legislative intent in which the 
Justice authored or joined an opinion that referenced intent to reach a conservative outcome. 
ϑ Percentage of cases involving majority–dissenting dueling over text or plain meaning in which 
the Justice authored or joined an opinion that referenced text or plain meaning to reach a 
liberal outcome. 
Table 6f: Judicial Ideology in Dueling Plain Meaning Cases (n=43) 
Justice 
Justice 
Ideology 
Percent 
Conservativeτ 
Percent 
Liberalϑ 
Percent Not 
Participating 
/ Neither 
Conservative 
–Liberal 
Differential 
Scalia Conservative 61.4% (27) 34.1% (15) 4.5% (2) 27.3% 
Thomas Conservative 72.7% (32) 22.7% (10) 4.5% (2) 50.0% 
Roberts Conservative 50.0% (22) 45.5% (20) 4.5% (2) 4.5% 
Alito Conservative 63.6% (28) 31.8% (14) 4.5% (2) 31.8% 
Kennedy Conservative 50.0% (22) 50.0% (22) 0.0% (0) 0.0% 
Souter Liberal 15.9% (7) 43.2% (19) 40.9% (18) -27.3% 
Ginsburg Liberal 36.3% (16) 56.8% (25) 6.8% (3) -20.5% 
Breyer Liberal 29.5% (13) 61.4% (27) 9.1% (4) -31.9% 
Stevens Liberal 13.6% (6) 65.9% (29) 20.5% (9) -52.3% 
Sotomayor Liberal 11.4% (5) 15.9% (7) 72.7% (32) -- 
Kagan Liberal 4.5% (2) 11.4% (5) 84.1% (37) -- 
τ Percentage of cases involving majority–dissenting dueling over legislative intent in which the 
Justice authored or joined an opinion that referenced intent to reach a conservative outcome. 
ϑ Percentage of cases involving majority–dissenting dueling over text or plain meaning in which 
the Justice authored or joined an opinion that referenced text or plain meaning to reach a 
liberal outcome. 
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Table 6g: Judicial Ideology in Dueling Legislative Intent Cases (n=13) 
Justice 
Justice 
Ideology 
Percent 
Conservativeτ 
Percent 
Liberalϑ 
Percent Not 
Participating 
/ Neither 
Conservative 
–Liberal 
Differential 
Scalia Conservative 76.9% (10) 23.1% (3) 0.0% (0) 53.8% 
Thomas Conservative 76.9% (10) 23.1% (3) 0.0% (0) 53.8% 
Roberts Conservative 76.9% (10) 15.4% (2) 7.7% (1) 62.5% 
Alito Conservative 61.5% (8) 30.8% (4) 7.7% (1) 30.7% 
Kennedy Conservative 69.2% (9) 30.8% (4) 0.0% (0) 38.4% 
Souter Liberal 30.8% (4) 69.2% (8) 7.7% (1) -38.4% 
Ginsburg Liberal 46.2% (6) 53.8% (7) 0.0% (0) -7.6% 
Breyer Liberal 46.2% (6) 46.2% (6) 7.7% (1) 0.0% 
Stevens Liberal 0.0% 92.3% (12) 7.7% (1) 92.3% 
Sotomayor Liberal 0.0% (0) 7.7% (1) 92.3% (12) -- 
Kagan Liberal 0.0% (0) 7.7% (1) 92.3% (12) -- 
τ Percentage of cases involving majority–dissenting dueling over legislative intent in which the 
Justice authored or joined an opinion that referenced intent to reach a conservative outcome. 
ϑ Percentage of cases involving majority–dissenting dueling over legislative intent in which the 
Justice authored or joined an opinion that referenced intent to reach a liberal outcome. 
 
The results are striking. They reveal that when the members of 
the Roberts Court duel over interpretive canons or tools, they do so 
in a manner that strongly correlates with their ideological 
preferences. Many of the conservative Justices used particular canons 
or tools to reach conservative outcomes in over 60 percent, and even 
over 70 percent of the cases, while the liberal Justices used those 
same canons or tools to reach liberal outcomes at similarly high rates 
in those same cases. Strikingly, in the nineteen cases in which the 
Court dueled over legislative history, Justice Scalia authored or 
joined an opinion that used legislative history to reach conservative 
results 68.4 percent of the time, and liberal results 10.5 percent of the 
time.124 The figures for Justice Thomas were similar, as were those for 
Justices Alito and Roberts. In contrast, the liberal Justices referenced 
legislative history to reach liberal results in the overwhelming 
majority (57.9 percent to 68.4 percent) of these same cases, and to 
reach conservative results in only 15.8–31.6 percent of the cases.125 
 
 124. In the remaining cases, Justice Scalia failed to join an opinion that referenced 
legislative history. 
 125. This calculation does not include Justice Souter, who retired from the Court in 2009, 
and did not participate in cases decided during two out of the five terms studied in the dataset 
(including nearly half of the dueling legislative history cases). It also does not include Justices 
KRISHNAKUMAR IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/2/2016  8:54 PM 
2016] DUELING CANONS 955 
The Justices’ dueling over other canons and interpretive tools shows 
similarly stark ideological-slanting.126 
These findings are consistent with Brudney and Ditslear’s 
findings that conservative Justices tend to invoke the canons to reach 
conservative outcomes, while liberal Justices tend to invoke the 
canons to support liberal outcomes.127 But these findings also deepen, 
or expand, on the Brudney–Ditslear study by demonstrating that the 
ideological slanting applies to interpretive tools other than the 
language and substantive canons, and by revealing that the 
ideological slanting is particularly forceful in the dueling canon cases. 
Further, the data in Tables 6a–6g suggests that the canons do not 
constrain the Justices on the Roberts Court to vote against their 
policy preferences, providing some support for Llewellyn’s legal 
realist view that judges do not decide cases based on neutral legal 
rules. 
The data in Table 6a also seem to contradict Brudney and 
Ditslear’s findings on the ideologically constraining effects of 
legislative history. Brudney and Ditslear found that liberal Justices 
were more likely to vote in favor of employer interests (that is, 
against their ideological preferences) when they invoked legislative 
history,128 and that during the Burger Court, conservative Justices 
were more likely to vote in favor of employee interests when they 
relied on legislative history.129 After 1986, the Brudney–Ditslear study 
reported that conservative Justices ruled increasingly in favor of 
employers, even when relying on legislative history.130 Table 6a shows, 
by contrast, that when the Justices dueled over legislative history, 
conservative Justices were highly likely to vote in favor of 
conservative outcomes and liberal Justices were highly likely to vote 
in favor of liberal outcomes. Even if we set aside the data regarding 
the conservative Justices’ voting patterns on the theory that they are 
consistent with Brudney and Ditslear’s findings for post-1986 cases, 
the data regarding the ideological direction of the liberal Justices’ 
 
Sotomayor or Kagan, who joined the Court in the last two years of the period studied, and did 
not participate in the overwhelming majority of the cases in the dataset. 
 126. See supra Tables 6b–6g. The one noteworthy exception was the conservative Justices’ 
dueling uses of dictionary definitions; Justices Scalia, Roberts, and Kennedy employed this 
interpretive tool very even-handedly, showing almost no ideological slanting. 
 127. Brudney & Ditslear, Cannons of Construction, supra note 5, at 57–60. 
 128. Brudney & Ditslear, Legislative History, supra note 32, at 144 tbl.6. 
 129. Id.  
 130. Id. at 142–44; Brudney & Ditslear, Cannons of Construction, supra note 5, at 6. 
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dueling canon use run exactly opposite to Brudney and Ditslear’s 
findings. 
But there is an interesting counterpoint to these data. Table 7 
reports the correlation between canon and interpretive tool use and 
ideology in the Roberts Court’s unanimous statutory cases. The Table 
does not contain entries for the individual Justices’ ideological 
slanting because, in the unanimous cases, all of the Justices voted the 
same way. Thus, the ideological breakdown for each interpretive tool 
tells us the rate at which individual Justices invoked that tool to reach 
conservative versus liberal outcomes. Interestingly, the Table shows 
that for this subset of cases, the Justices tended to use most of the 
canons and interpretive tools to support both liberal and conservative 
outcomes at generally comparable rates. There were some 
exceptions—for example, dictionary definitions and legislative history 
tended to be used to support liberal outcomes at much higher rates 
than conservative outcomes, and the common law tended to be used 
to reach conservative outcomes much more often than liberal ones. 
But overall, most canons and tools were used to support conservative 
outcomes in roughly 40 percent to 50 percent of the cases and liberal 
outcomes in roughly 40 percent to 50 percent of the cases. 
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Table 7: Ideology by Canon/Tool in Unanimous Cases 
 
Percent 
Conservative 
Percent 
Liberal 
Percent 
Neither 
Conservative 
–Liberal 
Differential 
Ideology in 
Unanimous Cases 
(n=115) 40% 53% 7.0% -13.0% 
Text/Plain Meaning† 
(n=68) 51.47% 41.17% 7.35% 10.3% 
Dictionaries131 
(n=28) 28.57% 60.7% 10.71% -32.13% 
Language / Grammar / 
Whole Act Rule 
(n=54) 38.89% 53.7% 74.07% -14.81% 
Other Statutes 
(n=36) 44.4% 50.0% 5.55% -5.6% 
Legislative History132 
(n=30) 30.0% 56.7% 13.33% -26.7% 
Purpose† 
(n=26) 50.0% 38.46% 11.54% 11.54% 
Intent 
(n=22) 40.9% 50.0% 9.1% -9.1% 
Practical Consequences† 
(n=34) 52.94% 38.24% 8.82% 14.7% 
Common Law*† 
(n=21) 57.14% 28.57% 14.29% 28.57% 
Substantive*† Canons 
(n=17) 41.2% 47.05% 11.8% -5.85% 
† Denotes that this canon or tool skewed in the opposite ideological direction from the overall 
ideological breakdown for unanimous cases (canon/tool tended to lead to conservative case 
outcomes, while a majority of unanimous cases had liberal case outcomes). 
*Indicates chi-squared test reveals a significant difference between the rates at which this tool 
was used to support liberal and conservative outcomes at p<.05. (Except that for substantive 
canons, the difference approaches significance at p=.057). 
 
The data reveal that the Justices tended to use at least some of 
the canons and tools in a manner that was inconsistent with their 
ideological preferences in cases with the highest degree of consensus. 
For example, conservative Justices, who used legislative history to 
support a conservative outcome in 52.6 percent to 68.4 percent of the 
 
 131. Nine of twenty-one liberal dictionary referencing unanimous opinions were authored 
by conservative Justices; four of the eight conservative ones were – so not just explained by 
liberal Justices authoring the unanimous opinions that used dictionary to reach liberal results. 
 132. Seven of the seventeen liberal legislative history unanimous opinions were authored by 
conservative Justices; two of the nine conservative ones were – so not just explained by liberal 
Justices authoring the unanimous opinions that used legislative history to reach liberal results. 
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dueling canon cases,133 authored or joined an opinion using legislative 
history to support a liberal outcome in 56.7 percent of the 
unanimously decided cases. Conversely, liberal Justices, who invoked 
statutory purpose to support a liberal outcome in 57.9 percent to 68.4 
percent of the dueling canon cases,134 authored or joined an opinion 
that employed purpose to reach a conservative outcome in half of the 
unanimous cases. For comparison purposes, Table 8 reports the 
correlation between opinion author and ideology for all cases. 
Table 8: Ideology by Opinion Author 
 Conservative Liberal Indeterminate 
Per Curiam 
(n=15) 26.7% 73.3% 0.0% 
Scalia 
(n=68) 63.2% 35.3% 1.5% 
Thomas 
(n=68) 58.8% 38.2% 3.0% 
Roberts 
(n=38) 52.6% 44.7% 2.6% 
Alito 
(n=52) 50.0% 46.2% 3.8% 
Kennedy 
(n=44) 43.2% 52.3% 4.5% 
Souter 
(n=34) 35.3% 64.7% 0.0% 
Ginsburg 
(n=46) 37.0% 63.0% 0.0% 
Breyer 
(n=73) 31.5% 63.0% 5.5% 
Stevens 
(n=60) 25.0% 70.0% 5.0% 
Sotomayor 
(n=23) 52.2% 43.5% 4.35% 
Kagan  
(n=7) 42.85% 42.85% 14.29% 
 
 
 133. As noted earlier, Justice Kennedy’s rate of invoking legislative history to support 
conservative outcomes was lower, at 42.1 percent. See supra Table 6a. 
 134. These figures do not include Justices Souter, Sotomayor, or Kagan, who did not 
participate in a substantial number of the cases, and whose rates of reference therefore are not 
comparable to those of the other Justices. 
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Why the significant difference? Again, causation is difficult to 
determine, but there seem to be at least three possible explanations. 
On the one hand, perhaps when confronted with a statutory case, the 
Justices are looking to the interpretive canons and tools for guidance 
in the first instance. When the canons and tools point clearly to a 
particular interpretation, perhaps the Justices are reaching high 
degrees of consensus and engaging in very little dueling canon use 
because the interpretive tools are pointing in a clear direction. 
Conversely, when the interpretive tools are indeterminate, that could 
be driving the Justices to divide over the correct statutory 
construction—and to engage the canons in a dueling manner. 
On the other hand, it could be the case that the Justices are 
starting with a preferred statutory construction—perhaps based on 
ideology, or considerations of practical consequences or equitable 
concerns, or some other intuition—and are invoking the interpretive 
tools to justify that construction. In other words, the Justices could be 
using the canons as “just window-dressing for results reached for 
other reasons.”135 If so, the Justices could be dueling more in the 
divided-vote cases (when they disagree over the correct statutory 
construction) because they are using the canons strategically, with the 
distinct purpose of neutralizing an opposing opinion’s arguments. 
A third possibility is that the Justices may be doing different 
things in different cases. That is, the close-vote-margin cases may be 
ones in which the Justices generally are starting with a preferred 
construction, perhaps based on ideology, and working backward to 
the interpretive tools—making them more prone to find competing 
applications for the same tool and to duel in such cases. In the 
unanimous cases, by contrast, the order of decisionmaking might be 
reversed; that is, these might be cases in which the Justices do not 
have strong ideological preferences and might be looking to the 
interpretive canons in the first instance for guidance. 
Bottom line: the canons and interpretive tools do not seem to be 
constraining the Justices to vote against their ideological preferences. 
But it also does not seem to be the case that the interpretive canons 
and tools are being readily manipulated to support competing 
outcomes in the same case, in the manner suggested by Llewellyn’s 
famous critique. That is, for most individual interpretive canons and 
tools, reliance by a majority opinion is not resulting in a dissenting 
 
 135. Eskridge, supra note 4, at 679.  
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opinion countering that same canon or tool most of the time (in 
roughly 75 percent of the cases). Only the plain meaning rule and 
Supreme Court precedent are being used in a dueling manner in a 
large percentage of the cases. And, surprisingly, many interpretive 
tools that seem highly susceptible to competing invocation—including 
legislative history, dictionary definitions, substantive canons, and 
statutory purpose—are generating only low levels of dueling (in 
roughly 25 percent of the relevant cases).136 The practical 
consequences and other statutes tools exhibit slightly higher rates of 
dueling, at 30.9–34.5 percent, but these tools, like Supreme Court 
precedent, are traditional tools of legal analysis rather than statutory 
interpretation-specific maxims; indeed, the other statutes tool has a 
significant precedent component, as it involves analogies to words in 
other statutes that have been given a particular construction by courts 
in prior cases. Also, importantly for the foundational theories of 
statutory interpretation, no individual statutory interpretation-
specific tool of interpretation—other than the plain meaning rule—
seems more prone than others to trigger counter-references in the 
opposite direction. Some implications of these findings are discussed 
below in Part III. 
III.  DOCTRINAL FINDINGS 
A. Inside Story: Patterns of Dueling Canon Use 
Llewellyn observed that a court must “take the music of any 
statute as written by the legislature; it must take the text of the play as 
written by the legislature. But there are many ways to play that music, 
to play that play . . . .”137 This Section examines the many ways in 
which majority and dissenting opinions play the same interpretive 
resource to reach different readings of the same statute. The Section 
explores the dueling canon cases by individual canon or interpretive 
tool, uncovering some noteworthy patterns in how the Justices duel. 
The analysis in this Section is doctrinal rather than empirical, focusing 
on understanding how the Justices employ the same tools to reach 
opposing statutory constructions rather than on how frequently they 
duel over particular tools. 
 
 136. See supra Table 1. 
 137. Llewellyn, supra note 3, at 399. 
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1. Text / Plain Meaning Rule.  My analysis identified three 
primary ways that opposing opinions in the same case tend to duel 
over application of the plain meaning rule. The majority and 
dissenting opinions in the case might: 
1. Focus on different words or phrases in the text of the same 
statute. 
2. Focus on the text of different statutes, where more than one 
statute is implicated in the parties’ dispute. 
3. Focus on the same word or phrase in a statute, but ascribe 
different meaning to that text. 
Further, when dueling in the third manner, one opinion might 
adopt the prototypical, or core meaning of the term at issue, while the 
opposing opinion adopts a more expansive reading of the same term. 
Let us consider in turn each form of judicial dueling over the 
plain meaning rule. 
a. Focus on different words or phrases in the text of the same 
statute.  When one party alleges that particular conduct gives rise to a 
claim under a statutory provision, judges may disagree about which 
precise words or phrases in the statute govern the statute’s reach. For 
example, in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,138 the Court 
construed a provision of the Patriot Act that makes it a federal crime 
to “knowingly provide[] material support or resources to a foreign 
terrorist organization . . . .”139 Pursuant to the statute, the Secretary of 
State designated the Kurdistan Workers’ Party in Turkey and the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka as “foreign terrorist 
organizations.”140 Some U.S. citizens and domestic organizations who 
wished to provide support for the lawful, nonterrorist activities of 
these organizations argued that the statute should be read to require 
proof that a defendant intended to further a foreign terrorist 
organization’s illegal activities.141 A majority of the Court disagreed, 
focusing on the word “knowingly” and arguing that the statute 
requires only knowledge about the organization’s connection to 
terrorism, not a specific intent to further the organization’s terrorist 
activities.142 The dissenting opinion, by contrast, focused on the words 
 
 138. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010). 
 139. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2012). 
 140. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 9. 
 141. Id. at 16. 
 142. Id. at 16–17. 
KRISHNAKUMAR IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/2/2016  8:54 PM 
962 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:909 
“material support” and argued that the statute required the 
government to show that the defendant knew his acts were likely to 
further the organization’s terrorist aims, not just its lawful ones.143 
b. Focus on the text of two different statutes, where more than one 
statute is implicated in the parties’ dispute.  This form of dueling over 
application of the plain meaning rule does not seem to be very 
common, but it did occur in a few Roberts Court cases. In AT&T 
Corp. v. Hulteen,144 for example, the majority opinion emphasized the 
text of Title VII, while the dissenting opinion focused on the text of 
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.145 
c. Focus on the same word or phrase in a statute, but ascribe 
different meaning to that text.  This is the most common, and perhaps 
most interesting, form of judicial dueling over plain meaning. 
Roughly three-fourths of the cases in which the Justices dueled over 
the plain meaning rule involved a disagreement over the meaning of 
the same word or phrase in the statutory text.146 In almost half of 
those cases, however, something more than simple disagreement was 
 
 143. See id. at 57–58 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Additional examples from outside the dataset 
include Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 691–
95, 727–30 (1995) (focusing on the statutory term “harm,” while the dissent focuses on the term 
“taking”), and Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 128–132,143–48 (1998) (focusing on the 
plain meaning of statutory term “carried,” while the dissent focuses on the phrase “carried a 
firearm”).  
 144. AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen, 556 U.S. 701 (2009). 
 145. Hulteen concerned whether an employer violated the Pregnancy Discrimination Act 
(PDA) by calculating pension benefits using an accrual rule that gave less retirement credit for 
pregnancy leave than for other kinds of medical leave. Id. at 704. The PDA was enacted in 1978 
to override a 1976 Supreme Court decision, General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, which held that 
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is not sex discrimination. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), 
superseded by statute, Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 2076, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) 
(1982). The Hulteen majority concluded that the employer’s pension policy did not violate the 
PDA, relying on a Title VII provision that defines “unlawful employment practice” with respect 
to seniority systems. Hulteen, 556 U.S. at 707. The majority held that a seniority system violates 
Title VII only if it was “adopted for an intentionally discriminatory purpose” and found that 
there could be no “intentional” discrimination in a policy adopted before the PDA was enacted, 
while Gilbert supplied the governing legal rule. Id. at 711–14. Justices Ginsburg and Breyer 
dissented, arguing that the PDA’s plain text unambiguously expressed Congress’s disapproval of 
both the holding and reasoning of Gilbert—and made clear that pregnancy-based discrimination 
always has constituted sex discrimination. Id. at 720–21 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 146. There were forty-three cases in the dataset in which the Court dueled over plain 
meaning; thirty-four involved majority and dissenting opinions that ascribed different meaning 
to the same statutory word or phrase. 
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at work.147 Specifically, the Justices seemed to divide over whether to 
adopt the “core” or “prototypical” meaning of the word at issue 
versus the “legalist” meaning. 
The distinction between “prototypical” and “legalist” meaning is 
not new. Linguist Larry Solan brought the concept of “prototypical 
meaning” to the attention of statutory interpretation scholars at least 
a decade ago, defining it as the meaning that focuses on the “core 
example” that the statute was designed to reach, rather than a 
meaning that stretches to the conceptual or logical extension of the 
word at issue.148 More recent work by Victoria Nourse has highlighted 
the distinction between “prototypical meaning” and the latter, logical 
extension kind of meaning, which she calls “legalist meaning.”149 
Nourse’s work also demonstrates the significance of the distinction, 
observing that “legalist meaning” is the meaning that New Textualists 
like Justice Scalia tend to employ, abstracting from the core meaning 
and considering all logical possibilities that fit within a statutory 
term.150 Both Solan and Nourse urge judges to follow “prototypical” 
rather than “legalist” meaning when construing statutes.151 
As noted, the Roberts Court’s first five-plus terms contained a 
significant number of cases in which the majority and dissent reached 
opposing statutory constructions based on the statute’s prototypical 
versus legalist meaning. Consider, for example, the dueling opinions 
in Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons.152 Ali involved the Federal Tort 
Claims Act (FTCA), which waives the United States’ sovereign 
immunity for claims based on torts committed by federal 
employees.153 The FTCA contains several exceptions, including one 
for “[a]ny claim arising in respect of the assessment or collection of 
any tax or customs duty, or the detention of any . . . property by any 
officer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement 
officer . . . .”154 Ali, a prisoner who was transferred between prisons, 
 
 147. Of the thirty-four cases that dueled over the meaning of the same statutory term, 
fourteen (41.2 percent) pitted prototypical meaning against legalist meaning. 
 148. Solan, supra note 18, at 2061. 
 149. Nourse, supra note 18, at 1000. 
 150. See id.; see also Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory Interpretation: 
Legislative History by the Rules, 122 YALE L.J. 70, 124–25 (2012) (discussing prototypical vs. 
legalist meaning in the context of Professors Vermeule and Chomsky’s debate over legislative 
history in Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892)). 
 151. Nourse, supra note 18, at 1001–04; Solan, supra note 18, at 2060–62. 
 152. Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214 (2008). 
 153. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2012). 
 154. Id. § 2680(c). 
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noticed that several items of his personal property were missing when 
he arrived at his new facility.155 Ali brought an FTCA claim alleging 
that Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) officials lost his property in 
transit. The BOP argued that Ali’s claim was barred under the above 
exemption. 
A majority of the Roberts Court agreed with the BOP, relying 
heavily on the plain meaning of the phrase “any other law 
enforcement officer,” which it read to confer immunity on all law 
enforcement officers.156 The majority argued that “[t]he phrase ‘any 
other law enforcement officer’ suggests a broad meaning” and 
observed that “[w]e have previously noted that read naturally, the 
word ‘any’ has an expansive meaning, that is, ‘one or some 
indiscriminately of whatever kind.’”157 To support its construction, the 
majority cited both a dictionary definition and prior cases that gave 
expansive meaning to phrases such as “any other term of 
imprisonment” and “any other final action.”158 The majority opinion 
acknowledged that the statute’s use of the terms “tax or customs 
duty” and “officer[s] of customs or excise” demonstrated Congress’s 
focus on preserving immunity for claims arising from an officer’s 
enforcement of tax and customs laws. But it emphasized that the text 
also explicitly mentions claims arising from the “detention of 
property” and insisted that there was no indication that Congress 
intended immunity to turn on the type of law being enforced.159 This is 
a legalist approach to plain meaning—abstracting out from the 
statute’s core application to customs officers, and relying on 
broadening interpretive resources such as the dictionary, which 
provides definitions detached from statutory context, to aid in this 
conceptual expansion. By contrast, Justice Kennedy’s dissenting 
opinion found that “the plain words of the statute indicate that the 
exception is concerned only with customs and taxes” and protects 
only law enforcement officers who deal with customs and taxes.160 
Justice Kennedy’s dissent emphasized that property damage resulting 
from customs and tax-related forfeitures was the core situation that 
the exemption was designed to reach, and faulted the majority for 
 
 155. Ali, 552 U.S. at 216. 
 156. Id. at 218–21. 
 157. Id. at 218–19 (emphasis omitted) (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. 
Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997)). 
 158. Id. at 219. 
 159. Id. at 220–21. 
 160. Id. at 230 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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reading the phrase “detention of property” too broadly161 and for 
focusing on the meaning of the word “any” in isolation, rather than in 
light of the statutory context.162 
What is especially interesting about the core-versus-legalist-
meaning divide is that it does not necessarily play out along 
predictable ideological or jurisprudential lines across cases. For 
example, at least in the cases decided during the Roberts Court’s first 
five-and-a-half terms, arch-textualist Justice Scalia voted to follow the 
statute’s prototypical meaning nearly as often as he did to follow its 
legalist meaning.163 Similarly, purposivist jurist Justice Ginsburg voted 
nearly as often to adopt a statute’s legalist meaning as she did to 
adopt its prototypical, or core, meaning.164 Purposivist Justice Breyer 
 
 161. See id. at 235–36 (“[T]he majority of the nine federal statutes other than § 2680(c) 
containing a reference to the detention of goods, merchandise, or other property are specific to 
customs and excise.”). 
 162. Id. at 233–35. 
 163. There were fourteen dueling plain meaning rule cases that divided over prototypical-
versus-legalist meaning; in six of these, Justice Scalia voted to adopt the prototypical, core 
meaning rather than the legalist meaning. See, e.g., Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative 
Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2304 (2011) (Thomas, J.) (finding that the prototypical conduct covered 
by SEC’s Rule 10b-5 prohibition against false statements in prospectus is statements made by 
entities who have final authority over statements); United States v. Tohono O’Odham Nation, 
131 S. Ct. 1723, 1728 (2011) (Kennedy, J.) (finding that the core conduct covered by statute’s 
jurisdictional bar is Civil War-era cotton claimants who sued the United States in the Court of 
Claims, while concurrently suing federal officials in other courts under state tort law); Kawasaki 
Kisen Kaisha Ltd. v. Regal-Beloit Corp., 561 U.S. 89, 102–03, 111 (2010) (Kennedy, J.) (finding 
that the core meaning of the Carmack Amendment subjects only “receiving rail carrier[s]” and 
“delivering rail carrier[s]” to liability and, therefore, property received overseas and later 
transported to inland location by rail carriers was not covered); Hamilton v. Lanning, 560 U.S. 
505, 524 (2010) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (finding that the core method of projecting debtor’s 
income for Bankruptcy Code purposes is to follow Code’s formula defining “current monthly 
income” as “the average monthly income from all sources that the debtor receives” during the 
past six months); Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, 557 U.S. 519, 525 (2009) (Scalia, J.) (finding 
that the core meaning of National Bank Act is that “visitorial powers” protect national banks 
against supervisory powers and actions by states, not against all ordinary enforcement by states); 
Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 142 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring) (finding that a DUI 
offense is not a “violent felony” because the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act 
covers only offenses similar to the core offenses enumerated in the statute).  
 164. There were fourteen dueling plain meaning rule cases that divided over prototypical-
versus-legalist meaning; in six of these, Justice Ginsburg voted to adopt the legalist meaning 
rather than the prototypical meaning. See Janus Capital Grp., 131 S. Ct. at 2307 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (reasoning that the “English language” does not impose boundaries on the word 
‘make’ and relying on examples external to the securities context); Tohono O’Odham, 131 S. Ct. 
at 1739 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (identifying legalist focus on the general, detached meaning of 
the terms “claim” and “cause of action,” and citing generalist treatise to conclude that 
entitlement to relief is an essential component of both terms); Kawasaki, 561 U.S. at 114–15 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (employing a legalist reading of the Carmack Amendment as 
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and intentionalist Justice Stevens were more predictable, voting to 
adopt a statute’s prototypical meaning in most, though not all, cases. 
Justice Thomas was similarly predictable, voting to adopt a statute’s 
legalist meaning in most cases, while Justices Roberts, Alito, and 
Kennedy were more evenly divided in their use of legalist versus 
prototypical meaning.165 
The above doctrinal patterns provide important insight into why 
the plain meaning rule does not seem to constrain jurists in the 
manner that textualists predict. Justices interpreting statutory text 
may find different words, phrases, or provisions within the same 
statute to be controlling or, more cynically, may emphasize different 
words, phrases, or provisions in order to justify their preferred 
statutory constructions. Even when the Justices agree on the precise 
text at issue, some may focus on the core situations that text was 
designed to cover, while others may seek the general, broad meaning 
of the word. None of this tells us directly whether the Justices are 
being disingenuous in their use of text/plain meaning in pursuit of 
predetermined outcomes, or are simply disagreeing honestly about 
the rule’s application. They could be doing either, or both. 
Regardless, this doctrinal information teaches that there is ample 
room for judicial discretion in identifying the so-called “plain” import 
of statutory terms. 
At the same time, however, the doctrinal insight about 
“prototypical” versus “legalist” meaning suggests a path by which at 
least some of the indeterminacy involved in application of the plain 
meaning rule might be eliminated, and judicial dueling over this 
interpretive canon reduced. Specifically, if jurists were to select either 
“legalist” or “core” meaning as the appropriate measuring device for 
a statute’s plain meaning, and all Justices sought to identify only that 
form of plain meaning in all cases, then at least some uncertainties 
about a statute’s meaning could be diminished and judicial dueling 
 
providing liability regime for all rail carriage of property within United States, and citing 
generalist maritime treatises); Hamilton, 130 S. Ct. 2464, 2472 (Alito, J.) (referencing broad, 
general meaning that “projections” are based on likely future events, not an assumption that the 
past will repeat itself); Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 944 (2009) (Alito, J.) (relying on a 
legalist reading of the term “any” to construe the RICO term “enterprise” to cover any group of 
individuals associated in fact); Ali, 552 U.S. at 220 (Thomas, J.) (voting with the majority and 
finding that the statutory mention of “any” law enforcement covers all law enforcement).  
 165. Justices Roberts, Kennedy, and Alito voted to adopt the prototypical meaning over the 
legalist meaning in five to six cases each, while Justice Thomas did so in only four of fourteen 
cases. 
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over this interpretive canon could be reduced appreciably—perhaps 
by as much as one-third. 
2. Whole Act Rule.  As with the plain meaning rule, there are a 
number of ways in which the members of the Roberts Court tend to 
duel over application of the whole act rule: 
1. In some cases, the majority and dissenting opinions apply 
different subparts of the whole act rule to the same statutory 
provision. 
2. In others, the majority and dissenting opinions focus on 
different subparts of the statute at issue. 
3. In still other cases, opposing opinions focus on the same 
subpart of the whole act rule, but reach different end results. 
a. Apply different subparts of the whole act rule to the same 
statutory provision.  This form of dueling whole act rule use is perhaps 
most akin to the “thrusts and parries” in Llewellyn’s famous list, as it 
involves one canonical maxim canceling out another. A majority 
opinion, for example, might invoke the “meaningful variation” 
subpart of the whole act rule, which holds that when Congress 
includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in 
another section of the same statute, courts should presume that 
Congress acts intentionally and purposefully in the disparate inclusion 
or exclusion; while the dissenting opinion might invoke the 
“consistent usage” rule, which presumes that statutory terms mean 
the same thing throughout all provisions of a statute. Consider the 
2009 case, Carcieri v. Salazar.166 Carcieri involved construction of the 
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA), which authorizes the 
Secretary of Interior to acquire land and hold it in trust “for the 
purpose of providing land for Indians.”167 The Act defines “Indian” to 
“include all persons of Indian descent who are members of any 
recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction.”168 At the 
time the IRA was enacted, federal authorities considered a tribe 
called the Narragansett to be under state, rather than federal, 
jurisdiction and refused to provide it with federal assistance. The 
Narragansett Tribe did not gain formal recognition from the federal 
 
 166. Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009). 
 167. Indian Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 73-383, 48 Stat. 985 (1934) (codified at 25 
U.S.C. § 465 (2012)). 
 168. 25 U.S.C. § 479 (2012). 
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government until 1983.169 Several years later, a dispute arose 
regarding land that the Tribe had purchased. While litigation was 
pending, the Secretary notified the State of Rhode Island that he 
intended to accept the disputed land into trust.170 Rhode Island 
challenged the Secretary’s authority to accept the land into trust, 
arguing that the statutory term “now” refers to the time of the IRA’s 
enactment, and permits the Secretary to take land into trust only for 
recognized tribes that were “under Federal jurisdiction” in 1934.171 
A majority of the Court agreed with the State’s construction. 
Among other canons, the majority opinion invoked the whole act rule 
“meaningful variation” principle, noting that other sections of the 
IRA refer to “now or hereafter,” and arguing that this shows that 
Congress knows how to draw both contemporaneous and future 
events into a statute when it wants to, and that its failure to include 
“or hereafter” in the provision at issue means that only tribes 
recognized at the time of the IRA’s enactment come under the 
provision.172 The dissenting opinion, by contrast, invoked a different 
whole act rule subpart, the “consistent usage” rule, and different 
statutory text. It observed that the majority’s construction works only 
if one reads the term “Indians” to refer to individuals, not an Indian 
tribe.173 And it noted that Congress has used “Indians” and “Indian 
tribe” interchangeably in other parts of the IRA, and that the 
consistent usage rule dictates that Congress should be understood to 
have done the same in this provision of the IRA as well.174 
b. The majority and dissenting opinions focus on different 
subparts of the statute at issue.  This form of dueling over application 
of the whole act rule can involve application of the same whole act 
rule subpart to different statutory provisions, or can involve two 
different subparts of the whole act rule applied to two different 
statutory provisions. Begay v. United States175 provides a good 
example of the first form of whole act rule dueling. Begay raised the 
question whether driving under the influence of alcohol is a “violent 
felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act. The majority held 
 
 169. Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 384. 
 170. Id. at 382. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 389–90 (construing 25 U.S.C. § 472). 
 173. Id. at 409–10 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 174. Id. 
 175. Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008). 
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that a DUI does not constitute a “violent felony,” relying significantly 
on a whole act “rule against superfluity” argument that compared the 
first and second clauses of § 924(e)(2)(B) and noted that if “violent 
felony” meant all risky crimes, there would be no need for Congress 
to include specific examples of crimes such as burglary and arson in 
the second clause—the examples would be superfluous and would 
render the first clause, which covers the use of physical force, 
superfluous.176 The dissent also made a whole act rule superfluity 
argument, but based on a different statutory provision—
§ 924(e)(2)(A), which includes offenses that “have as an element the 
use or threatened use of violence.”177 The dissent maintained that this 
subparagraph shows that § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) is not limited to “violent” 
crimes because, if it were, it would be redundant, covering the exact 
same ground as § 924(e)(2)(A).178 
c. Opposing opinions apply the same subpart of the whole act rule, 
but reach different end results.  This form of dueling over application 
of the whole act rule is similar to the third form of plain meaning 
dueling, in which the majority and dissenting opinions take different 
views about what constitutes the “plain” meaning of the same 
statutory text. It suggests that judicial application of the canons 
suffers not merely from a “cherry-picking” problem, whereby judges 
have substantial discretion to decide which canons or tools to apply 
and which precise statutory terms and provisions to focus on, but that 
even when judges agree on the precise tool to apply and the precise 
terms or provisions of the statute at issue, there is substantial room 
for disagreement about the interpretive conclusion to be drawn. In 
other words, this form of dueling canon use suggests that it is not just 
the exceptions and countercanons that can render the tools of 
statutory interpretation indeterminate; but, rather, that the canons 
and interpretive tools themselves are fairly open to interpretive 
license. 
 
 176. Id. at 147–48; see 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2012) (defining violent felony to mean 
“any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” that “(i) has as an 
element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of 
another or (ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves 
conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another”).  
 177. Begay, 553 U.S. at 160 (Alito, J., dissenting) (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)). 
 178. Id. at 159–60. 
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The Court’s dueling statutory-structure inferences in Dean v. 
United States179 provide a good example. Dean involved a sentencing-
enhancement statute that contained three subparts: the first imposes a 
five-year mandatory-minimum enhancement if a firearm is used or 
carried during and in relation to a violent crime, the second increases 
the enhancement to seven years “if the firearm is brandished,” and 
the third increases the enhancement to ten years “if the firearm is 
discharged.”180 At issue was whether the ten-year mandatory 
enhancement applies if the gun was discharged accidentally, or 
whether there is an intent requirement for the ten-year enhancement. 
A majority of the Court interpreted the statute not to contain an 
intent requirement, relying significantly on the whole act rule 
“meaningful variation” and “holistic endeavor” subparts. The 
majority opinion pointed to the “is brandished” provision 
immediately preceding the “is discharged” provision and noted that it 
expressly includes an intent requirement, because the brandishing 
must be done “in order to intimidate.”181 It concluded that Congress’s 
failure to include a similar intent requirement in the “is discharged” 
provision should be viewed as intentional and deliberate.182 Justice 
Stevens’ dissenting opinion also relied heavily on the whole act rule 
“holistic endeavor” subpart; but in contrast to the majority, it read 
the three enhancements clauses, taken as a whole, to provide 
escalating mandatory sentences for increasingly culpable conduct.183 
Based on this statutory structure, it drew a different conclusion from 
the intent requirement in the “is brandished” provision—reading it to 
mean that the “is discharged” clause also must contain an intent 
requirement because unintentional discharges are less culpable than 
intentional brandishing, and it would be nonsensical for clause (iii) to 
impose a higher sentence for conduct less culpable than that 
described in clause (ii).184 
The multiple ways in which the Justices duel over application of 
the whole act rule are instructive. They reveal that majority–
dissenting dueling is not necessarily a simple canon-for-countercanon 
affair. The Justices disagree not just over the applicable legal rule, but 
 
 179. Dean v. United States, 556 U.S. 568 (2009). 
 180. See id. at 570 (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)). 
 181. Id. at 572–73 (emphasis omitted) (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(4)). 
 182. Id. at 573. 
 183. Id. at 578–79 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 184. Id. at 579. 
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also over which parts of the statute are relevant to the interpretive 
question at issue. These doctrinal observations show that Justices 
seeking to counteract an opposing opinion’s whole act rule argument 
will have many avenues available for crafting a dueling “parry.” 
Indeed, given the evidence that federal statutes increasingly are 
drafted by multiple committees, with different sections pieced 
together in a hurried fashion—rather than carefully planned out by 
one drafter attentive to how different subparts interact—it is almost 
surprising that we do not see more judicial dueling over this 
interpretive tool. 
3. Statutory Purpose.  Again, there were a number of ways in 
which the members of the Roberts Court dueled over the proper 
application of statutory purpose in the majority and dissenting 
opinions in the same case. The primary patterns I observed were: 
1. Majority and dissenting opinions focus on different, 
sometimes competing, statutory purposes. 
2. Majority and dissenting opinions invoke the same statutory 
purpose, but draw different conclusions about how that 
purpose should impact their construction of the statute. 
3. Related to the first, majority or dissenting opinion focuses 
on a broad, general statutory purpose, while the opposing 
opinion focuses on a narrow or specific purpose of the statute. 
a. Majority and dissenting opinions focus on different, sometimes 
competing, statutory purposes.  This form of dueling over statutory 
purpose is, I think, what Justice Scalia has in mind when he argues 
that interpreting statutes based on purpose leaves too much 
discretion to individual judges. Justice Scalia has, for example, noted 
that every statute has multiple purposes and that “[n]o legislation 
pursues its purposes at all costs”185—meaning that the limitations and 
compromises enacted into a statute are as much a part of its purpose 
as are its broad goals.186 
 
 185. Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2034, 2044 (2012) (quoting Rodriguez v. 
United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525–26 (1987) (per curiam)). 
 186. See, e.g., Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 183–84 (2003) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (noting that “[i]t is naïve for the Court to rely on guesses as to what Congress would 
have wanted in legislation as complicated as this, the culmination of a long, drawn-out 
legislative battle in which” interested parties attempted to pull the provisions in different 
directions); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 726 (1995) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Deduction from the ‘broad purpose’ of a statute begs the question if it 
is used to decide by what means (and hence to what length) Congress pursued that purpose.”); 
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The competing-purposes form of dueling occurred in fourteen of 
nineteen dueling purpose cases.187 A good example is Conkright v. 
Frommert,188 an ERISA case that raised the question whether courts 
must defer to subsequent interpretations made by a plan 
administrator whose initial interpretation of a benefits plan was 
deemed “unreasonable” by a court.189 The majority opinion held that 
deference remained appropriate, relying in part on ERISA’s statutory 
purpose of balancing the need to “ensur[e] fair and prompt 
enforcement of rights” with the need to “encourag[e] the creation of 
such plans” by employers.190 The dissenting opinion, by contrast, 
construed the statute to allow more searching judicial review where a 
plan administrator’s first interpretation was unfair to employees, 
arguing that this construction is most consistent with ERISA’s “core 
purpose of promot[ing] the interests of employees and their 
beneficiaries in employee benefit plans.”191 
b. Majority and dissenting opinions invoke the same statutory 
purpose, but draw different conclusions about how that purpose should 
impact their construction of the statute.  As with the “plain meaning” 
rule and the whole act rule, this form of dueling over the same, 
agreed-upon statutory purpose suggests an inherent looseness in 
translating statutory purpose into statutory construction, as opposed 
to mere judicial discretion in choosing among different versions of a 
canon or tool. That is, it suggests an “inherent indeterminacy,” rather 
than merely a “cherry-picking” problem in the use of interpretive 
tools. 
 
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636–37 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The number of 
possible motivations, to begin with, is not binary, or indeed even finite.”); see also Barnhart v. 
Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 461 (2002) (Thomas, J.) (“[The statute’s] delicate crafting 
reflected a compromise amidst highly interested parties attempting to pull the provisions in 
different directions.”); City of Joliet v. New West, L.P., 562 F.3d 830, 836–37 (7th Cir. 2009) 
(Easterbrook, C.J.) (stating that when courts look to purpose, “judges become effective 
lawmakers, bypassing the give-and-take of the legislative process”). 
 187. See infra Appendix for dueling purpose cases. The five cases in which the Court dueled 
without invoking different statutory purposes were: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. 
Ct. 1740 (2011); Jerman v. Carlisle, 559 U.S. 573 (2010); Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70 
(2008); Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008); Howard Delivery Serv., Inc. v. 
Zurich Am. Ins., 547 U.S. 651 (2006).  
 188. Conkright v. Frommert, 559 U.S. 506 (2010). 
 189. Id. at 509–11. 
 190. Id. at 517 (citations omitted). The majority noted several ways in which deference 
would benefit employers. Id. 
 191. Id. at 535–36 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
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The Court’s opinions in Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, 
Kramer & Ulrich, L.P.A.192 provide a good illustration. Jerman 
involved construction of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 
which prohibits debt collectors from making false representations to 
debtors about a debt’s character, amount, or legal status.193 The Act 
contains an exception if a debt collector can show that its violation 
“was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error.”194 At issue 
was whether a law firm that filed a lawsuit on behalf of a mortgage 
company mistakenly seeking to foreclose on property owned by 
Jerman qualified for the bona fide error exception.195 A majority of 
the Court concluded that the bona fide error defense does not apply 
to violations that result from a debt collector’s mistaken 
interpretation of the legal requirements of the FDCPA.196 In so ruling, 
the Court cited the statute’s purpose of “eliminat[ing] abusive debt 
collection practices by debt collectors [and] insur[ing] that those debt 
collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are 
not competitively disadvantaged” and argued “that immunizing debt 
collectors who adopt aggressive but mistaken interpretations of the 
law would be inconsistent with the statute’s broadly worded 
prohibitions on debt collector misconduct.”197 The dissenting opinion 
quoted the same statutory purpose, but concluded that when referring 
to “abusive debt collection practices” Congress “surely did not 
contemplate attorneys who act based on reasonable, albeit ultimately 
mistaken legal interpretations” and noted that debt collectors do not 
gain a competitive advantage by making good-faith legal errors.198 
c. Majority or dissenting opinion focuses on a broad, general 
statutory purpose, while the opposing opinion focuses on a narrow, or 
specific purpose of the statute. This form of dueling over statutory 
purpose also may be one that Justice Scalia has in mind when he 
criticizes purpose-based statutory interpretation. It is a standard 
textualist complaint that by framing the statutory purpose at whatever 
 
 192. Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich, L.P.A., 559 U.S. 573 (2010). 
 193. Id. at 576; see Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pub. L. 95-109, 91 Stat. 874 (codified 
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. (2012)). 
 194. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c) (2012). 
 195. Jerman, 559 U.S. at 579. The debt had already been paid, but the complaint contained a 
notice stating that the debt would be assumed valid unless Jerman disputed it in writing. Id. 
 196. Id. at 581–82. 
 197. Id. at 602. 
 198. Id. at 619 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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level of abstraction she wishes, a judge can reach the interpretive 
outcome that she prefers.199 
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.200 provides a good 
example of this form of dueling over statutory purpose. In Ledbetter, 
a female retiree sued her former employer under Title VII and the 
Equal Pay Act, alleging that poor performance evaluations she 
received as a result of sex-based discrimination early in her tenure 
resulted in her receiving lower pay than her male colleagues from the 
time of the evaluations through the end of her career.201 Goodyear 
argued that Ledbetter’s claims were time-barred under a Title VII 
provision requiring that individuals who wish to bring a 
discriminatory pay lawsuit must file a charge with the EEOC within 
180 days “after the alleged unlawful employment practice 
occurred.”202 Ledbetter countered that her claims were timely because 
each unequal paycheck she received constituted a new Title VII 
violation and gave her an additional 180 days to file an EEOC 
charge.203 A majority of the Court disagreed, concluding that the later 
effects of past discrimination do not restart the clock for filing an 
EEOC charge.204 The majority opinion relied in part on the narrow, 
specific purpose of the time limitation, noting that statutes of 
limitations serve a “policy of repose.”205 The dissenting opinion, by 
contrast, focused on Title VII’s broad, general purpose of “assur[ing] 
equality of employment opportunities” and “mak[ing] persons whole 
for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment 
discrimination.”206 The dissent also criticized the majority’s 
 
 199. See, e.g., John F. Manning, Competing Presumptions About Statutory Coherence, 74 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2009, 2010–11 (2006) (arguing that “legislators . . . rely on semantic detail to 
express the level of generality at which a proposed legislative policy is acceptable to them” and 
that judges ignore the “untidy compromise[s]” designed to check a statute’s reach when they 
engage in purposivist analysis); Mark Tushnet, Theory and Practice in Statutory Interpretation, 
43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1185, 1196–97 (2011) (noting that Justice Scalia has made this point). 
 200. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007), superseded by statute, 
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5. 
 201. Id. at 621–22. 
 202. Id. at 623–624 (discussing Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified 
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2012))). 
 203. Id. at 624. 
 204. Id. at 628–29. 
 205. Id. at 630. 
 206. Id. at 660–61 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 
324, 328 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975)). 
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construction as “totally at odds with the robust protection against 
workplace discrimination Congress intended Title VII to secure.”207 
4. Practical Consequences.  Finally, many of the Roberts Court’s 
statutory cases contain dueling assessments of the practical 
consequences that are likely to flow from adopting a particular 
interpretation. Within this subset of dueling opinions, one pattern or 
divide is prominent: in 61.3 percent of the cases, one opinion makes 
an “administrability” argument, while the opposing opinion makes a 
“policy constancy” argument.208 In an earlier empirical study of the 
 
 207. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 661. Another good example of majority–dissent dueling over 
general versus specific purpose can be found in CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Alabama 
Department of Revenue, 131 S. Ct. 1101 (2011), where the majority opinion relied on a tax 
statute’s broad purpose of restoring financial stability to railroads, id. at 280, while the dissent 
referenced the more specific statutory purpose of preventing states from discriminating against 
railroads, id. at 298 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 208. This was true in nineteen of thirty-one cases. See Fowler v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 
2045, 2049, 2053 (2011) (majority argues that rejected interpretation would undermine another 
section of the statute [policy constancy] while dissent argues that majority’s reading adopts a 
standard that will confuse judges and juries [administrability]); Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 
320, 332–33, 355 (2010) (majority makes an absurd results argument [policy constancy], while 
dissent argues waste of prosecutorial resources [administrability]); Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd. 
v. Regal-Beloit Corp., 561 U.S. 89, 109–10, 137 (2010) (majority argues that rejected 
interpretation would be unworkable, leading to two different sets of rules depending on where 
shipping damage occurred [administrability], while dissent emphasizes unfair advantage to some 
carriers created by majority’s reading [policy constancy]); Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 
U.S. 167, 179, 191–92 (2009) (majority argues that rejected burden-shifting framework has 
proved difficult to apply in practice [administrability], while Justice Breyer’s dissent argues that 
burden-shifting framework makes more sense because it would otherwise be practically 
impossible for plaintiffs to prove statutory violations [policy constancy]); Harbison v. Bell, 556 
U.S. 180, 193–94, 204 (2009) (majority argues that rejected interpretation would lead to 
unworkable waste of resources, forcing defendants to get both state and federal counsel 
[administrability], while dissent argues that majority’s interpretation will lead to absurd results 
and gamesmanship [policy constancy]); Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 65, 76 (2009) 
(majority argues that rejected reading would create procedural mess [administrability], while 
dissent argues that majority’s reading unjustly produces different results for parties with 
identical claims [policy constancy]); Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 17, 40 (2009) (plurality 
argues unworkability [administrability], while dissent argues consistency with statute’s goals and 
avoidance of absurd results [policy constancy]); United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415, 425–26, 
436 (2009) (majority argues that rejected interpretation would make provision at issue 
inapplicable in most cases [policy constancy], while dissent argues that majority’s reading makes 
statute difficult to administer, requiring elaborate fact-finding [administrability]); Greenlaw v. 
United States, 554 U.S. 237, 251–52, 256 (2008) (majority makes an absurd results argument 
[policy constancy], while dissent makes a judicial resources argument [administrability]); United 
States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 528, 530 (2008) (concurrence argues that rejected interpretation 
would lead to perverse, unthinkable results [policy constancy], while dissent argues that proof 
problems will plague implementation of concurrence / majority reading [administrability]); 
United States v. Rodriquez, 553 U.S. 377, 383, 398–99 (2008) (majority claims rejected 
interpretation could lead to defendants receiving more than the maximum federal sentence 
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Roberts Court’s statutory interpretation practices, I described the 
“administrability” form of practical consequences as encompassing 
discussions about the practical difficulty of implementing the 
particular interpretation, the likely effect the interpretation will have 
on judicial or other public resources, the consistency or lack of 
consistency between federal and state laws created by the 
interpretation, and the clarity or predictability of the legal rule or 
landscape going forward in light of the interpretation.209 The “policy 
constancy” form of practical consequences, by contrast, includes 
discussions about inconsistencies in statutory policy likely to result 
from a particular interpretation, the equity or justness of the 
interpretation, the likelihood that the interpretation will render the 
statutory provision “meaningless” or ineffective, and assertions that 
logical absurdities or statutory incoherence will result from the 
interpretation.210 
There are many examples of majority–dissent division over 
administrability versus policy-constancy concerns. In Gonzalez v. 
United States,211 the Court considered whether the Federal Magistrate 
 
[policy constancy], while dissent argues that majority’s construction leads to lack of uniformity 
across states [administrability]); Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 249–50, 265 (2008) 
(majority argues that adversary process could not function effectively under rejected 
construction [administrability], while dissent makes an absurd results argument [policy 
constancy]); Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 404, 420 (2008) (majority argues 
that rejected interpretation is “illogical and impractical” [policy constancy], while dissent argues 
that majority’s reading leaves legal rule vague and unsettled [administrability]); Bowles v. 
Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 211–12, 216–17 (2007) (majority references Congress’s institutional 
competence to decide statute of limitations parameters [administrability], while dissent 
references harshness of majority’s result [policy constancy]); Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. 
Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 531, 542–43 (2007) (majority argues unfairness of treating procedural and 
substantive claims differently [policy constancy], while dissent argues that its construction 
conserves judicial resources and limits frivolous claims [administrability]); Watters v. Wachovia 
Bank, 550 U.S. 1, 11, 31–32 (2007) (majority emphasizes structural concerns – history of national 
bank immunity to state regulation [administrability], while dissent argues fairness [policy 
constancy]); Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336, 342–43 (2007) (majority cautions against 
interpretation that would encourage certiorari filings as a delay tactic [administrability], while 
dissent counters that majority’s reading will produce absurd results [policy constancy]); 
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 89, 115–16 (2006) (majority emphasizes burden that prisoner 
suits place on judicial system [administrability], while dissent criticizes majority’s reading as too 
absolute [policy constancy]); Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 721–22, 772, 806 (2006) 
(plurality emphasizes administrative costs and delays associated with permit process 
[administrability], while concurrence and dissent argue that plurality’s reading produces 
inconsistent consequences [policy constancy]). 
 209. Krishnakumar, supra note 17, at 244–45. 
 210. Id. at 245–46. 
 211. Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242 (2008). 
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Act empowers magistrate judges to preside over the voir dire and 
selection of prospective jurors in a felony criminal trial based on the 
consent of defense counsel, or whether the Act requires the personal 
consent of the defendant for magistrate supervision.212 A majority of 
the Court read the FMA to allow magistrate supervision based on 
defense counsel consent alone.213 In so ruling, the majority 
emphasized the practical necessity of giving defense counsel control 
over trial-management matters—an “administrability” argument.214 
“The adversary process could not function effectively if every tactical 
decision required client approval.”215 The dissenting opinion 
countered with a “policy constancy” absurd results argument, noting 
that the statute requires defendant’s express, informed consent in 
order for a magistrate judge to conduct a misdemeanor trial and 
calling it a “glaring” inconsistency to read the statute to require 
greater consent for defendant’s waiver of rights in a misdemeanor 
case than in a felony case.216 
In earlier work, I described how the “administrability” versus 
“policy constancy” divide reflects a deeper jurisprudential divide 
between the Justices over the kind of coherence that jurists should 
prioritize when construing statutes;217 the fact that this divide shows 
up prominently in the dueling practical consequences cases is 
intriguing, and its implications are explored further in Part III of this 
Article. 
B. Other Observations 
Last, let us turn to judicial dueling over dictionary definitions 
and legislative history. No noteworthy patterns were found regarding 
how the Justices dueled over either of these interpretive tools. 
Nevertheless, it is worth discussing doctrinal trends in the cases 
involving dueling over these tools because, as noted earlier, the low 
level of dueling for these tools was so surprising. 
 
 212. Id. at 243. 
 213. Id. at 245. 
 214. Id. at 249. 
 215. Id. (quoting Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 418 (1988)). 
 216. Id. at 262–63 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Winkelman, 550 U.S. at 531, 542–43 
(majority making policy-constancy injustice argument about allowing parents to sue pro se to 
enforce IDEA; part-concurring, part-dissenting opinion counters with administrability argument 
that pro se cases impose unique burdens on lower courts, schools, and school districts). 
 217. See Krishnakumar, supra note 17, at 244–45. 
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1. Dictionary Definitions.  Two things stand out when one 
examines the dueling dictionary cases. First, in most of the cases, 
majority and dissenting opinions dueled over different definitions of 
the same word, as one would expect.218 However, in a nontrivial 
minority of the cases, opposing opinions dueled over the dictionary 
definitions for different words.219 This parallels the manner in which 
the Justices sometimes dueled over the plain meaning of different 
statutory words and phrases.220 
Second, when the Justices did duel over dictionary definitions, 
they rarely placed significant weight on such definitions as an 
interpretive aid. Of the more than thirty-two opinions in the sixteen 
cases that involved dueling dictionary definitions, the vast majority 
referenced such definitions in a corroborative manner, to note that 
they pointed in the same direction as other interpretive tools. Some 
opinions even referenced dictionary definitions only to note that they 
were not particularly helpful in construing the statute. Only six 
opinions seemed to use the dictionary in a manner that was 
dispositive, or that significantly directed the interpretive outcome—
all but one of these was authored by Justice Scalia or Justice Alito.221 
These findings are consistent with a recent empirical study about the 
Supreme Court’s dictionary use, which found that the bulk of the 
Court’s dictionary references employed the dictionary in an 
“ornamental role”—rather than as a primary aid in identifying the 
 
 218. This was true in eleven of the sixteen cases in which the Justices dueled over dictionary 
definitions. See Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 1651, 1659–60, 1668 (2011); New Process Steel, 
L.P. v. NLRB, 560 U.S. 674, 683, 692 (2010); Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & 
Ulrich, L.P.A., 559 U.S. 573, 587, 613 (2010); Graham Cty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. 
U.S. ex rel. Wilson, 559 U.S. 280, 287, 304 (2010); Cuomo v. Clearing House Assoc., 557 U.S. 
519, 526, 539–40 (2009); Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 946, 952–53 (2009); Nken v. 
Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 428, 441 (2009) (counting “injunction” and “enjoin” as the same word); 
United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 511, 531–32 (2008); Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 
144, 151, 156 (2008); Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 667–68, 
692 n.12 (2007); Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 732–33, 769–70, 801 (2006). 
 219. See Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics, 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1331–32, 1337 (2011) 
(dueling over “filed” v. “complaint”); Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. 223, 231–32, 251 
(2011) (“even though” v. “unavoidable”); Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 228, 237 
(2008) (“any” v. “detention” and “bailment”); James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 207, 213–14 
(2007) (“potential” v. “otherwise”); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 632, 639, 711 (2006) 
(“constituted” v. “special”). 
 220. See supra Part III.A.1 (noting a pattern that majority and dissenting opinions 
sometimes “[f]ocus on different words or phrases in the text of the same statute”). 
 221. See Boyle, 556 U.S. at 946 (Alito, J.); Nken, 556 U.S. at 441, 444 (Alito., J., dissenting); 
Begay, 553 U.S. at 156 (Alito, J., dissenting); James, 550 U.S. at 218 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Nat’l 
Ass’n of Home Builders, 551 U.S. at 667–68 (Alito, J.); Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 732–33 (Scalia, J.). 
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best interpretation—and that when the Court did use dictionary 
definitions in a dispositive manner, it was almost exclusively in an 
opinion authored by one of the conservative Justices.222 
These findings also suggest an explanation for the Court’s low 
overall rate of dueling over dictionary definitions, despite the 
abundance of dictionaries and definitions within those dictionaries. 
Perhaps, when confronted with an opinion that employs a dictionary 
definition in an “ornamental” or corroborative fashion, the Justices 
writing in opposition do not feel compelled to invoke a countervailing 
dictionary definition to undermine the first opinion’s reasoning. That 
is, perhaps dueling over dictionary definitions does not seem worth 
the effort to the Justices because the dictionary definition does not 
seem to add much to their opponent’s statutory construction—so that 
providing a dueling definition conversely would not subtract much 
from the opposing construction. 
2. Legislative History.  With respect to legislative history, I 
examined the dueling cases for patterns such as one opinion that 
relied on legislative history countered by another that used legislative 
history merely to corroborate, or one opinion that focused on the 
evolution of the statute countered by another that invoked statements 
from the legislative record. But no such patterns emerged. Instead, 
most of the dueling legislative history cases involved majority and 
dissenting opinions that relied on different pieces of legislative history, 
such as a conference report versus a rejected proposal, or floor 
statements versus committee reports, and so on.223 Only a handful of 
the cases even arguably involved majority and dissent dueling over 
the meaning of the same form of legislative history.224 Thus, when the 
Justices dueled over legislative history, they typically did so in the 
“cocktail party” or “something for everyone” manner that textualists 
decry. 
 
 222. See Brudney & Baum, supra note 67, at 493, 540, 548 n.229, 554 n.273, 569–73. 
 223. Thirteen of nineteen cases containing dueling references to legislative history involved 
majority and dissenting references to different forms of legislative history. 
 224. Only six of nineteen cases could be said to fall into this category. See AT&T Mobility 
LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1749, 1757 (2011) (H. Rep. v. H. Rep., floor and hearing 
statements); Bruesewitz, 562 U.S. at 240–42, 254–55 (H. Rep. v. H. Rep.); Carr v. U.S., 130 S. Ct. 
2229, 2241, 2249 (2010) (H. Rep and evolution v. H. Rep.); Graham Cty. Soil & Water 
Conservation Dist. v. U.S. ex rel. Wilson, 559 U.S. 280, 296, 308 (2010) (evolution and H. Rep., 
S. Rep. v. evolution); AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen, 556 U.S. 701, 713, 718 (2008) (H. Rep v. H. Rep. 
and statutory evolution); Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 578–80, 665 (evolution, rejected proposal, floor 
statements v. floor statements). 
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Further, in contrast to the Justices’ largely “ornamental” use of 
dictionary definitions, the overwhelming majority of the dueling 
legislative history cases involved at least one opinion that relied on 
legislative history to reach its chosen construction, rather than merely 
to corroborate a construction arrived at through other interpretive 
tools. Half of the cases involved both majority and dissenting opinions 
that relied on legislative history. These data might lead one to 
hypothesize that the low overall rate of judicial dueling results from 
judicial disinclination to duel in cases where legislative history is used 
only to corroborate a statute’s meaning; that is, perhaps most of the 
Roberts Court opinions that employ legislative history do so in a 
corroborative manner—and perhaps the Justices who author 
opposing opinions in those cases do not consider it necessary to 
counteract such secondary interpretive references. I explored this 
possibility, but the data were not consistent with such an 
explanation—most of the opinions in the study that referenced 
legislative history relied on such history, rather than used it in a 
corroborative manner, yet in the vast majority of those cases 
opposing opinions did not make competing legislative history 
references.225 
I also reviewed the dueling legislative history cases to determine 
whether they involved “smoking-gun” pieces of legislative history 
that seemed to address the precise interpretive question at issue—
perhaps explaining why these particular cases triggered a response of 
some kind in the opposing opinion. I found, however, that “smoking-
gun” pieces of legislative history were rare and referenced in only a 
few of the dueling cases.226 
Finally, in order to test the possibility that competing legislative 
history arguments may not have been available in many of the cases 
in which one opinion referenced legislative history, but the opposing 
opinion(s) did not, I examined the briefs in fifty-four of the fifty-six 
cases in the dataset in which only one opinion cited legislative 
 
 225. Of the 528 opinions in the dataset, 137 referenced legislative history. Eighty-four of 
these relied on that legislative history, while fifty-three used legislative history to corroborate an 
interpretation reached primarily through other tools. Only nineteen of the eighty-four reliance 
cases, however, involved judicial dueling over this interpretive tool. See supra Table 1; infra 
Appendix. 
 226. In my view, the following are the only cases in the dataset in which the legislative 
history referenced by the Court could be considered of the “smoking-gun” variety: Gross v. 
FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 174–75 (2009); Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 318 
(2009); Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 578–80. 
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history.227 I found that in forty-eight of these cases (88.9 percent), at 
least one brief supporting the reading opposed by the legislative-
history-citing opinion contained competing legislative history 
references.228 So the textualist claim that some argument from 
legislative history can be manufactured to support almost any reading 
does seem to hold true, although this does not seem to be translating 
into judicial manipulation of the legislative history in the manner that 
textualists predict. 
* * * 
Overall, the above patterns of dueling interpretive tool use show 
that there are numerous ways in which judges may disagree over the 
application of a particular interpretive resource or canon. There are 
not simply canons and countercanons, as Llewellyn pointed out, and 
there is not only a cherry-picking problem as Bill Eskridge has 
pointed out.229 Rather, even when judges use the same interpretive 
tool, they may disagree about the statutory word, phrase, provision, 
or subpart to which that tool should be applied; they might draw 
competing inferences using the same canon or interpretive rule, or 
they might bring different focuses (general versus specific) when 
applying an interpretive tool. All of this amounts to significant 
judicial discretion in the application of particular interpretive tools 
and canons. Indeed, when viewed in light of all the possible ways the 
canons could be used in a dueling manner, it is surprising that the 
Court does not show higher rates of dueling use for most statutory-
interpretation-specific tools. 
IV.  THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
The data reported in Part II have important implications for 
several prominent theories of statutory interpretation. The 
implications are greatest for interpretive theories that emphasize 
predictability or that seek to constrain judicial discretion, but theories 
that rely on other justifications also can benefit from—or be 
undermined by—this study’s findings. This Part explores the 
theoretical upshot of the Roberts Court’s dueling canon practices. It 
argues that the dueling canon data undermine several normative 
 
 227. Briefs were not available online for two of these cases. 
 228. Most of these references were contained in the main or reply brief for the party; some 
were contained in an amicus brief. 
 229. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism and Normative Canons, 113 COLUM. 
L. REV. 531, 534–35 (2013) (book review). 
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claims made by textualists,230 calling into question key justifications 
that theory offers for privileging certain interpretive tools over others. 
At the same time, however, the data do not provide any particular 
support for textualism’s chief competitor theory, purposivism. The 
data do lend some support, at least descriptively, to pragmatic 
theories of statutory interpretation—highlighting the significant role 
that practical reasoning plays in the Court’s decisions and divisions. 
The Part concludes by discussing what the dueling canon data might 
instruct about the viability of methodological stare decisis—the 
suggestion that federal courts should adopt a binding statutory 
interpretation methodology. 
A. Textualism 
Textualism is a formalist method of statutory interpretation that 
seeks answers primarily from the official language of the statute. It 
directs judges to identify the ordinary meaning, at the time of 
enactment, of the statutory term in question.231 It prioritizes clarity 
and predictability232 and is founded on a belief that there is one 
correct, definitive answer to every interpretive question. Textualism 
treats the interpretive process like a puzzle;233 if the correct answer 
cannot be found through a plain reading of the text, then the 
 
 230. See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 27, at 17–22, 132; ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. 
GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS xxviii–xxix, 18–19 (2012) 
(arguing that the textualist approach will produce greater certainty and less variation in the 
law—“The most destructive (and most alluring) feature of purposivism is its manipulability”—
as well as that purposivism is unpredictable and five different judges are likely to have five 
different ideas about a particular statute’s purpose); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of 
Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 65 (1988) (arguing 
that intent obfuscates the law and is less clear than textual meaning); Antonin Scalia, The Rule 
of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179 (1989) (arguing that textualism leads to 
predictability and clarity of statutory meaning). 
 231. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 548 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part); SCALIA, supra note 27, at 17; John F. Manning, The Absurdity 
Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2397–98 (2003); W. David Slawson, Legislative History and 
the Need to Bring Statutory Interpretation Under the Rule of Law, 44 STAN. L. REV. 383, 416 
(1992); David A. Strauss, Why Plain Meaning?, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1565, 1565 (1997). 
 232. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 230, at xxix, xxii–xxvi. 
 233. See Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 351, 354, 372 (1994) (describing textualists’ puzzle-solving approach); Richard J. Pierce, 
Jr., The Supreme Court’s New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in 
the Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 779 (1995) (observing that a textualist judge’s 
interpretive process is analogous to solving a puzzle); see also Bradford C. Mank, Is a Textualist 
Approach to Statutory Interpretation Pro-Environmentalist?: Why Pragmatic Agency 
Decisionmaking is Better than Judicial Literalism, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1231, 1257 (1996) 
(noting textualists’ conviction and certainty about their method). 
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dictionary, the statute’s structure, and the Court’s prior 
interpretations of the same word or phrase in other statutes should be 
consulted to decipher the statute’s meaning. Textualists trust such 
bounded interpretive aids to lead courts to the proper statutory 
construction—and to restrict the opportunity for “strong-willed 
judges to substitute their own personal political views for those of the 
legislature.”234 
Related to its emphasis on predictability and judicial constraint, 
textualism fervently rejects judicial inquiry into legislative history, 
intent, and statutory purpose.235 Textualists have articulated numerous 
objections to these interpretive sources, particularly legislative 
history. Formally, they point out that only the statutory text is law 
and that statements in the legislative record about statutory purpose 
or the meaning of particular words have not been enacted following 
the bicameralism and presentment requirements articulated in Article 
I, Section 7.236 Textualists also challenge the concept of collective 
intent, noting that legislative history usually is created by 
congressional staffers or, at best, a few legislators—so it does not 
represent the views of the legislature as a whole.237 Most relevantly for 
a study of dueling canons, textualists argue that judges use legislative 
history and statutory purpose selectively, picking and choosing 
statements or statutory objectives that support constructions that 
align with their personal policy preferences.238 As Justice Scalia has 
commented, “In any major piece of legislation, the legislative history 
is extensive, and there is something for everybody.”239 In this vein, 
textualists are fond of invoking Judge Harold Leventhal’s famous 
quip that using legislative history is like going to a cocktail party, and 
“look[ing] over the heads of the crowd to pick out your friends.”240 
The dueling canon data pose some serious problems for the 
textualist account. First, the data undermine textualism’s central 
 
 234. Robert S. Summers, Judge Richard Posner’s Jurisprudence, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1302, 
1320 (1991) (book review).  
 235. See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 27, at 16−18, 23, 25 (“[O]f course it’s formalistic! The rule 
of law is about form.”(emphases omitted)).  
 236. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7; SCALIA, supra note 27, at 35. 
 237. See, e.g., Hirschey v. FERC, 777 F.2d 1, 7−8 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J., concurring); 
SCALIA, supra note 27, at 16−23. 
 238. See Pierce, supra note 233, at 751; see also Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the 
Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 205–06 (1983). 
 239. See SCALIA, supra note 27, at 36. 
 240. See, e.g., id.; Frank H. Easterbrook, Judicial Discretion in Statutory Interpretation, 57 
OKLA. L. REV. 1, 18 (2004). 
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claim that text-based analysis constrains judicial decision-making and 
leads jurists to one correct result.241 Most notably, the high rate of 
majority–dissent dueling over the plain meaning of statutory text—
over 40 percent—indicates that the Justices are not finding textual 
analysis particularly clarifying or determinative of one correct answer. 
Further, the data in Table 6f, reporting the ideological direction of 
the Justices’ votes in the text/plain meaning dueling cases, suggest 
that the plain meaning rule is not constraining the Justices 
ideologically either.242 Second, the data also undermine textualism’s 
claim that interpretive tools such as legislative history, purpose, and 
intent are inherently more indeterminate or manipulable than 
textualism’s favored tools.243 There is no evidence, for example, that 
statutory purpose, legislative history, or intent is particularly 
susceptible to dueling use. Table 1 reports low overall levels of 
dueling for each of these interpretive tools—at or near 25 percent.244 
More importantly, these purposivist tools exhibited rates of dueling 
that were roughly equal to some of textualism’s most favored tools—
e.g., language canons/whole act rule and dictionary references—and 
exhibited lower rates of dueling than other textualism-favored tools, 
such as the plain meaning rule and other statutes.245 
Textualists might counter that the low rates of dueling over 
purpose, legislative history, and intent reflect the fact that some 
Justices—particularly those who follow a textualist methodology—
refuse to reference these interpretive tools as a matter of principle. 
Thus, even where competing applications of these three interpretive 
tools exist, they may not be invoked in a dueling manner in cases 
authored by these Justices. If this is true, the argument might 
continue, then the dueling rates for these tools could be dampened—
and therefore should be taken not as evidence that the purposivist 
tools are not manipulable or indeterminate, but merely as evidence 
 
 241. Textualists may argue that the “dueling text” cases in the dataset contain one opinion 
that correctly construes the statute paired with an opposing opinion that incorrectly construes 
the statute—that is, the “dueling text” cases reveal corrupt applications of the textualist 
approach, rather than two correct, competing textualist constructions. Even if we accept this 
argument at face value, however, it means that the textualist-preferred interpretive tools are 
highly susceptible to judicial manipulation and can be made to appear to support the 
construction favored by the judge in a large percentage of the cases, precisely the charge 
textualists have leveled at the purposivist interpretive tools. 
 242. See supra Table 6f. 
 243. See supra Table 6f. 
 244. See supra Table 1. 
 245. See supra Table 1. 
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that these tools are not popular, or widely accepted interpretive 
resources. 
There is some surface appeal to this critique, as the overall 
reference rates for individual Justices show that Justices Scalia, 
Thomas, and Roberts rarely invoked purpose, legislative history, or 
intent in the statutory opinions they authored.246 For a number of 
reasons, however, I do not believe that this factor can sufficiently 
explain the low rate of judicial dueling over the purposivist tools or 
reconcile the lack of more significant dueling with the traditional 
textualist critique of these interpretive tools. First, Justice Roberts 
has not expressed a philosophical opposition to citing legislative 
history, statutory purpose, or intent—in fact, he has expressly 
endorsed legislative history use when the statutory text is 
ambiguous;247 so his low rates of legislative history citation could have 
many causes, including a failure to locate on-point legislative history, 
purpose, or intent in the cases he authored. 
Second, although Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Roberts rarely 
invoked the purposivist interpretive tools in the opinions they 
authored, all of these Justices proved quite willing to join opinions 
that dueled with opposing opinions over statutory purpose or 
legislative history.248 This is consistent with Brudney and Ditslear’s 
pointed finding that there was no “Scalia Effect” for opinions 
authored by other conservative Justices.249 Thus, it is difficult to tell 
whether Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Roberts’s low rates of 
legislative history and purpose reliance are caused by philosophical 
objections—or by a lack of available legislative history, purpose, or 
intent arguments in the cases in which they authored opinions, or by 
some other factor. 
Third, there is a difference between statements about statutory 
meaning made by legislators in the legislative record, on the one 
hand, and the objective statutory history that shows how a statute 
 
 246. See infra Table 9. 
 247. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice 
of the United States Supreme Court: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 
318−20 (2005). 
 248. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 342 (2011); CSX Transp., Inc., v. 
Ala. Dep’t of Revenue, 562 U.S. 277, 301 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Bruesewitz v. Wyeth 
LLC, 562 U.S. 223, 225, 240–42 (2011); Bloate v. United States, 562 U.S. 223, 234–35 (2010); 
Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 174–75 (2009); FCC v. Fox, 556 U.S. 502, 525 n.5 
(2009); Harbison v. Bell, 556 U.S. 180, 198 (2009); Powerex v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 551 
U.S. 224, 231 (2007); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 680 (2006). 
 249. Brudney & Ditslear, Legislative History, supra note 32, at 169−70. 
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evolved over time, through multiple drafts and amendments, on the 
other. Although textualists object to the use of statements in the 
legislative record, even the most ardent among them is willing to 
consult evidence of how a particular statutory phrase or provision 
evolved over time.250 The cases in my dataset were coded both for 
references to statements in the legislative record and for references to 
the evolution of the statute form of legislative history that textualists 
favor. Thus, philosophical objections to legislative history use cannot 
entirely explain textualist Justices’ low rates of reference, or dueling 
over, this interpretive tool. Further, all of the Justices other than 
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Roberts—including conservative Justices 
Alito and Kennedy—were willing to invoke statutory purpose and 
legislative history in a sizeable number of the cases they authored, 
which means that legislative history dueling was possible in all of the 
opposing opinions authored by six of the nine Justices on the Court at 
any given time.251 
Finally, it is possible to take a crude measure of what the 
Justices’ dueling over legislative history, purpose, and intent might 
look like without the skewing effect potentially created by Justices 
Scalia, Thomas, and Roberts—by examining the subset of cases in 
which none of these Justices authored an opinion on either side.252 
When we adjust the dataset in this manner, the results are surprising, 
and provide only mixed support for the “refusal to cite” hypothesis. 
Most surprisingly, the rate of judicial dueling for legislative history 
actually decreases, from 25.3 percent to 16.7 percent, when opinions 
authored by these three Justices are removed!253 This means that the 
 
 250. See, e.g., Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 702–03 (1995) (“[T]he historical 
evolution of a statute—based on decisions by the entire Congress—should not be discounted for 
the reasons that may undermine confidence in the significance of excerpts from congressional 
debates and committee reports.”); Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 385 n.2 
(1992) (Scalia, J.) (comparing the enacted language of the Airline Deregulation Act with an 
earlier version that passed the Senate); Cont’l Can Co. v. Chi. Truck Drivers, Helpers & 
Warehouse Workers Union (Indep.) Pension Fund, 916 F.2d 1154, 1157 (7th Cir. 1990) 
(“[L]egislative history of a bill is valuable only to the extent it shows genesis and 
evolution . . . .”). 
 251. See infra Table 9. 
 252. Such a measure is overinclusive, excluding cases in which dueling may have occurred 
between a majority and dissenting opinion authored by other Justices, but it provides at least a 
crude control set of opinions for examining whether judicial dueling over purpose, legislative 
history, and intent looks substantially different when the authors of both opposing opinions are 
regular users of these interpretive tools. 
 253. There were only twenty-four cases in this reduced dataset in which at least one opinion 
referenced legislative history (compared to seventy-six such cases when cases containing 
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Court was actually more likely to duel over legislative history as an 
interpretive resource in cases where Justices Scalia, Thomas, or 
Roberts authored an opinion than in cases where they did not. 
Indeed, of the nineteen dueling legislative history cases in the full 
dataset, Justice Scalia authored one of the dueling opinions in five 
cases, and Justice Thomas did so in another four.254 In other words, 
although Justices Scalia and Thomas may not prefer to reference 
legislative history of their own accord in the vast majority of opinions 
they author, these Justices seem willing to counter an opposing 
opinion’s legislative history references with competing references of 
their own. 
For purpose and intent, by contrast, when we eliminate opinions 
authored by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Roberts from the dataset, 
the rates of judicial dueling increase, from 24.7 percent to 32.0 
percent, and from 26.5 percent to 35.8 percent, respectively.255 These 
latter rates do provide some crude evidence of a dampening effect on 
dueling in opinions authored by these three Justices. However, even 
with this adjustment, the rates of judicial dueling over purpose and 
intent remain comparable to the rates of dueling over many 
textualist-preferred tools—slightly higher than dictionary references 
(28.6 percent), at roughly the same level as the other statutes tool 
(34.5 percent), and below the rate for text/plain meaning rule (42.7 
percent). 
At bottom, the problem for textualism is that its claims about the 
ubiquity and malleability of legislative history, statutory purpose, and 
congressional intent have been so vigorous. In arguing that “there is 
something for everyone” and invoking Judge Leventhal’s cocktail 
party quip, textualists have implied that competing purposes, 
congressional intent, and legislative history should be available—or 
manufacturable—in most cases. Against that rubric, a dueling rate of 
25 percent seems quite low, even if one accepts some dampening 
effect based on Justices Scalia’s and Thomas’s disinclination to 
reference statutory purpose, intent, or the legislative record form of 
legislative history in the opinions that they author. Relatedly, 
textualists have made such strong claims about the ability of text-
 
opinions authored by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Roberts are included). Of these, only four 
involved dueling over legislative history, compared to nineteen dueling legislative history cases 
in the full dataset.  
 254. See sources cited supra note 248. 
 255. For purpose, the no-Scalia-Thomas-Roberts dueling figure was seven of twenty-four 
cases; for intent, it was five of fourteen cases. 
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based interpretive tools to lead judges to one correct result that the 
rough equivalency between the rates of dueling exhibited for these 
interpretive tools and the purposivist tools is glaring.256 
In short, the dueling canon data suggest that textualism’s 
underlying assumptions about different interpretive tools’ ability to 
constrain judges may be incorrect. If textualism wants to push 
interpreters to privilege text-based interpretive tools over tools such 
as purpose and legislative history, then, it may need a different 
theoretical rationale for this methodological prioritization. Perhaps 
that rationale is the formalist Article I, Section 7 argument that only 
the statutory text is law. Perhaps it is the landscape coherence idea 
that individual statutes should be interpreted in a manner that is 
consistent with the rest of the corpus juris.257 Textualism already relies 
significantly on both of these justifications, so the lesson from the 
dueling canons study may simply be that the judicial restraint 
component of the textualist argument against legislative history and 
related purposivist tools of construction has been called into doubt.258 
At the same time, the dueling canon data suggest that textualism 
may be able to find a way to render its preferred interpretive tool—
the plain meaning rule—more constraining, or predictable. The 
doctrinal analysis in Section II.C showed that much of the dueling 
that occurs over the plain meaning rule involves one opinion that 
follows the “prototypical meaning” of a statute, pitted against an 
opposing opinion that employs a “legalist meaning” of the statute. 
This observation raises the possibility that courts could eliminate at 
least some judicial dueling that occurs over this interpretive tool by 
choosing decisively between prototypical and legalist meaning—that 
is, by declaring that plain meaning means the prototypical meaning, 
not the legalist meaning, or vice-versa—and by dictating the kinds of 
measures that jurists should look for when applying the plain meaning 
rule going forward (for example, the core example the legislature was 
 
 256. Moreover, the dampening argument made regarding purposivist tools is matched on 
the other end by dictionary definitions: Justices Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Stevens—who 
are philosophically disinclined, though not opposed, to relying on dictionary definitions—all 
exhibited very low overall reference rates for dictionary reliance. See infra Table 9. If one 
accepts the argument that legislative history dueling would be higher if all Justices on the Court 
were willing to use this interpretive tool, then one also must accept that dictionary dueling 
would be higher if the liberal Justices were more willing to use this interpretive tool. 
 257. See SCALIA, supra note 27, at 17; Krishnakumar, supra note 17, at 270−71.  
 258. Or further into doubt, as other empirical studies have shown that the plain meaning 
rule does not constrain the Justices ideologically. See CROSS, supra note 50, at 176; Brudney & 
Ditslear, Canons of Construction, supra note 5, at 57−60. 
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seeking to cover or, conversely, the meaning given to a word or 
phrase in other parts of the corpus juris).259 In other words, courts 
could adopt a sort of binding, mini-methodological stare decisis 
dictating how the plain meaning rule should be applied going 
forward. The data from the Roberts Court’s first five-and-a-half terms 
suggest that such a rule could reduce the frequency of plain meaning 
dueling at least a little, and perhaps by as much as one-third. 
B. Purposivism 
Purposivism is an interpretive approach associated with the 
Legal Process movement.260 In contrast to textualism, it advocates that 
jurists interpret the words of a statute by identifying the statute’s 
purpose and selecting the meaning that best effectuates that 
purpose.261 Purposive statutory interpretation typically involves 
inquiries into legislative history, the societal problem that prompted 
the legislature to enact the statute, legislative intent, and other 
sources that might illuminate a statute’s objectives. It can entail 
guesswork and judicial discretion, but is often defended on the 
ground that reliance on legislative history and purpose helps restrict 
judicial discretion and fulfill congressional intent.262 
Purposivism once was the dominant approach to statutory 
interpretation, but over the past few decades it has come under 
significant attack.263 The criticism has come from both the New 
Textualism, which arose largely as a reaction to purposivism, and 
 
 259. Victoria Nourse, who along with Larry Solan, popularized the prototypical-legalist 
meaning distinction, argues that statutory interpreters should seek a statute’s prototypical 
meaning. See Nourse, supra note 18, at 1000−04. For our purposes, it matters not which form of 
plain meaning rule courts choose, so long as they choose one and stick with it. 
 260. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical 
Introduction, in HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC 
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW, at li, lii (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & 
Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (noting the centrality of The Legal Process materials to purpose-
based views of statutory interpretation). 
 261. Id. at xcii. 
 262. See Eskridge, supra note 16, at 1548−49; Stevens, supra note 16, at 1−2.  
 263. See Roger Colinvaux, What Is Law? A Search For Legal Meaning And Good Judging 
Under A Textualist Lens, 72 IND. L.J. 1133, 1139 (1997); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. 
Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 334−35 (1990); 
Albert C. Lin, Erosive Interpretation of Environmental Law in the Supreme Court’s 2003–04 
Term, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 565, 574 (2005); Manning, supra note 231, at 2416−17; see also John F. 
Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 103 (2006) 
(questioning “whether the construct of imputed semantic meaning reflects a more defensible 
conception of legislative supremacy than does the construct of imputed policy coherence”). 
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from public choice theorists, who have criticized purposivism as 
providing a rose-colored glasses view of the legislative process. Both 
sets of critics have emphasized the open-endedness of the search for 
statutory purpose and have argued that purpose-based interpretation 
enables judges to import their personal policy preferences into the 
statute.264 
This study’s dueling canon findings provide mostly good news for 
purposivism. First and foremost, purposivism can celebrate that the 
data show no evidence supporting textualism’s attack on purposivist-
preferred tools of interpretation. Indeed, for purposivists, the 
headline from the study should be that as interpretive tools, purpose, 
legislative history, and intent appear no more susceptible to judicial 
shaping to support competing interpretations than do textualist-
favored tools such as the whole act rule, dictionary definitions, and 
the plain meaning rule. Moreover, during the period studied, the 
purposivist-interpretive tools were used to support competing 
readings of the same statute in only one-fourth of the cases in which 
they were invoked.265 These data came as quite a surprise because 
most statutes have more than one motivating purpose and because 
legislative history (particularly statements made on the House and 
Senate floor) can cut in multiple directions—rendering these two 
purposivist interpretive tools ripe for dueling use in opposing 
opinions. 
On the other hand, the data do not show any evidence 
supporting purposivism’s affirmative claims that statutory purpose 
and legislative history constrain judges or ensure that jurists give 
statutes a meaning that is faithful to Congress’s intent. In fact, the 
doctrinal analysis in the next section illuminates several ways in which 
judges can disagree over how to characterize a statute’s purpose or 
over what the legislative history means. Moreover, Tables 6a and 6b 
demonstrate that when the Justices duel over statutory purpose and 
legislative history, they do so in a manner that is highly ideological. 
(The data for legislative intent are better, suggesting some 
 
 264. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, supra note 78, at 26−29 (commenting that the application of 
statutory purpose is dependent on the perspective of the interpreter); Philip P. Frickey, From 
the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. 
REV. 241, 251 (1992); Adrien Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial 
Competence: The Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1833, 1885 (1998) 
(criticizing the “malleability of purposive interpretation”). 
 265. See supra Table 1. 
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constraining effect for Justices Ginsburg and Breyer).266 Thus, while 
the frequency of judicial dueling over purpose, intent, and legislative 
history might be relatively low, the manner in which the Justices duel 
over these interpretive tools shows that there is substantial room for 
disagreement in application—and that these tools seem incapable of 
constraining judges to vote against their ideological preferences. 
As with the plain meaning rule, however, the inside legislative 
history doctrinal analysis suggests a way that this purposivist tool 
might be made more determinate or predictable in application. 
Specifically, most of the Roberts Court’s dueling over legislative 
history involved a majority opinion that cited one form of legislative 
history (e.g., a conference report) and a dissenting opinion that 
referenced a different form of legislative history (e.g., a rejected 
proposal). Thus, if courts were to adopt a binding hierarchy of 
legislative history, dictating a precise order in which judges should 
rely on specific forms of legislative history, at least some of the 
dueling over this interpretive tool potentially could be diminished. 
For example, the Supreme Court could adopt a rule that, say, 
conference reports trump all other forms of legislative history, 
followed by regular committee reports, statements by sponsors, 
rejected proposals, and so on down the line. If the Court enforced 
such a rule strictly, then the only forms of dueling over legislative 
history that should occur are disagreements about which 
interpretation a particular piece of legislative history favors and/or 
competing inferences drawn from inconsistent statements in the same 
piece of legislative history. This latter form of dueling was rare—
occurring in only six cases in the dataset.267 This suggests that a 
binding hierarchy of legislative history sources could provide clarity 
about which interpretation the legislative history points toward in a 
particular case, enabling litigants and their attorneys to know where 
to concentrate their resources when researching legislative history 
and perhaps making legislative history use more predictable. 
Significantly, an informal hierarchy of legislative history sources 
does already exist.268 Committee reports, for example, are widely 
 
 266. See supra Table 6g. 
 267. See cases cited supra note 219. 
 268. See, e.g., OTTO J. HETZEL, MICHAEL E. LIBONATI & ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, 
LEGISLATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 589 (3d ed. 2001); ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 1, at 972 n.d 
(providing an ordered list of legislative history materials from OTTO HETZEL, MICHAEL 
LIBONATI & ROBERT WILLIAMS, LEGISLATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 589 (3d ed. 2001)). For a 
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considered to be the most authoritative form of legislative history, 
falling second only to conference reports.269 And empirical studies 
have found that the majority of legislative history references made in 
Supreme Court opinions are to committee reports.270 So adopting a 
formal hierarchy of legislative history sources would not require a sea 
change in the Court’s interpretive practices or even great debate 
about the appropriate order of sources. What it would require is a 
judicial precommitment to employ the most authoritative forms of 
legislative history when they are available, and judicial discipline to 
avoid invoking less authoritative forms when the latter contradict the 
most authoritative forms. Of course, one cannot expect such a 
hierarchy to eliminate all judicial dueling over legislative history—the 
battleground could simply shift from competing forms of legislative 
history to arguments over the relevance that a particular piece of the 
legislative record bears for a particular interpretive question.271 But a 
hierarchy could help to reduce the already low overall rate of dueling 
over legislative history by creating greater consistency in at least some 
cases. For example, where a conference committee report and a floor 
statement directly conflict on the same question, a hierarchy of 
sources would tell us which one ranks as more authoritative. 
C. Pragmatism 
Pragmatism is not a jurisprudential approach that claims to 
ensure judicial constraint or to improve the predictability of statutory 
interpretation. Rather, it posits only that judges should construe 
statutes by focusing on the practical consequences that will result 
from an interpretation and seeking the best result. There is no single 
or uniform theory of pragmatism, but its various strands are united—
 
persuasive argument that the most relevant legislative history is that which corresponds to the 
last decisionmaking point by Congress, see Nourse, supra note 149, at 98. 
 269. See In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 977 (9th Cir. 1999); accord Nw. 
Forest Res. Council v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 825, 835 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[A] congressional 
conference report is recognized as the most reliable evidence of congressional intent because it 
‘represents the final statement of the terms agreed to by both houses.’” (quoting Dep’t of 
Health & Welfare v. Block, 784 F.2d 895, 901 (9th Cir. 1986))). 
 270. See Jorge L. Carro & Andrew R. Brann, The U.S. Supreme Court and the Use of 
Legislative Histories: A Statistical Analysis, 22 JURIMETRICS J. 294, 299 (1982); Michael H. 
Koby, The Supreme Court’s Declining Reliance on Legislative History: The Impact of Justice 
Scalia’s Critique, 36 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 369, 390 (1999); Krishnakumar, supra note 17, at 237. 
 271. For example, we often see different sources that address the interpretive question at 
issue with varying degrees of precision, such that an on-point line of questioning from a hearing 
arguably could trump, say, a vague or silent committee report. 
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and distinct from textualism and purposivism—in their open emphasis 
on outcomes and practical consequences and their frank recognition 
that statutory interpretation involves creative policymaking by judges. 
Judge Richard Posner, for example, has argued that the goal of 
statutory interpretation should be to produce the best results for 
society.272 Judge Posner defines pragmatism, at its core, as “a 
disposition to base action on facts and consequences rather than on 
conceptualisms, generalities, pieties, and slogans.”273 Bill Eskridge 
similarly urges that statutory interpreters should take public values 
into account and construe statutes dynamically—to reflect current 
social, political, and legal contexts.274 
Notably, pragmatism shares much in common with legal realism, 
which challenges the rule-bound formalist narrative and insists that 
judges decide cases based significantly on social or practical 
considerations.275 In fact, Llewellyn himself was a pragmatist, albeit 
one who focused on disproving the formalist account as an impossible 
ideal and providing a more accurate description of how judges 
actually decide cases, rather than on articulating a normative theory 
for how judges should decide cases. 
It is perhaps fitting, then, that the dueling canon data provide 
some descriptive support for pragmatism—and the legal realist 
account. As Table 1 shows, the Justices on the Roberts Court dueled 
over practical-consequences considerations slightly more often than 
they dueled over most traditional canons and tools of statutory 
construction—indeed, more often than they dueled over every other 
interpretive tool save the plain meaning rule and other statutes.276 
Moreover, all of the Justices other than Justice Thomas referenced 
practical consequences frequently in the statutory opinions they 
 
 272. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL & LEGAL THEORY 
227 (1999); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 73−74 (1990).  
 273. RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 3 (2003). 
 274. See, e.g., Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 260, at 321; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic 
Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987); see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, 
Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20, 46 (1988) (“[S]tatutes ought to be 
responsive to today’s world. They ought to be made to fit, as best they can, into the current legal 
landscape.”). 
 275. See, e.g., E.W. THOMAS, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS: REALISM, PRAGMATISM, 
PRACTICAL REASONING AND PRINCIPLES 4−6 (2005); MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND 
BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 193−94 (1988); Zipporah Batshaw 
Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the Merchant Rules, 100 HARV. L. REV. 465, 
470–71 (1987).  
 276. See supra Table 1. 
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authored, as Table 9 reports.277 Only the plain meaning rule and 
Supreme Court precedent exhibited higher rates of dueling 
consistently, across all Justices. In this sense, the data vindicate the 
larger point made in Llewellyn’s article, that statutory cases are not 
very different from common-law cases in their susceptibility to 
judicial policymaking, despite the existence of neutral canons of 
construction. 
Table 9: Rates of Reliance on Interpretative Canons and Tools by 
Opinion Author 
 
Scalia 
(n=68) 
Thomas 
(n=67) 
Alito 
(n=51) 
Roberts 
(n=38) 
Supreme Court Precedent 36.8% 53.7% 41.2% 57.9% 
Text or Plain Meaning Rule* 61.8% 64.2% 54.9% 50.0% 
Dictionary Rule 22.1% 26.9% 29.4% 15.8% 
Language Canons + 
Whole Act Rule (Combined) 27.9% 44.1% 37.3% 55.3% 
Other Statutes 25.0% 17.9% 33.3% 28.9% 
Common Law 16.2% 9.0% 13.7% 18.4% 
Substantive Canons 8.8% 11.9% 9.6% 21.1% 
Whole Act Rule 25.0% 37.3% 31.4% 47.4% 
Practical Consequences* 30.9% 17.9% 41.2% 31.6% 
Purpose* 8.8% 14.9% 25.5% 13.2% 
Intent* 2.9% 6.0% 15.7% 7.9% 
Legislative History* 10.3% 9.0% 23.1% 13.2% 
 
  
 
 277. This is true even for those Justices who openly subscribe to other interpretive 
approaches and even for textualists, who object in principle to pragmatic reasoning. 
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Kennedy 
(n=44) 
Souter 
(n=35) 
Ginsburg 
(n=46) 
Breyer 
(n=73) 
Stevens 
(n=60) 
Supreme Court Precedent 61.4% 54.3% 47.8% 49.3% 55.0% 
Text or Plain Meaning Rule* 50.0% 45.7% 30.4% 27.4% 43.3% 
Dictionary Rule 27.2% 17.1% 13.0% 15.1% 16.7% 
Language Canons +  
Whole Act Rule (Combined) 29.5% 31.4% 30.4% 20.5% 25.0% 
Other Statutes 22.7% 22.9% 23.9% 20.5% 16.7% 
Common Law 4.5% 14.3% 6.5% 11.0% 16.7% 
Substantive Canons 13.6% 11.4% 13.0% 8.2% 25.0% 
Whole Act Rule 22.7% 31.4% 28.3% 19.2% 21.7% 
Practical Consequences* 47.7% 31.4% 50.0% 42.5% 30.0% 
Purpose* 47.7% 17.1% 34.8% 41.1% 30.0% 
Intent* 6.8% 22.9% 21.7% 21.9% 41.7% 
Legislative History* 22.7% 28.6% 32.6% 41.1% 38.3% 
* Indicates that one-way ANOVA test, using Bonferroni multiple comparison test, reveals a 
significant difference between rates of reliance by different Justices in the opinions they 
authored at p<.05. (For Text / Plain Meaning p=.0016; Purpose p=.0001; for Intent p<.0001; and 
for Legislative History p=.0001). For Substantive Canons, the differences in rates of reliance 
approached significance at p=.0597. 
 
What is perhaps most interesting about the Court’s practical 
consequences dueling is that it occurs despite wide-spread concerns 
about judicial policymaking. Federal judges tend to resist the idea of 
making any kind of federal common law and their concerns are 
heightened in the statutory context, where legislative supremacy 
looms large.278 Given this, the fact that the Roberts Court Justices 
openly dueled over practical consequences at a rate of 30.9 percent in 
their statutory cases suggests that the Justices believe that explaining 
an interpretation’s practical effects will persuade readers of the 
interpretation’s correctness or, at the least, that countering an 
opposing opinion’s characterization of the consequences that would 
follow from an interpretation is necessary to persuade opinion 
readers. Otherwise, it would have been safer for the Justices to avoid 
 
 278. See Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—
An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 STAN. L. 
REV. 725, 788 (2014). 
KRISHNAKUMAR IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/2/2016  8:54 PM 
996 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:909 
mentioning that pragmatic considerations played any role in the 
Court’s reasoning, for fear of being charged with judicial activism. 
Finally, the doctrinal discovery of the Court’s administrability-
versus-policy-constancy dueling suggests that practical-consequences-
based reasoning may be less ad hoc than the conventional wisdom 
suggests, and perhaps more predictable than pragmatists themselves 
realize. We now know that the Justices tend to focus their practical 
reasoning on concerns such as an interpretation’s likely effect on 
judicial resources, the difficulty of implementing the interpretation, 
the clarity and predictability of the rule the interpretation creates or, 
conversely, on the fairness, arbitrariness, or consistency over time of 
an interpretation. Moreover, we know that these two sets of concerns 
sometimes point to different interpretations in the same case, and 
that different Justices prioritize these two sets of concerns differently. 
This understanding gives litigants a better sense of what to expect 
from judicial construction and scholars a better sense of what 
practical reasoning means in practice. It also opens the door to new 
debates within pragmatism, suggesting that it may no longer be 
enough for pragmatists to urge judges to choose the construction that 
achieves the “best results”—but may now also require pragmatists to 
provide more concrete accounts of what kinds of practical 
consequences judges should concern themselves with, and which 
consequences judges should seek to ensure or avoid when different 
consequences point in conflicting directions. 
D. Methodological Stare Decisis 
Recent scholarly work has illuminated efforts by state courts and 
state legislatures to dictate a binding hierarchy of interpretive tools 
that courts must follow, in a prescribed order—what Abbe Gluck has 
called “methodological stare decisis.”279 A good example is the 
Oregon Supreme Court’s three-step interpretive framework, which 
the state court adopted on its own initiative and followed 
“religiously” for sixteen years.280 Oregon’s framework consisted of a 
three-tier hierarchy of interpretive resources that required courts to 
consult textual canons at step one, legislative history at step two if 
and only if the textual canons proved inconclusive, and substantive 
 
 279. Gluck, supra note 19, at 1754.  
 280. Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 859 P.2d 1143, 1145–47 (Or. 
1993); Jack. L. Landau, The Intended Meaning of “Legislative Intent” and Its Implications for 
Statutory Construction in Oregon, 76 OR. L. REV. 47, 50 (1997). 
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canons at step three, only as a last resort if both textual tools and 
legislative history proved indeterminate.281 Proponents of 
methodological stare decisis have argued that this kind of binding 
interpretive framework renders statutory interpretation more 
predictable, promotes consensus, conserves litigant and judicial 
resources, and make courts seem less results-oriented.282 Critics have 
argued that federal courts cannot agree on an interpretive framework, 
that diversity in interpretive methods improves the quality of 
deliberation about statutory meaning, and that different interpretive 
techniques may be appropriate for different courts.283 This Article 
need not take sides in the debate over the normative value of 
methodological stare decisis. Rather, it is possible to bracket the 
question of the desirability of methodological consistency and focus 
instead on what the dueling canon data might teach us about the 
workability of methodological stare decisis in federal courts. 
On the one hand, the dueling canon data provide some reason 
for optimism regarding the feasibility of methodological stare decisis. 
One significant concern about methodological stare decisis is that it 
simply will not work in federal courts, particularly at the Supreme 
Court level, where most interpretive questions are close and 
individual canons hypothetically are more likely to point in multiple 
directions. The Roberts Court’s low overall rates of judicial dueling 
for most interpretive tools, however, contradict that gloomy 
prediction, showing that even in cases involving close statutory 
questions, the Justices did not tend to find multiple applications for 
most interpretive tools most of the time.284 In so doing, the data 
demonstrate that it is quite possible that if the Justices were able to 
agree on a binding hierarchy of interpretive tools to use in a 
 
 281. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 859 P.2d at 1146. 
 282. See Sydney Foster, Should Courts Give Stare Decisis Effect to Statutory Interpretation 
Methodology?, 96 GEO. L.J. 1863, 1885 (2008); Gluck, supra note 19, at 1767; Nicholas Quinn 
Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2085, 2142 (2002). 
 283. See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchy and Heterogeneity: How to Read a Statute in a 
Lower Court, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 433, 443–44 (2012); Ethan J. Leib & Michael Serota, The 
Costs of Consensus in Statutory Construction, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 47 (2010). 
 284. See supra Table 1. Recall that most interpretive tools coded for showed dueling rates in 
the range of 21.8–28.6 percent (whole act rule, dictionary definitions, common law, purpose, 
intent, legislative history) or lower, at 10.9–13.3 percent (substantive canons and grammar 
canons). Two other interpretive tools, practical consequences and other statutes showed rates of 
dueling in slightly more than three out of ten cases that invoked these tools (30.9 percent and 
34.5 percent, respectively). Only one interpretive tool—text/plain meaning—gave rise to judicial 
dueling at even close to half of the cases that invoked the tool (42.7 percent). 
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prescribed order, they could apply those tools in a nondueling 
manner much of the time. 
On the other hand, two aspects of the dueling canon data caution 
against too much optimism about the prospects for methodological 
stare decisis. First, despite the low rates of judicial dueling reported 
for most interpretive tools, the Justices’ rates of dueling over the plain 
meaning rule were rather high. This is significant because, as 
Oregon’s framework illustrates, the plain meaning rule tends to place 
high in the hierarchy of interpretive tools that courts prescribe when 
they adopt some form of methodological stare decisis.285 Thus, the 
dueling canon data suggest that the first interpretive tool in a 
preordained interpretive regime might prove inconclusive and have to 
be bypassed in many cases. Second, this Article’s doctrinal analysis 
demonstrates that there are countless ways for interpreters to divide 
over the application of a particular interpretive tool, and countless 
ways for judges to invoke the same interpretive tool to reach different 
results.286 Majority and dissenting opinions might focus on different 
statutory words, invoke different subparts of the whole act rule, argue 
about which subsection of a statute is relevant, disagree over whether 
to follow a statute’s general versus its specific purpose, and so on. 
These multiple avenues for conflicting application of the same 
interpretive tool raise the possibility that even if the Justices could 
agree on a binding hierarchy of interpretive tools—e.g., committing to 
employ textual tools of interpretation before considering others—the 
result might be much higher rates of dueling over textualist tools of 
interpretation such as the whole act rule, dictionary definitions, and 
other statutes, rather than more judicial consensus. The same danger 
of heightened dueling exists for legislative history and other tools that 
are included lower in the interpretive hierarchy, as these tools 
become relevant when the textualist tools do not produce a clear 
answer. That is, in the tough cases with significant stakes, the judicial 
battleground might simply shift from disagreement over which tools 
to privilege to whatever terrain the new methodological regime 
requires—e.g., what the “prototypical meaning” of a particular word 
is. 
Conversely, we might see Justices in opposing opinions claiming 
less often that statutory text or the whole act rule dictates an 
opposing construction, and more likely to characterize these 
 
 285. See Gluck, supra note 19 at 1754.  
 286. For a doctrinal analysis and discussion, see supra Part III. 
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interpretive tools as creating ambiguity—so that they legitimately can 
bring in helpful legislative history or other interpretive tools 
authorized at later steps. If either of these results ensues, 
methodological stare decisis might not, in practice, work to ensure the 
consensus, predictability, conservation of resources and the like in the 
federal context that it seems to have achieved in state courts. 
Nevertheless, this study’s findings might provide at least a 
modest boost for methodological stare decisis. As noted earlier, many 
of the doctrinal patterns identified within the Justices’ dueling over 
individual interpretive tools—e.g., prototypical versus legalist 
meaning, administrability versus policy-constancy-based practical 
reasoning, different forms of legislative history—suggest small-scale 
opportunities for courts to adopt binding methodological rules 
governing the application of particular interpretive tools, in the name 
of greater predictability and clarity. That is, courts need not adopt an 
Oregon-like rigid hierarchy of interpretive tools but could, instead, 
bind themselves to consult only certain forms of legislative history 
(and to reject others or use them only if more authoritative forms are 
not available) or to seek the prototypical rather than the legalist plain 
meaning, or to privilege administrability-type practical concerns over 
policy-constancy concerns. Even if such small-scale binding rules 
could not ensure greater predictability or judicial restraint in high-
stakes cases, they might do so for more run-of-the-mill, low-stakes 
cases. 
CONCLUSION 
More than sixty years ago, Karl Llewellyn inflicted serious injury 
upon the canons of construction, providing what many have regarded 
as anecdotal “proof” that the canons are indeterminate, easily 
manipulated facades used to give judicial decisionmaking a false aura 
of objectivity. Textualists long have argued that Llewellyn’s critique 
was grossly exaggerated and that, in fact, it is the purposivist tools of 
construction that are indeterminate and easily manipulated by judges. 
Purposivists have countered that their preferred interpretive tools 
ensure fidelity to legislative intent, taking for granted that such tools 
point toward only one statutory construction. No one has bothered to 
test these relative claims empirically. This Article begins the effort to 
do so, seeking to measure the extent to which jurists serving on the 
nation’s high Court employ individual interpretive tools to reach 
competing outcomes in the same case. The measure is imperfect, but 
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it reveals a lot about how the Justices publicly defend their statutory 
constructions. Ultimately, the data suggest that some of the central 
claims made by textualism may be unfounded, and that pragmatism 
may benefit from more granular attention to the specific forms of 
practical reasoning the Court seems to employ, and to divide over. 
Throughout, this Article’s aim has been to illuminate how the Court’s 
actual practices align—or not—with the myths suggested both by 
Llewellyn’s infamous list of canons and countercanons and by the 
most prominent theories of statutory interpretation. 
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APPENDIX: DUELING CANONS BY CASE 
Legend: 1 = Text; 2 = Dictionary; 3 = Language/Grammar/Whole Act Rule; 
4 = Other Statutes; 5 = Purpose; 6 = Legislative History; 7 = Substantive 
Canons; 8 = Common Law; 9 = Intent; 10 = Supreme Court Precedent; 
11 = Practical Consequences. 
 
             Canons 
Case 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Rapanos v. United States 
(4–1–4)  Y   Y     Y Y 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 
(5–4) Y Y   Y Y Y Y  Y  
AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen 
(7–2) Y     Y    Y Y 
Ledbetter v.  
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. 
(5–4)     Y    Y Y  
FCC v.  
Fox Television Stations, Inc. 
(5–4) Y     Y    Y  
Boumediene v. Bush 
(5–4) Y   Y        
Massachusetts v. EPA 
(5–4) Y           
Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good 
(5–4) Y    Y     Y  
Bartlett v. Strickland 
(5–4) Y         Y Y 
Harbison v. Bell 
(5–2–2) Y  Y   Y     Y 
Zuni Public Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Educ. 
(5–4)    Y     Y   
Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A. 
(6–3) Y  Y   Y     Y 
Riley v. Kennedy 
(7–2)          Y Y 
Ricci v. DeStefano 
(5–4)   Y  Y     Y Y 
Kasten v. Saint-Gobain 
Performance Plastics Corp. 
(6–2)  Y  Y        
Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of 
Educ. v. Murphy 
(5–1–3)    Y        
Bloate v. United States 
(7–2) Y     Y    Y Y 
Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC 
(6–1–2) Y Y Y   Y      
Wyeth v. Levine 
(5–2–3)     Y     Y  
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Legend: 1 = Text; 2 = Dictionary; 3 = Language/Grammar/Whole Act Rule; 
4 = Other Statutes; 5 = Purpose; 6 = Legislative History; 7 = Substantive 
Canons; 8 = Common Law; 9 = Intent; 10 = Supreme Court Precedent; 
11 = Practical Consequences. 
 
             Canons 
Case 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing 
(5–4)       Y     
Marrama v. 
Citizens Bank of Mass. 
(5–4) Y           
Morgan Stanley Capital Grp., 
Inc. v. Publ. Util. Dist. No. 1 
(5–2) Y        Y Y  
Woodford v. Ngo 
(5–1–3)         Y   
United States v. Santos 
(4–1–4)  Y  Y     Y  Y 
Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc. 
(5–4) Y     Y    Y Y 
Brown v. Plata 
(5–4) Y     Y     Y 
Gomez-Perez v. Potter 
(6–3)    Y     Y Y  
Lopez v. Gonzales 
(8–1) Y  Y Y        
United States v. Rodriquez 
(6–3)         Y  Y 
Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend 
(5–4)    Y      Y  
Coeur Alaska, Inc. v.  
Se. Alaska Conservation Council 
(6–3) Y  Y         
Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc. 
(8–1)    Y     Y Y Y 
Nken v. Holder 
(7–2) Y Y Y       Y  
Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd. v. 
Regal-Beloit Corp. 
(6–3) Y    Y      Y 
Sykes v. United States 
(5–1–3)   Y       Y  
Carcieri v. Salazar 
(6–3) Y  Y   Y      
Graham Cty. Soil & Water 
Conservation Dist. v.  
United States ex rel. Wilson 
(7–2)  Y Y   Y      
Milner v. Dep’t of Navy 
(8–1)      Y      
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Legend: 1 = Text; 2 = Dictionary; 3 = Language/Grammar/Whole Act Rule; 
4 = Other Statutes; 5 = Purpose; 6 = Legislative History; 7 = Substantive 
Canons; 8 = Common Law; 9 = Intent; 10 = Supreme Court Precedent; 
11 = Practical Consequences. 
 
             Canons 
Case 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. 
Defs. of Wildlife 
(5–4)  Y          
Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council 
(5–2–2)     Y       
Powerex Corp. v. 
Reliant Energy Servs., Inc. 
(7–2)      Y      
Tellabs, Inc. v.  
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. 
(6–2–1)     Y    Y   
Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons 
(5–4) Y Y Y       Y  
Begay v. United States 
(5–1–3) Y Y Y         
Howard Delivery Serv., Inc. v. 
Zurich Am. Ins. 
(6–3)    Y Y  Y     
Hall Street Assocs. v.  
Mattel, Inc. 
(6–3)     Y      Y 
Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, 
Rini, Kramer & Ulrich, L.P.A. 
(6–2–2) Y Y  Y Y     Y Y 
Conkright v. Frommert 
(5–3)     Y   Y   Y 
CSX Transp., Inc. v. 
Ala. Dep’t of Revenue 
(7–2)     Y Y    Y  
James v. United States 
(5–4)  Y          
Gonzalez v. United States 
(7–1–1)    Y       Y 
Schindler Elevator Corp. v. 
United States ex rel. Kirk 
(5–3)   Y         
Sossamon v. Texas 
(6–3)  Y        Y  
Perdue v. Kenny 
(5–4)     Y     Y  
Chamber of Commerce v. Brown 
(7–2)         Y   
United States v. Ressam 
(6–2–1)    Y  Y   Y   
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Legend: 1 = Text; 2 = Dictionary; 3 = Language/Grammar/Whole Act Rule; 
4 = Other Statutes; 5 = Purpose; 6 = Legislative History; 7 = Substantive 
Canons; 8 = Common Law; 9 = Intent; 10 = Supreme Court Precedent; 
11 = Practical Consequences.
 
             Canons 
Case 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. 
Scientific-Atlanta 
(5–3)      Y    Y  
AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion 
(5–4) Y    Y Y    Y Y 
Entergy Corp. v.  
Riverkeeper, Inc. 
(5–1–3)   Y         
Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. 
United States 
(6–2) Y           
Vaden v. Discover Bank 
(5–4) Y  Y       Y Y 
Negusie v. Holder 
(6–4–1) Y  Y Y        
Cullen v. Pinholster 
(5–4)         Y Y  
Winkelman v. 
Parma City Sch. Dist. 
(7–2) Y          Y 
Chamber of Commerce v. 
Whiting 
(5–3)    Y Y       
Dolan v. United States 
(5–4) Y   Y        
Fowler v. United States 
(6–1–2) Y          Y 
Dillon v. United States 
(7–1)         Y Y  
Hamilton v. Lanning 
(8–1) Y           
Ransom v.  
FIA Card Servs., N.A. 
(8–1) Y           
Osborn v. Haley 
(7–2) Y  Y Y      Y  
Glob. Crossing Telecomm., Inc. 
v. Metrophones Telecomm., Inc. 
(7–2) Y   Y      Y  
Ministry of Def. & Support for 
the Armed Forces of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran v. Elahi (II) 
(6–3) Y    Y       
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Legend: 1 = Text; 2 = Dictionary; 3 = Language/Grammar/Whole Act Rule; 
4 = Other Statutes; 5 = Purpose; 6 = Legislative History; 7 = Substantive 
Canons; 8 = Common Law; 9 = Intent; 10 = Supreme Court Precedent; 
11 = Practical Consequences.
 
             Canons 
Case 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Schwab v. Reilly 
(6–3) Y           
Holder v. 
Humanitarian Law Project 
(6–3) Y           
New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB 
(5–4) Y Y          
Barber v. Thomas 
(6–3) Y    Y       
United States v. 
Tohono O’odham Nation 
(5–2–1) Y         Y  
Dean v. United States 
(7–2)   Y Y    Y  Y  
Johnson v. United States 
(7–2)        Y    
Boyle v. United States 
(7–2) Y Y Y       Y  
United States v. Hayes 
(7–2)    Y       Y 
Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. 
First Derivative Traders 
(5–4) Y         Y  
Lawrence v. Florida 
(5–4)   Y        Y 
Corley v. United States 
(5–4)      Y      
Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n 
(5–4) Y Y      Y  Y  
Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford 
Junior Univ. v. Roche 
Molecular Sys., Inc. 
(7–2)        Y    
Bowles v. Russell 
(5–4)          Y Y 
Anza v.  
Ideal Steel Supply Corp. 
(7–2)          Y Y 
Magwood v. Patterson 
(5–4)          Y Y 
Greenlaw v. United States 
(6–1–2)           Y 
Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A. 
(5–3)           Y 
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Legend: 1 = Text; 2 = Dictionary; 3 = Language/Grammar/Whole Act Rule; 
4 = Other Statutes; 5 = Purpose; 6 = Legislative History; 7 = Substantive 
Canons; 8 = Common Law; 9 = Intent; 10 = Supreme Court Precedent; 
11 = Practical Consequences.
 
             Canons 
Case 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki 
(7–2)           Y 
United States v. Denedo 
(5–4)          Y  
CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride 
(5–4)          Y  
Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. 
SEB S.A. 
(8–1)          Y  
Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. 
Jackson 
(5–4)          Y  
Hemi Grp. v. City of New York 
(5–3)          Y  
14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett 
(5–4)          Y  
CSX Transp., Inc. v. Hensley 
(7–2)          Y  
Metro. Life Ins. v. Glenn 
(6–2–2)          Y  
Preston v. Ferrer 
(8–1)          Y  
John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. 
United States 
(7–2)          Y  
League of United Latin Am. 
Citizens v. Perry 
(5–4)          Y  
Spears v. United States 
(5–3)          Y  
CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries 
(7–2)          Y  
Lance v. Dennis 
(8–1)          Y  
Jefferson v. Upton 
(7–2)          Y  
Holland v. Florida 
(6–1–2)          Y  
Wood v. Allen 
(7–2)          Y  
Roper v. Weaver 
(5–1–3)          Y  
Panetti v. Quarterman 
(5–4)          Y  
 
